Trump claims that the United States and Iran have already entered into direct negotiations, but Tehran has denied the claims. The parties are set to meet in Oman on April 12 to discuss the Iranian nuclear programme.
Last month, Trump sent Ayatollah Ali Khamenei a letter via the United Arab Emirates, expressing his desire to come to a deal on the Iranian nuclear issue that would replace the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that Trump withdrew from in 2018. The letter itself has not been made public, however Trump has stated that it contained a threat of military force should Iran not be willing to negotiate. Naturally, the Supreme Leader of Iran dismissed such bullying rhetoric and reminded that Iran is capable of delivering a heavy reciprocal blow.
On March 30, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said that Iran is not ready to engage in direct talks, however did not rule out such a scenario for the future.
What do the parties want?
In short, the US aims to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. This objective has been maintained by US foreign policy for years. During the aforementioned meeting with Netanyahu, Trump stated: “And I think everybody agrees that doing a deal would be preferable to doing the obvious. And the obvious is not something I want to be involved with, or, frankly, that Israel wants to be involved with, if they can avoid it”. The “obvious” being referred to here by Trump is US and Israeli attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities. “If the talks aren’t successful with Iran…Iran is going to be in great danger, and I hate to say it – because they can’t have a nuclear weapon…Right now we have countries that have nuclear power that shouldn’t have it”.
It is not yet clear which demands exactly the US will present to the Iranian side; they could possibly include a full shut-down of the Iranian nuclear programme (even peaceful nuclear power), stopping the development and production of ballistic missiles, drones and other military technologies, as well as cutting off Iranian allies operating in the region (Hezbollah, Ansar Allah, Hamas).
As for Iran, which is the second most sanctioned country in the world after Russia and on which these sanctions have been in place for 40 years, a softening of these harsh unilateral restrictive measures would certainly alleviate some of the suffering of the Iranian economy. As has already become the norm for the United States at this point, sanctions are being used as a foreign policy tool to exert pressure on Iran. Iran may demand the lifting of sanctions in certain spheres (e.g. SWIFT, medicine) or in general.
In addition, it can be expected that Iran will insist on an official agreement ratified by the US Congress to avoid a unilateral withdrawal as was the case with the 2015 JCPOA. Also, Iran is interested in its frozen assets abroad.
With the devastating blows dealt to Hezbollah and the coup in Syria removing Bashar al-Assad, Iranian influence in the region has weakened, placing it in a less favourable position in terms of negotiations with the US. The fact that Iran has agreed to enter into such high-level negotiations in the first place indicates just how much Tehran wishes to avoid being struck by the United States or Israel. Furthermore, considering the history of Iranian-US bilateral relations (specifically how Barack Obama lifted sanctions only for Trump to re-introduce them), Iranian fears of negotiating with the US are justified. With the whole world following these talks and Trump being quite bold, it would make sense for the Iranian side to drag out negotiations for a bit to avoid any unnecessary sensationalism.
The famed ‘Khamenei nuclear fatwa’
The Iranian nuclear fatwa (decree), according to which Khamenei banned Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, is constantly recalled by Iranian diplomats. Recently, Official Representative of the Iranian Foreign Ministry Esmaeil Baghaee cited this fatwa in response to an Iranian MP proposing to create a nuclear bomb to level the playing field in negotiations with the US. Former president Rouhani, Foreign Minister Araghchi and Vice President for Strategic Affairs Javad Zarif have also referenced this fatwa.
Only here is the issue: this fatwa does not exist. Rather, there is no proof of this fatwa existing, neither in writing or orally (although fatwas are traditionally published in written form). According to an article published by the Atlantic Council, this so-called nuclear fatwa was in reality a part from the Supreme Leader’s message to the NPT International Conference, which Tehran hosted in 2010: “We consider the use of such weapons as haram and believe that it is everyone’s duty to make efforts to secure humanity against this great disaster”. According to Memri, the existence of this fatwa was already articulated during negotiations on Iran’s nuclear dossier with world powers in 2003-2006 and has since then been invoked several times.
The absence of proof of this fatwa has led some to question whether it is a deceptive front, developed to confuse others. Perhaps the fatwa was spoken and not recorded, instead having been spread through government officials. In any case, it is a staple in any high-level Iranian discourse vis-à-vis the Iranian policy on the development of nuclear weapons.
Vanessa Sevidova, post-graduate student at MGIMO University and researcher on the Middle East and Africa
