On March 7, the first meeting of the Japan-UK “2+2 Format” platform, involving the heads of foreign affairs and economic ministries from both countries, took place in Tokyo. This marked a notable event in relations between two key players in the current stage of the “Great Global Game.”
Second, as a rule, participants in the “2+2 Format” are the foreign and defense ministers. In the context of Japan-UK relations, this format emerged in the mid-2010s. However, an “economic” version of such a platform remains a rarity and serves as further evidence of the positive development of relations between certain state pairs — an increasingly relevant characterization of the Japan-UK relationship.
Brief Overview of the Development of Japan-UK Relations Over the Last Decade
First and foremost, it is worth noting that what we are witnessing is more of a restoration of the high level of trust in bilateral relations that existed in the first half of the 20th century — almost up until the beginning of World War II. A landmark event in this process was the state visit to Japan by a UK government delegation led by Prime Minister Theresa May in August 2017.
This visit, incidentally, launched the broader “pivot to the East” in British foreign policy, a shift largely triggered by the rupture with the EU following the 2016 Brexit referendum. Another factor that contributed to this pivot was Donald Trump’s first ascent to power in Washington, accompanied by his overarching slogan: “No more freeloading allies.”
Under these circumstances, London recalled its once-excellent relations with Japan, which had risen from post-war ruins to become the world’s third-largest economy. Of course, such a pivot cannot unfold overnight, and European countries remain the UK’s primary trade and economic partners.
Nonetheless, significant steps have already been taken in this direction. In October 2020, UK and Japanese economic ministers Liz Truss and Toshimitsu Motegi signed a roadmap for the gradual implementation of the UK-Japan Free Trade Agreement, which had been concluded a month earlier. This was followed by the UK’s accession process to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a regional bloc in which 11 Indo-Pacific countries are gradually forming a free trade zone. Japan is the informal leader of the CPTPP, and it is largely thanks to its “patronage” that the UK, as of December 2024, became the first non-regional member of this bloc.
It is worth noting that the very idea of the CPTPP, which took shape in the late 2000s, was originally driven by the United States. However, Donald Trump’s first act as president in January 2017 was to withdraw the U.S. from the agreement, in perfect alignment with the slogan mentioned above.
The sharp deterioration of the global situation since the late 2010s has also spurred the development of the defense component in Japan-UK relations. In addition to regular meetings within the “defense” version of the “2+2 Format,” 2022 saw the signing of the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), facilitating military cooperation between the two nations. Furthermore, in the trilateral “Japan-UK-Italy” format, work is underway on a sixth-generation fighter jet.
A particularly symbolic demonstration of the growing importance of Japan-UK bilateral ties was the week-long visit of the Japanese imperial couple to the UK in June 2024.
Background and Some Outcomes of the First Meeting of the “Economic” Version of the Japan-UK “2+2 Format”
In this context, the establishment of the “economic” version of the bilateral “2+2 Format” represents a further step in Japan-UK relations. It is important to highlight the moment when Prime Ministers Shigeru Ishiba and Keir Starmer agreed to “launch a new framework program to address trade, economic security, and other shared challenges between the two countries.” This occurred in mid-November last year in Brazil (on the sidelines of the G20 Summit), immediately following the preliminary results of the U.S. general elections — an event of considerable significance in the global political landscape.
In particular, the previously cited report by Kyodo News regarding the upcoming ministerial meeting in Tokyo stated that the decision in question was made against the backdrop of “President Donald Trump’s protectionist trade policies, including tariffs.” However, the motivation behind this step taken by Tokyo and London appears significantly broader. Specifically, it relates to the general uncertainty that has recently been frequently discussed in NEO, which has arisen within the group of countries still collectively referred to by the meme “the generalized West.” This factor compels each of these nations to seek certain “backup options” both in their relations with one another and with the world external to the “West.” One such move in this search, alongside the previously mentioned initiatives, was the creation of the “economic” version of the Japan-Britain “2+2 Format.”
At the inaugural meeting on March 7, Japan was represented by Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya and Economy Minister Yoji Muto, while the UK delegation included their counterparts David Lammy and Jonathan Reynolds. The extensive Joint Statement released after the meeting drew attention with its opening sentence in the “Free and Open International Trade” section, which “reaffirms the importance of a rules-based multilateral trading system, with the WTO at its core.” It is hard not to interpret this as a veiled jab at the current administration of their key ally.
The “China Factor” Was Invisibly Present at the Tokyo Negotiating Table
The re-emergence of the “Trump Factor” for the second time has sent shivers down the spines of the U.S.’s closest allies, prompting them to seek “backup options.” One such option involves improving relations with Washington’s main geopolitical rival — Beijing. This is precisely what both London and Tokyo have been engaging in recently.
In Japan’s case, the country’s business sector has been particularly active in attempting to enhance the foundation for further economic cooperation with China. This comes despite the already impressive scale of bilateral economic interaction. However, as China solidifies its position as a leader in global economic development, competition — particularly in the Global South — has become a growing point of friction in Japan-China relations.
This competitive factor manifests itself with increasing intensity in the waters of the East and South China Seas, around Taiwan, and among the Pacific island nations. Accordingly, the military-political component of Japan-UK relations has been gaining further prominence, with Italy also playing a growing role — something reaffirmed by Italian President Sergio Mattarella during his visit to Japan in early March.
Finally, it is worth addressing the frequent speculations regarding the potential implications for Russia-China relations of the apparent easing of tensions between Russia and the U.S., occurring amidst the collapse of the old world order. From the author’s perspective, this should not create any issues for Russia-China relations, which operate under the “back-to-back” paradigm. Within this framework, both countries can remain unconcerned about their shared 4,000-kilometer border — with Mongolia, the total reaches 8,000 km — while maintaining certain degrees of strategic flexibility in their foreign policies
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on issues of the Asia-Pacific region
