Israel’s escalation in Gaza and Lebanon has severely hindered U.S. efforts to expand the Abraham Accords by bringing Saudi Arabia into the fold.
Simultaneously, this overall failure has also negatively affected Washington’s ability to drive a wedge between Iran and Saudi Arabia to undo the Beijing-mediated normalisation between the two erstwhile rivals in the Middle East. Instead, this normalisation seems to have found new grounds in the wake of Israeli expansion of the war into Lebanon against Hezbollah. Riyadh, as reports show, categorically denied Israel the leeway it needed to execute its plans to attack Iran’s oil and nuclear facilities. How Saudi Arabia reached this conclusion is an outcome of, among other things, Iran’s active diplomacy.
Iran-Arab Normalisation
According to a recent report in Reuters, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE explicitly gave Washington an ‘enough is enough’ call when they asked it to stop Israel from attacking Iran’s oil and nuclear facilities. Simultaneously, all three of these states have also closed their space for Israeli jets and missiles to cross to attack Iran. As the report mentions, “the moves by the Gulf states come after a diplomatic push by non-Arab Shi’ite Iran to persuade its Sunni Gulf neighbours to use their influence with Washington amid rising concerns Israel could target Iran’s oil production facilities”.
The fact that Arab states conveyed Iran’s message – and explicitly took Tehran’s side – reveals many things. But, most importantly, it shows their ability to transcend the US-imposed narrow confines of ‘sectarian rivalry’ to follow a radically alternative line of foreign policy – one that prioritises long-term regional goals. In other words, while Arab states may have failed to bring Israel’s war on Gaza to an end, they have certainly succeeded in denying Israel an easy way to impose another war in the region – a war, if it breaks out, will affect Arab states more than the Gaza war.
It has turned out to be a source of confidence for Iran to confront Israel. The Foreign Minister of Iran recently noted Iran’s readiness to respond to any hostile actions by the Zionist regime, stating, “We are not seeking to escalate tensions or war.”
No Anti-Iran Alliance
In terms of regional politics, the Arab states’ refusal to become a party to tensions between Iran and Israel means that Washington – and Israel – will not be able to establish an anti-Iran regional alliance, which was one of the goals of The Abraham Accords. Thanks to the proactive diplomacy of China and Russia, Arab states no longer share with Washington and Israel the anti-Iran enthusiasm that, until recently, defined the very core of Arab geopolitics in the region. This is one of the reasons why the US and Saudi Arabia have not been able to finalize their otherwise ‘history making agreement’.
For one thing, if Saudi Arabia has openly declared its intentions to not engage Iran in a military fight, Washington sees no potential benefit arising out of this pact vis-à-vis the security of Israel and its ability to manipulate regional politics to its advantage and at the expense of its global rivals.
This failure, in many ways, has to do with how Washington behaved in 2019 when Saudi oil facilities came under Houthi attacks. The US failed to ‘protect’ Saudia Arabi – something that created an opening for China to push for an alternative to war.
For the Saudia as well, signing this treaty in the present context has become a lot more complicated than it would have been in a context with no Israeli war on Gaza and no prior Saudi-Iran rapprochement. Riyadh understands that tying its defence deeply with Washington via a treaty means it will have to, for instance, offer its space for the US/Israel to launch strikes on Iran. It would also mean Saudi Arabi exposing itself – once again – to Iran and Iran-backed Houthis. It also means Saudi Arabia going back to the past insofar as its ties with Iran are concerned and insofar as its plans to push for a multipolar order, both in the region and worldwide, are concerned. From the Saudi perspective, this treaty not only offers (an illusion of) protection but also comes with (the very real possibility of) a new phase of military conflict.
Alternatives to Washington
Middle Eastern states have become assertive vis-à-vis Washington’s dictates has also to do with the fact that the US is no longer the only global player in the region. Russia and China are already two major players that these states have deep ties with. Beijing, for instance, reportedly invested US$152 billion in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region between 2013 and 2021.
Russia’s sale of advanced missile and air defence systems to countries like Turkey and Iran showcases its willingness to deepen its defence with the region, presenting itself as an alternative to Washington. The availability of alternatives allows Arab states to better position themselves vis-à-vis Washington.
Will this pattern be permanent and bring a long-term in the region? This is a key question. The Middle East, as it stands, is unlikely to see any major internal shift in terms of one state singularly dominating the region. Still, the region itself is surely moving towards a system that has multi-alignment as its central feature. It means Arab states are not necessarily becoming anti-US; it means they are diversifying in ways that give them a lot more leverage to manoeuvre and protect their interests. It means they are becoming stronger both regionally and globally.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
