The upcoming visit of Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar to Pakistan for the SCO summit in mid-October provides an opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues affecting the relations between these countries.
Given the current state of relations between the two countries, one could hardly expect Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to travel to Islamabad for the SCO summit. But the planned visit of the Indian Foreign Minister is already a significant positive development in the, to put it mildly, challenging nature of the relations between the two South Asian giants. This has been made clear by recent events in both countries—events which, while seemingly of purely domestic importance, in reality have a bearing on extremely sensitive issues central to their bilateral relations.
India’s parliamentary elections in the Jammu and Kashmir Union Territory
In India, a country with an almost uninterrupted series of elections, the local parliamentary elections in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir have attracted particular attention as a result of recent events. These will be the first elections in the region since the landmark events of 2019, when the former state of Jammu and Kashmir lost its special status and was divided into two Union Territories, one of which is Jammu and Kashmir. This downgrading of the region provoked sharply negative reactions both from India’s Muslims (who number about 200 million) and from neighboring Pakistan.
Significantly, among the groups participating in the elections are groups which reflect the sentiments of the local Muslim population, but which have refused to engage in radical (armed) struggle against the central Government. Their interests are represented by the regional National Conference party, in coalition with India’s oldest political party, the Indian National Congress. The Indian National Congress has always upheld the principle that India is a secular state.
This stance is in stark contrast to the position of the Bharatiya Janata Party, now in its third consecutive term, which has been to espouse Hindu nationalism (a kind of Indian version of a “return to roots” policy). This course of action is not well suited to India’s new political realities and has already failed in the April-May general parliamentary elections.
And it is particularly unpopular in Jammu and Kashmir, with its predominantly Muslim population that has understandably reacted negatively to the revocation of the region’s special status. All this could not but affect the results of the elections there, which have been held in three stages, and the results of which will be officially announced on October 8. However, exit polls from various sources indicate that the BJP is lagging behind the INC and National Conference alliance in the vote for seats in the 90-seat parliament of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.
This (likely) setback for the BJP is on top of its disappointing performance in the state of Haryana where elections were held at the same time. Like the results of the elections in the national Parliament, the preliminary results of voting in the above two administrative units suggest, among other things, that the INC is experiencing a revival. Moreover, they also confirm the validity of INC leader Rahul Gandhi’s claim to be a politician of national stature.
It should be noted that one important issue in the Jammu and Kashmir elections was that of resuming trade and economic relations with Pakistan at the local level. This proposal was strongly opposed by India’s national government, specifically the Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Defense, who cited Pakistan’s alleged “involvement in terrorist attacks” in the Indian part of the former principality of Kashmir.
But Islamabad has made similar allegations against India.
Pakistan has its own problems
These are mostly domestic in nature. Nevertheless, there are also external challenges, in the form of fraught relations with India as well as with fellow Muslims in Afghanistan. The problems in relations with India are mainly due to the Kashmir issue. Lately, however, Pakistan has accused New Delhi of supporting separatist movements in Balochistan, which have been responsible for a series of particularly bloody terrorist attacks in recent months. It has also made barely-veiled accusations that Indian intelligence agencies are supporting Pashtuns (both Afghan and Pakistani) in their equally bloody atrocities in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.
But still, perhaps the main challenge to domestic stability remains the various consequences of the imprisonment, more than a year ago, of the Movement for Justice Party (PTI) leader and former Prime Minister Imran Khan. Lately, Khan’s PTI Party has been holding massive protests to demand the release of their leader in Pakistan’s largest cities, effectively bringing them to a standstill. Prohibitions and threats of various kinds of reprisals, and even actual reprisals by the authorities have had no effect. In particular, the preliminary “preventive” detention by the police of more than one and a half thousand PTI activists, including two sisters of Imran Khan, failed to prevent the holding of similar demonstrations on September 5.
In the face of a de facto loss of control over the main cities and in anticipation of the SCO ministerial meeting, the government has been forced, as a last resort, to station army units in the capital.
The current situation in South Asian cannot but affect the interests of Russia as well
For a number of understandable reasons, all that concerns relations between the two main countries in South Asia is of significance to Russia. That said, for more than half a century, Russia has tended to prioritize relations with India. This was due to the specific nature of the final thirty-year phase of the Cold War.
But, as they say, “everything flows, everything changes,” and Russia has long recognized the need to develop mutually beneficial relations with Pakistan as well. The deputy heads of the Russian Foreign Ministry and General Staff, who recently visited Islamabad, were tasked with promoting this agenda.
Two remarks seem appropriate here. First, it is necessary to be well oriented in all the nuances of the processes taking place both inside Pakistan and in its relations with its neighbors. Second, Russia’s development of relations with Pakistan should not be seen as a reaction to the well-known “pro-Western” trends in India’s foreign policy. The relationship with Pakistan is important in its own right, as is maintaining friendly relations with India. Neither should not be developed to the detriment of the other. In exactly the same way, relations with China have their value, and this is in no way dependent on the state of Russia’s relationship with the US and Europe.
As for the very real process of the “turn to the East” in Russia’s foreign policy, it certainly does not need to be accompanied by a “show of teeth” (your Sarmats, Poseidons and other Hypersonics) towards Europe. Meanwhile, the persistently constructed propaganda on both sides of the “demarcation line” in Europe is working 24/7.
It should be noted here that the new world is forming as if by itself, and all of us, including members of powerful closed “cabals,” are really, it seems, nothing more than wood chips carried by the wave of this historical process. One of these “cabals” is credited with adhering to the so-called “Solomon Plan,” named after the ancient and probably legendary king who, it is claimed, had “700 wives and 300 concubines.” And that means that he only had time to turn around, catching bad diseases in the process. It is unlikely that he had time to make any long-term global “plans.”
Modern Russia, setting sail on uncharted and dangerous political seas, can learn from the ancient adage: “Be wise as serpents…” But we will not cite the second part of it, so as not to provoke the anger of the “Sarmat-Poseidon-Hypersonics” party.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
