In recent weeks, the Horn of Africa has continued to treat the expert community to a series of political developments that require careful reflection and offer a wide field for interpretation.
This time, Egypt has gone from words to deeds—shortly after signing a Defense Cooperation Agreement with Somalia, it has sent the first shipment of military assistance to the Somali government, led by Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud. In connection with this Defense Cooperation Agreement, not only the factors influencing Cairo’s decision to sign it and follow up on it, but also Addis Ababa’s potential reaction to such decisive and unambiguous steps are of particular interest.
Last week, as if seeking to summarize the contradictions in the relationship between Ethiopia and Egypt for the general reader, two news items reflecting the current political confrontations between the regional powers in the Horn of Africa appeared in the media simultaneously. The first of these news items dealt with Egypt’s prompt implementation of the Defense Cooperation Agreement signed with Somalia, by sending what, according to some reports, was a very significant contingent of military hardware to that country, while the second dealt with Ethiopia’s announcement that it had launched the operation of the third and fourth turbines of the Renaissance Dam, and that the Dam spillway was now operating, which, in effect, means that this ambitious project will soon be operating at full capacity. While the latter news item can be seen as the logical and long-announced continuation of the multi-year process of constructing and commissioning this major infrastructure facility—a facility to which Egypt, fearing for its food and water security, has consistently voiced its opposition, the beginning of the active implementation of the Somali-Egyptian Defense Cooperation Agreement has come as something of a surprise. As a result, the main issues that need to be considered are the political will and interests of the countries involved, the presence of any objective incentives, and the extent to which these countries are prepared to risk further confrontation.
Egypt’s military presence in Somalia: what do we know?
According to the latest reports, which are, admittedly, difficult to verify, Cairo has sent a shipment of military supplies to Mogadishu and, according to some sources has deployed, or rather plans to deploy, some 5,000 soldiers in Somalia’s federal center, with the intention of deploying a further 5,000 under the auspices of the new African Union peacekeeping mission. It appears that Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud’s government would be happy for its new allies to replace the Ethiopians, who are leaving far from willingly.
Military and political significance of the steps taken by Cairo
While the specific timing and size of the deployment will undoubtedly affect any assessments of the situation, the general picture is very clear: after 7-8 months of putting diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia, including by means of its contacts with Somalia, and making a number of rather intransigent statements, Egypt, having failed to gain any visible concessions from Ethiopia (negotiations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu in the Turkish capital have failed on two occasions) has begun to follow a different, more aggressive course. In accordance with this course, Cairo will increase military cooperation with Somalia, first by making formal arrangements—and thus sending a clear signal to Abiy Ahmed’s government—and then, as we can see today, by beginning to train and equip Somalia’s Armed Forces and, more importantly, by deploying its own forces to the eastern tip of the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, Egypt is keeping its options open: its military presence in Somalia, although it cannot but annoy Addis Ababa, does not cross any “red line” and, if necessary, could be useful in the context of strengthening geopolitical positions which have no connection with Ethiopia. However, it should be understood that Egypt’s readiness to replace the Ethiopian troops tasked with guaranteeing relative security in Mogadishu and the territories under the control of the federal center imposes a number of obligations. Egypt would scarcely be able to simply withdraw from Somalia without incurring enormous reputational losses and leaving behind it a heated conflict. In essence, any Egyptian troops deployed in Somalia would have to provide for their own security and probably also provide at least indirect support to local forces in the fight against extremists. The ability to “hover” just across the border from Ethiopia would necessarily require it to get involved in Somalia’s internal conflicts and confrontations. In addition, deploying troops close to the borders will require overcoming resistance from tribal leaders in the regions of Somalia close to the border with Ethiopia. In other words, the landing of troops in Mogadishu itself would be the simplest part of the challenge facing the Egyptian military commanders and political establishment.
Ethiopia’s reaction
Predictably, shortly after the reports about the beginning of the practical implementation of the Egypt’s Defense Cooperation Agreement with Somalia, the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry issued a press release criticizing Mogadishu’s decision as undermining security in the region as a whole by bringing in external actors. Nevertheless, the tone of the statement remained rather moderate: the end emphasizes Ethiopia’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the controversy with Somalia, and Egypt is not directly mentioned.
Previously, following the signing of the Defense Cooperation Agreement between Cairo and Mogadishu, the Ethiopian military defiantly signaled its readiness to confront external threats along any part of the country’s border. However, Ethiopia has much less room than Egypt to taking new political and military initiatives, and the agreement on the construction of a military base in Somaliland can already be characterized as a moderately aggressive development, which means that at present it is Cairo that retains the opportunity to ramp up the pressure. Addis Ababa will be forced to adopt a “wait-and-see” policy for some time.
Ivan Kopytsev, political scientist and research assistant at the Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
