Turkey is particularly concerned about the ongoing simmering conflicts near its borders, where the Kurdish issue poses a key security threat to Ankara. Turkey refuses to countenance the existence of any form of Kurdish entities in neighboring countries, and this is having a negative effect on relations between Turkey and the USA.
Turkey supports the consolidation of the Islamic world, but also differs on many points from other Muslim-majority countries
The Middle East region and the Islamic world in general are key areas of diplomacy for Turkey. Naturally, this attitude is based on Turkey‘s geographical position as part of the Middle East, and by its religious ties with the Arab nations and with Iran. Moreover, in the first quarter of the 21st century Turkey, under the administration of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is aiming to positioning itself as a kind of leader of the Islamic world, and is also claiming the position of permanent member of the UN Security Council.
Ankara, in defiance of its Western allies (especially the US), publicly and regularly supports the idea of Palestinian independence and Hamas’s struggle against Israel, and is consistently critical of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. Turkey is particularly interested in developing economic and political relations with neighboring Iraq, which became a much weaker country after the US invasion. In forming an alliance with Baghdad, Ankara is not only hoping to block the formation of an independent Kurdish state on the territory of Iraq – a scenario promoted by the US – but is also, pragmatically, trying to develop profitable energy ties with the government of the Kurdish autonomous region, based in Erbil and dominated by the Barzani clan.
In April 2024, during a visit to Baghdad, President Erdoğan signed an important agreement on transportation infrastructure cooperation with Iraq, as part of the Development Road project. This project envisages the creation of a transportation and logistics corridor including both highways and railroads, which would Iraq’s oil-rich regions with Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.
In August this year, the military and foreign intelligence agencies of Turkey and Iraq signed a memorandum of cooperation in the fields of defense, security and counterterrorism. Significantly, Ankara and Baghdad both consider the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and Kurdish organizations affiliated with it in the Middle East as terrorist threats.
However, Turkey’s high level of activity in the Islamic world and as a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation does not mean that it sees eye to eye with Iran and Arab Middle Eastern states (especially Syria, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) on all issues. For example, unlike Iran, Turkey is limiting its support for Palestine to diplomatic rhetoric and humanitarian assistance, and draws the line at providing military assistance. Ankara still has a number of economic and political differences with Riyadh. Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia see Turkey as the leader of the Islamic world.
Nevertheless, the Islamic countries of the Middle East are largely agreed in their opposition to Kurdish statehood, which they believe would increase the threat of separatism in other regions, and to the desire of certain world powers (in particular, the United States) to redraw national boundaries in order to give the Kurds a homeland.
Differences between Turkey and the US in relation to Turkish Kurdistan
The US., which sees itself as a global hegemon, is blatantly interfering in the internal affairs of everyone and everything, else, and trying to establish its own monopoly over strategically important regions, in particular the Middle East, while maximizing the economic benefits and exploiting local resources.
The “Syrian issue” has been the subject of much controversy in Turkish-American relations ever since the beginning of the civil conflict in that country. Turkey and the US regularly discuss the issue of Syria and the Syrian Kurdish problem in high-level meetings between the heads of their intelligence services, defense ministers and foreign ministers. The main US allies in Syria are local Kurds, represented by the Syrian Democratic Council, the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which formed the Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (AANES), and the militant forces under their control.
The US, supporting the idea of Kurdish autonomy in Syria, just as it does in Iraq, is trying to establish control over the north of the country, where 90% of Syrian oil reserves are located and which produced up to 500 thousand barrels of oil per day before the war.
Naturally, for Washington, the idea of a rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus is quite a sensitive issue. For example, Mona Yacoubian, Senior Advisor on Syria, the Middle East and North Africa at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) believes that the U.S. should anticipate a shift in the balance of power in the Syrian conflict. “This,” she says, “means planning for the possibility of Turkey, Russia, and the regime working together to push US forces out of northeast Syria, as well as the possibility of intensified clashes between Israel and Iran within Syria.”
One of the options the United States is offering the Syrian opposition is to unite the areas under the control of the Syrian Kurds and the Syrian National Army. Once the Syrian Kurds have come on board, the US and its allies plan to provide the new united opposition with a wide range of support, including support for international recognition. But that would fly in the face of Turkey’s interests and creates another complication in relations between Ankara and Washington.
Hakki Öcal, an expert writing for Turkey’s Daily Sabah, rightly points out that the Western countries, led by the United States, are trying to undermine the possible restoration of relations between Turkey and Syria relations – a rapprochement which have received the support of the ever-pragmatic Erdoğan. In fact, Washington and the media under its control are making active attempts to vilify and block the normalization of ties between Ankara and Damascus. However, such reconciliation, according to H. Öcal, is in line with Turkey’s national security interests, as the potential breakup of Syria, under U.S. pressure, into three territorial entities (two Arab and one Kurdish) would create serious problems in the region and increase the threat of separatism in Turkey itself.
The US, however, has repeatedly betrayed the Syrian Kurds themselves in favor of Turkey, as it did in 2017. The Kurds in the AANES have not ruled out the possibility of the Americans once again leaving them to their fate and agreeing with the Turks to suspend operations in northern Syria. After all, in 2023 Ankara linked the Kurdish issue to the negotiations on Sweden’s admission to NATO and on a “military deal” involving new F-16 fighter jets.
A rapprochement with Syria would be beneficial for Turkey for three reasons. Firstly, it would relieve Ankara of the cost, more than $40 billion, of support 3.7 million Syrian refugees on its territory. Secondly, it would free it from problems caused by its reliance on the Syrian National Army (SNA), the pro-Turkish opposition to Damascus, which is torn by internal conflicts. And thirdly, and most importantly, it will prevent the creation of a Western-backed Kurdish entity on its borders.
The US is naturally jealous of the partnership between Turkey and Russia in Syria case, given that the roadmap for reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus was drawn up by Sanaa. Of course, achieving such a diplomatic success will require a great deal of hard work.
Among Syria‘s conditions for beginning the normalization of relations with Turkey, the most important one is the withdrawal of all Turkish forces from the north of the country. However, Turkey considers ultimatums unacceptable, and Damascus is unable to ignore the fact that the Turkish military presence in Syria has transformed the status quo. At least in Idlib, Ankara considers its presence legitimate, since its decision to send in Turkish troops and establish observation posts was taken at the 6th round of talks in Astana, in which Russia, Iran and Turkey participated. Syria has also endorsed this decision.
However, the Northern Aleppo region and the zones where Turkey conducted its operations codenamed “Olive Branch”, “Euphrates Shield” and “Source of Peace” should be considered as Turkish-occupied territory, since the Syrian authorities have not authorized any Turkish presence in these areas. Subsequently, Turkish forces were withdrawn from these territories by the Syrians, which handed over control to the Syrian National Army, in effect a pro-Turkish proxy force, Meanwhile, maintaining its presence in the Turkish-occupied areas of Syria is costing Ankara about $2 billion a year, a heavy burden on the Turkish budget at a time when the country is undergoing a severe financial crisis.
The solution to the Kurdish issue in Syria most likely lies in the restoration of Syria’s territorial integrity and the restoration of relations between Syria and the Kurds.
However, the US has not stopped placing diplomatic and economic pressure on Turkey in hopes of upsetting Turkish-Russian relations and derailing the normalization of ties between Ankara and Damascus. It is no coincidence that the US has stepped up threats of sanctions against Turkey over its trade with Russia.
The German newspaper Berliner Zeitung notes in this regard: “Turkey’s active trade with Russia infuriates the US.”
Assistant US Commerce Secretary Matthew Axelrod urged Turkish officials to help the US “stop the illicit flow of US technology to Russia”, and warned Turkey of possible sanctions. Otherwise, he continued, “we will have no choice but to impose consequences on those that evade our export controls.”
Alexander Svarants, Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“
