In the post-colonial history of Africa, Egypt has steadily remained one of the most active players, whose well-established ambitions and resources form the prerequisites for Cairo’s active participation in political processes far beyond the «land of the pyramids». The recent defence and security agreement with Somalia was another step by Egypt, aimed (among other things) at creating favourable negotiating and (if necessary) strategic positions vis-à-vis the increasingly ambitious Ethiopia.
The Horn of Africa is a region located at the eastern tip of Africa and includes – depending on the approach – Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan and Kenya (the last three are less commonly considered), traditionally seen one of the most explosive regions of the African continent. After ten years of relative calm in relations between state actors, which were forced to focus on solving numerous internal problems, since the autumn of 2023, the region has again begun to plunge into the abyss of international conflicts.
The ambitions of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to gain access to the seashore have become a catalyst for accumulated problems; one after the other, the governments of neighbouring countries, as well as external players involved in the region’s affairs, have stated (and mostly openly) their position on Ethiopian ambitions. Predictably, Addis Ababa’s geopolitical aspirations have not been well received by Asmara, who fears the strengthening of its huge neighbour, Djibouti, a key transit route for Ethiopian foreign trade and, of course, Mogadishu. An anti-Ethiopian coalition began to form around Somalia, albeit only politically so far. In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, any foreign policy activity with which serves as a painful reminder to the Somali government of its inability to control the northwest. At the same time, in addition to the states directly involved in intraregional disputes, Egypt and Turkey (in the form of behind-the-scenes negotiations) took an active part in the unfolding war of rhetoric and discourses. Cairo’s interest in the affairs of the Horn of Africa is by no means new, but in light of statements on signing a defensive agreement between Somalia and Egypt, the role of the latter deserves separate consideration.
Egypt: getting closer to the opponent’s borders
The current contradictions between Egypt and Ethiopia have largely developed over the past decade during the construction and preparation for the commissioning of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile. Cairo, supported by Khartoum, strongly opposed the use of the dam, citing possible environmental consequences, particularly the shallowing of the Nile, which is vital for the economy and, in a sense, the cultural and civilizational identity of Egypt. In addition, the Egyptian-Ethiopian rivalry is based on fairly objective reasons, including demographic and economic potential, as well as foreign policy ambitions arising from it. Religious differences only fuel the desire of the two regional powers to position themselves as alternative centres of power.
Thus, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi’s government’s active support of Somalia already in the early days of the crisis surrounding Somaliland is unsurprising. Egypt is not only not going to allow the potential strengthening of Ethiopia, but is also eager to take advantage of the miscalculations of Addis Ababa, which is gaining more and more opponents. In fact, if in 2018 Abiy Ahmed managed to form a triple alliance with Eritrea and Somalia, today both neighbours are siding with Cairo.
According to recent reports, the most significant consequence of the agreement between Egypt and Somalia may be the deployment of an Egyptian military contingent within the framework of the African Union mission on the territory controlled by Mogadishu instead of Ethiopian forces. Based on the statements of officials, the agreement is primarily aimed at combating terrorism, which, however, in no way cancels the ‘anti-Ethiopian’ message contained in such a step.
To a large extent, through the efforts of Addis Ababa itself, Egypt managed to construct an unfriendly barrier around Ethiopia. This may (largely) include 1) Sudan, whose armed forces occupied the disputed Al-Fashaga region a few years earlier; 2) Eritrea, which definitely reduced contacts with Ethiopia to a minimum and expanded diplomatic cooperation with Egypt; 3) Somalia, which became a ‘victim’ of the geopolitical appetites of Addis Ababa. Despite the fact that the possible deployment of the Egyptian military in Somalia, as well as the formal status of their presence, has not yet been decided finally, Ethiopia has clearly expressed its concern, especially since the Egyptian-Somali agreement was signed a few days after the second round of Ethiopian-Somali talks in Ankara. Thus, the Chief of the Ethiopian General Staff, Field Marshal Berhanu Jula, according to some sources, arrived in areas bordering Somalia, which from a symbolic point of view is appropriate to regard as a non-verbal threat to Mogadishu and a demonstration of readiness to send the Ethiopian army to any potentially problematic section of the border.
As a result, by concluding a defensive agreement with Somalia, Egypt is expanding its presence around the borders of Ethiopia, which cannot but make the government of the latter feel uncomfortable. It should be understood that, given the numerous armed conflicts in which Ethiopia and Egypt have been directly or indirectly involved in recent years, it is not worth excluding the possibility of military clashes. Worst-case scenario: the Egyptian military will be able to provide training and coordination of Somali formations for activity along the ‘transparent border’ with Ethiopia.
Ivan Kopytsev – political scientist, junior researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Institute for International Studies, MGIMO, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially for online magazine «New Eastern Outlook»
