July of this year saw a multitude of noteworthy events along the line of Japanese foreign policy.
Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa visited Europe again
She did so ‘again’, as she visited Europe only two and a half months earlier together with her boss, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Their main interlocutor was French President Emmanuel Macron. At the end of June, the Japanese imperial couple visited the UK for a week-long ‘visit of goodwill’.
Y. Kamikawa naturally contacted some of her European colleagues during the G7 ministerial meeting held in mid-June in southern Italy, just as F. Kishida did during the NATO anniversary summit held on July 9-11 in Washington. At the end of the latter event, the Japanese Prime Minister, who participated as one of the main guests, stopped in Germany on his way home, where he held talks with his colleague Olaf Scholz.
Thus, on July 15, Y. Kamikawa went on a week-long tour, visiting Italy, then Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Kosovo. When explaining Japan’s recent active behaviour in Europe, a general trend emerges: two of the three leading Asian powers (China and Japan) are positioning themselves in an increasingly competitive way internationally. It is very likely that this trend is spreading to Europe. Among the latest evidence of China’s increased activity in Europe, we will mention the trip of Chinese leader Xi Jinping to France, Serbia and Hungary in early May.
We shall also draw attention to the fact that the Japanese Foreign Minister visited Italy two weeks before the Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, went on a long-announced visit to China. This was, in itself, a remarkable event, though it deserves to be commented on separately. Let us recall that six months earlier, Italy withdrew from the key Chinese Belt and Road Initiative project – though not without a serious internal political struggle, but still. Moreover, ‘in the format of don Basilio’, i.e. quietly and invisibly, apparently with a feeling of certain discomfort. It seems that the country’s prime minister will explain herself directly to the Chinese leader in this regard.
All these ‘nuances’ in the relations of Italy, as well as other European countries with China, cannot but be of interest to Japan. It is quite possible to assume that while in Italy, Y. Kamikawa was engaged in clarifying these ‘nuances’, in addition to participating in the meeting of G7 trade ministers and EU officials. China’s interest in resuming the work of the ‘1 +14’ group, which includes a number of Eastern European countries, seems an equally likely motive for the subsequent trip to the Balkans.
Y. Kamikawa at the latest ASEAN forums
A week after completing her trip to Europe, Y. Kamikawa already found herself in the capital of Laos, Vientiane, where she participated in a series of forum events from July 25 to 27 organized annually by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It should once again be noted that the Japanese-Chinese factor is also becoming increasingly evident in the escalating struggle for influence on the Southeast Asian region as a whole and on its individual countries, which is being led here by leading world players. This was evidenced by the fact that Y. Kamikawa and her Chinese colleague, Wang Yi, held a number of similar events there.
Of Wang Yi’s numerous meetings and events, his meeting with US Secretary of State A. Blinken differed notably. Y. Kamikawa no less regularly meets with the foreign minister, a key ally, both bilaterally and within the scope of various other formats. This was confirmed immediately after the end of the Laos trip.
Among the events held in Vientiane, the (15th in a row) ‘Mekong-Japan’ meeting attracted special attention. As a result, a new edition of the ‘Strategy’ on bilateral cooperation in various fields was signed, replacing a similar document from 2018. It should be noted that China has its own similar forum, ‘Lancang-Mekong’, which was also created long ago in order to develop relations with the same group of states.
Quad ministerial meeting
A day after completing her trip to Laos and returning home, Y. Kamikawa took part in the latest ministerial meeting of ‘Quad’, a grouping also including the US, India and Australia. As a result, a joint statement, consisting of 24 points, was adopted. The last of them is India as the organizer of the next Quad summit, which is scheduled to take place before the end of this year. However, in September, the leaders of the participating countries intend to meet in New York on the occasion of the start of the next UN General Assembly.
Some expert assessments of this event (both in general and in some of its particular parts) are noteworthy. Thus, the Japanese Yomiuri Shimbun recreated the meme ‘about the inadmissibility of attempts to unilaterally change the current status quo’ – a meme almost all participants are tired of – believing that it is ‘subtly directed towards the PRC. The Taiwanese Taipei Times also expresses a similar position, while clarifying that the situation in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait is of particular concern to the participants of this meeting.
Of course, the message was not ignored by the addressee. In a commentary of the Chinese Global Times (with a remarkable illustration), three points stand out. Firstly, it states that Quad participants are actively exploited the ‘Chinese threat’ thesis in their actions. Secondly, it indicates that the main beneficiary of this is the ‘Washington elite’. Finally, it notes that the unfair games of the latter are quite obvious to most countries of the Indo-Pacific region and are therefore unlikely to be successful.
Bilateral US-Japanese events
The day before the Quad ministerial meeting, a number of bilateral US-Japanese events took place. The main event was the latest ‘2+2’ meeting, at which Japan was represented by Y. Kamikawa and Defence Minister M. Kihara; the US represented by A. Blinken and L. Austin. As a result, a joint statement was also adopted, extensive in its scope and encompassing a number of interesting ideas.
This event may be considered an important (although, perhaps, intermediate) stage in the emerging process of upgrading various aspects of the bilateral union with an emphasis on its ‘military’ component. In the final document, the state visit of Japanese Prime Minister F. Kishida to the US in April this year is highlighted. This trip turned out to be a remarkable event due to circumstances that were previously discussed at New Eastern Outlook.
In the text of the document, the main sources of all sorts of threats to ‘peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific’ are mentioned loudly and clearly: China, Russia and the DPRK; the quality of interaction between the Japanese and US armed forces should be improved to oppose them. At the same time, special attention is also paid to the nuclear component of the US armed forces.
No less important is the expansion of NATO’s responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific, including NATO-Japanese cooperation.
The Chinese reaction to the plethora of US-Japanese events currently being held in Tokyo at the ministerial level was as expected.
Japanese parliamentarian in Moscow
Finally, the announcement of the arrival of Japanese parliamentarian M. Suzuki (deputy of the upper house of parliament) in Moscow at the end of July is interesting. In less than a year, this is his second visit to Russia. Moreover– as described in the commentary on the first trip – the author continues to doubt very much that the current trip is exclusively the product the Japanese guest’s own initiative. This is what is publicly stated in Japan both then and now, though M. Suzuki was subjected to certain reprisals in his homeland already during his first trip (however, this was at the party level).
The current trip was almost certainly coordinated with the ‘relevant’ government institutions. Naturally, this coordination was tacit, so as to tell key allies in the future that ‘we are not engaged in any behind-the-scenes dealing with our common geopolitical opponent behind your back’.
It should be noted here that Russian-Japanese relations over the past two decades have generally been developing rather positively, despite well-known bilateral problems. Let us remember the fact that for almost two years, one of the most popular post-war prime ministers, Shinzo Abe, was engaged in barely concealed sabotage of the anti-Russian sanctions launched by the Obama administration in relation to the conflict in Ukraine.
The deterioration of these relations, which began at the end of the last decade, coincided with the entire system of international relations shifting to a state of crisis. It is evident that the nature of the visit is to probe Russia to clarify the prospects for improving Russian-Japanese relations.
This is, of course, also in the interests of Russia, however Russia needs to take into account the difficulties (to put it mildly) in relations between Japan and the main foreign policy partner of the Russian Federation, i.e. China. By the way, the same problem exists in Russian-Indian foreign policy cooperation.
Nobody has it easy in today’s mad world.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the problems of the Asia-Pacific region, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”