After a two-year respite, Washington seems to be coming ‘back’ to Afghanistan to primarily sabotage China’s inroads. In the second week of February, China received Afghanistan’s ambassador to China, signalling Beijing’s willingness to recognise the Taliban* regime in Afghanistan. In late 2023, China also became the first country to appoint an ambassador to Afghanistan. These developments come against the backdrop of the success of the Taliban* in ensuring that anti-China terror groups, i.e., the Islamic State – Khorasan (IS-K) and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), do not attack Chinese interests in Afghanistan or outside of Afghanistan. China, on the other hand, has designed its ties with the Taliban in a way that respects the latter’s political system.
Beijing, unlike Washington and most other Western states, does not express reservations about or criticise the Taliban’s ultra-orthodox system, denial of educational rights to women, and restrictions on women’s mobility. Beijing sees this as the Taliban’s internal matter. The Taliban* in return have never expressed any concerns vis-à-vis China’s relationship with its Muslim minorities. This has allowed economic ties to flourish too. In 2023, for instance, several Chinese companies signed multiple business deals with the Taliban government. The most prominent among them was a 25-year-long, multimillion-dollar oil extraction contract with an estimated investment value of US$150m in the first year, and up to US$540m over the next three years.
But the ties that have matured due to this bilateral configuration upset Washington – a frustration that it expressed in a recently released policy document called an “Integrated Country Strategy: Afghanistan”. The document blames the Taliban regime – which came into power as a result of a deal with Washington – for people’s sufferings. It goes on to target “predatory powers” like China (and Russia) seeking to put the “US at a disadvantage”. Washington, therefore, is seeking to disturb China’s inroads by highlighting the “brutality” of the regime. Unlike China’s emphasis on recognising the Taliban regime’s political culture, Washington’s narrative sees “sustainable security in Afghanistan not” depending “on killing its enemies but on the meaningful participation of all of Afghanistan’s citizens in Afghan life”.
Washington, therefore, has an interest in undoing the outcome of its own deal with the Taliban*, i.e., the 2020 Doha-Pact that paved the way for the Taliban’s political return to Kabul. Therefore, it intends to empower groups that might continue to build counter-narratives in Afghanistan against the regime. Washington, therefore, aims to “simultaneously pump unprecedented amounts of humanitarian assistance into the country, convince the Taliban* to adopt international economic norms and advocate tirelessly for education”. This is in addition to Washington’s willingness to “work with civil society and human rights defenders on confidence-building measures to support the meaningful participation of a broad range of Afghan citizens in discussions about the future of Afghanistan”.
To this end, Washington might even be relying on help from Afghanistan’s neighbours, including an old Taliban* ally, i.e., Pakistan. Ever since the Taliban’s takeover of power in August 2021, Kabul’s relationships with Islamabad have deteriorated. With more suicide attacks hitting Pakistan in 2023 than anytime since 2014, Pakistan has directly blamed the Taliban regime for failing to eliminate the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and allowing it to use the Afghan territory for cross-border terrorism. Pakistan calls it a violation of the terms the Afghan Taliban* agreed in the Doha pact. The Taliban*, on the other hand, have denied that the pact bounds them to act against the TTP. This led Pakistan to approach the US to develop a joint position against the Taliban*. Pakistan’s top civil and military officials recently met U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State Antony Blinken, to discuss security and terrorism.
The US policy document, accordingly, highlights that one of the key policy objectives Washington will pursue is “to achieve an Afghanistan that is at peace with itself and its neighbours and does not pose a threat to the United States or its partners”. The document further explains, “it is thus in the vital U.S. interest to press Afghan leaders, including the Taliban*, for fulfilment of Afghanistan’s counterterrorism commitments. The U.S. interest is further advanced by a demonstrated and sustained commitment by the “relevant authorities” of Afghanistan to a strong foundation for rule of law and good governance, including fiscal transparency, to prevent violent extremism, radicalization, and threats to Afghans”.
Washington, in short, wants to reinsert itself into Afghanistan in the name of security. But the real purpose is to prevent the so-called “predatory” China from exclusively dominating Afghanistan. However, whether the US can achieve this objective is far from certain. A recent report in the Voice of America itself reflects this near impossibility. According to it, the only thing that binds the Taliban with China (and Russia) is their shared interest in containing – and challenging – the US in the region. If all of these actors are united in anti-Americanism – which may not be wrong – it means that Washington does not have any special leverage in this equation to utilise to reinsert itself into Afghanistan in a more enduring sense.
The most it might be able to do is put international pressure on the Taliban* to act against terrorism, and Islamabad, for now, may join Washington in pressing this narrative. But let’s not forget that Islamabad itself is also very closely tied to China’s geopolitics of regional connectivity – a programme that connects, in a more political sense, Pakistan and Afghanistan. For Islamabad, and given Islamabad’s very close ties with Beijing, China can always be an alternative option to put pressure on the Taliba*n to act against groups like the TTP. This is already much more possible now that China has almost recognised the Taliban regime. It means that Washington, even if it wanted to, will not have any partner in the region that might be willing to exclusively side with it vis-à-vis the Taliban* and against China.
*- is banned in Russia
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research-analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”