The internal politics of the DPRK is a rather closed thing, and quite often we draw conclusions about the processes taking place there and the state of affairs in the administrative system from indirect signs.
For example, watching Kim Jong-un during negotiations with Putin or Shoigu, one can see that he turns to the interpreter on purpose and speaks louder and clearer so that the interpreter can better understand his thoughts and convey them to his interlocutor. At the same time, the standard cultural code, which is very noticeable in the Republic of Korea, says that a high-ranking Korean should be soft-spoken and, on the contrary, speak quietly under his nose so that everyone follows his words with reverence. Kim, on the other hand, behaves differently and in his actions one can clearly see that he understands the difficulties of the interpreter’s work and wants to make this really difficult job easier. From this we can draw certain conclusions that the DPRK leader does not treat his subordinates as villeins.
Moreover, if we analyse the direction in which the DPRK leader is leading the country, we can come to a conclusion that significantly breaks the patterns for those who are used to seeing in the DPRK a system in which everything rests only on the supreme leader.
In the 10 years of Kim Jong-un’s rule, it can be seen that he has led the system of power from the traditionally charismatic system according to Max Weber to a roughly institutionalised one. In contrast to Kim Jong Il’s rule, state bodies have begun to meet regularly. The Central Committee meetings show discussion rather than the usual “hear-and-say” approach. Although the works of South Korean experts still speak of structures that automatically approve the Chief’s endeavours.
Meanwhile, the process is underway and a very important new step was taken on 26 November 2023. On 26 November, the elections of deputies to the people’s assemblies of provinces (cities of central subordination), cities (districts) and counties of the DPRK were successfully held. According to the consolidated data of the Central Election Commission, 99.63 per cent of voters took part in the voting. Kim Jong-un, General Secretary of the WPK and Chairman of State Affairs of the DPRK, took part in the election by voting at polling station No. 26 of constituency No. 55 in South Hamgyong Province for the candidate for the People’s Assembly of South Hamgyong Province, Kim Choon Hyuk, director of the Songun Iron Foundry of the Ryongseong Engineering Association, Lee Chor Hak, head of the Mechanical Shop No. 3 of the Ryongseong Engineering Association, candidate for the People’s Assembly of Hamheung City, Lee Chor Hak, candidate for the People’s Assembly of Haean District of Hamheung City. Hamheung, deputy head of the Haean District Statistical Office. Kim was accompanied by Prime Minister Kim Tok Hun and key party officials, including his younger sister Kim Yo-jong and Hyun Seong-wol, deputy director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, the same “shot mistress.”
On 27 November, the Central Election Commission published a report on the results of the election of deputies. 99.63 per cent of all voters registered in the voter lists participated in the voting. 0.37% of voters who are abroad or working on the high seas did not participate in the election, and 0.000078% of voters abstained.
99.91 per cent of voters voted for candidates for provincial or centrally subordinate people’s congresses and 0.09 per cent voted against, while 99.87 per cent of voters voted for candidates for people’s congresses of cities (districts) and counties and 0.13 per cent voted against. According to the Yonhap News Agency, “this was the first time in decades that a repressive regime reported voting against its candidates in an election.”
In a separate article, the North’s central newspaper Rodong Sinmun.
criticised the US electoral system as being “promoted as a fair election based on freedom and equality”, but is in fact “a sophism aimed at hiding the true nature of a rotten and diseased capitalist society”.
The newspaper also argued that there are many requirements to participate in US elections, such as race, wealth and intelligence level, adding that election results in capitalist societies depend heavily on vote-buying.
The information that the election “allowed” a microscopic number of negative votes is already quite an important step forward compared to the old days, but that’s not the most interesting part.
On 8 November 2023, the Republic of Korea media, citing North Korea’s cabinet newspaper Minju Choson, reported that North Korea has revised its election law, and in some (unspecified) constituencies there are plans to nominate two candidates to select deputies for local elections. This will not be across the board, some precincts will have a single candidate, but it is still a significant step up from the system previously, in which the WPK, as in the USSR, selected a single candidate.
According to another view, North Korea would hold a preliminary election to decide on the final candidate after considering the qualifications of the two candidates, and the winner would be allowed to meet with voters and then be voted for as a single candidate.
South Korean experts noticed this moment, but described it as “another sign of regime weakness,” which is how they describe any news related to North Korea. If something happens there that is not a reason to talk about the regime’s horrors, then in this way the Kim regime is simply trying to divert attention from pressing problems and postpone its imminent end. Within this trend, the election innovations were seen as “a move to deflect criticism that elections in the North are a formality.” According to the “experts”, “Facing international criticism that the repressive regime has long restricted the voting rights of its people, North Korea appears to have overhauled its electoral system in an attempt to ease people’s grievances amid prolonged economic hardship.”
South Korea’s Ministry of Unification also said the revision of North Korea’s election law does not guarantee the people’s suffrage. According to its spokesman, separate ballot boxes of different colours – one for approval and one for disapproval – have been installed at polling stations. This prevents secret voting because it is easy to see whether people are voting in favour or against.
The latter is interesting, since Russian diplomats were observing the election. At the request of the Russian Embassy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK organised a visit to one of the polling stations. It was located on the territory of the Pyongyang Hosiery Factory, where citizens voted for two candidates: for deputies to the Pyongyang People’s Assembly and for deputies to the Pyongchon District People’s Assembly. There was nothing about two ballot boxes in their report. But the practice of two ballot boxes was definitely practised in the pre-democratic Republic of Korea, especially under Lee Seung Man and allegedly for ease of counting.
In addition, the ministry claimed that the voter turnout percentage had dropped slightly, but that was because “North Korea may have adjusted it to give the impression that the last election was free.” The Korea Institute for National Unification, a state-run think tank, also said “that the lower voter turnout may indicate that North Korea’s control over its people may have weakened, as the number of citizens who escape state oversight has probably increased.”
The more engaged experts explained that in fact there was such mass dissatisfaction with the regime in the DPRK that the authorities were forced to say so. An analogy with the period of military dictatorship, when the dispersal of a demonstration was covered in the news as the arrest of several students distributing leaflets, is clearly visible in the reasoning. However, in the author’s opinion, the open information about the votes against shows that the authorities have nothing to fear. And if there is any opposition, it does not play a decisive role. By the way, the same goes for long foreign trips – Kim is not afraid that something wrong will happen in his absence.
More interesting is another: whether the local government vote is a test ahead of the vote for the Supreme People’s Assembly, the country’s legislature, in March 2024. If this practice is repeated, the world will be given a very important sign that Kim Jong-un is continuing to reform the state system and make it more workable.
And I repeat: there is no attempt on the Party’s monopoly power, but there is an attempt to improve the quality of the deputy corps so that the representatives of the authorities feel the presence of an alternative and realise that, roughly speaking, they can be replaced not only by orders from above. To make the electoral mechanism really work and not turn into a ritual. All this strengthens state institutions, not the personal power of the leader, who for 12 years of rule has not organised a personality cult equal to that of his father and grandfather.
Konstantin ASMOLOV, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Leading research fellow of the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.