The disputable situation surrounding the safety of discharging water from the damaged Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, which the author discussed in Part 1, prompted a team of 21 South Korean experts to visit Japan from May 21 to 26 to inspect the plant and the treatment of radioactively contaminated water that Japan plans to begin discharging into the ocean in the near future because the tanks are full.
Many Koreans are concerned about this because they believe the waters are still contaminated and will have a negative impact on the environment and health of the population of the area, especially South Korea. A presidential administration official stated that Seoul feels a real inspection of the nuclear disaster by South Korean experts is required in light of the rapprochement between Seoul and Tokyo on May 9, 2023. He reminded that the inspection of contaminated water quality is carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) specialists. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the treatment facilities and their operational capabilities need to be independently verified. On the same day, South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, visiting Europe at the time, met with IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi and noted the need for South Korean specialists and research organizations to be constantly involved in the process of monitoring the composition of contaminated water.
The idea was also supported in Washington. On May 12, Philip Goldberg, US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, said that South Korea and Japan should exercise “patience and diplomatic skill.”
The delegation consisted of 19 experts from the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, one expert from the Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology and its head, South Korea’s Nuclear Safety and Security Commission Chairperson Yoo Guk-hee. Indeed, it was a serious team, but the preparation for the visit was fraught with a number of difficulties.
On the one hand, the parties defined the goals of the trip differently. The visit, the Foreign Ministry anticipated, would provide “opportunity to conduct a multilayered review and evaluation” of the water’s safety independently of the IAEA’s monitoring team. However, Japanese Industry Minister Yasutoshi Nishimura stated that the inspection is intended to “help deepen understanding” about the safety of the release, not to evaluate or certify its safety.
On May 17, South Korea and Japan held further consultations at the working level, but could not elaborate on the details of the upcoming inspection, despite many hours of talks.
On the other hand, the question arose as to whose representatives would go there. On May 12, Park Ku-yeon, the first deputy chief of the Office for Government Policy Coordination, stated that “the inspection team will be composed of top-notch experts in safety regulations,” and “the purpose of inspection activities is to provide an overall review of the safety of the water discharge into the ocean.”
But on May 19, Park Ku-yeon said that in addition to government experts, a separate group of about 10 civilian experts would be formed by Yoo Guk-hee to review and support the inspection team.
As a result, the government formed an advisory group of 10 civilian experts, some of whom strongly raised questions about the safety of radioactive water and called for a thorough review. But members of the advisory group were not included in the on-site inspection team.
This raised the question of objectivity, as the arguments of the critics were worth considering:
- Members of the expert group serve in government agencies; it may be difficult for them to express an opinion different from the government which supports Japan.
- Japan will not allow experts to take radioactive water samples at the power plant site and will not accept the results of the safety assessment of the Korean inspection team, a clear indication that Japan does not want a full objective inspection.
- Japan does not allow Korean journalists to accompany the inspection team. The lack of transparency and openness may cause concern.
However, the Yoon administration and the ruling People Power Party claimed that there is no need for the public to be alarmed because Japan will permit an additional inspection if a problem is discovered at the facility and the Korean delegation will have the chance to examine and assess the advanced cleaning system developed at the Fukushima plant.
On the third hand, the democratic opposition started its resistance right away. On May 10, opposition leader Lee Jae-myung called on the government to reconsider its plan to send an inspection team “that has no power to conduct a substantial and thorough inspection and verification,” saying that the visit could end up approving the planned discharge of contaminated water from the damaged plant. “It appears the government is trying to be a volunteer helper for Japan’s plan to dump contaminated water from the nuclear power plant into the ocean.”
On May 13, the Democratic Party called on the government to withdraw its plan to send an inspection team to Japan, saying it would only justify Japan’s plan. The Democrats pointed out that the Japanese government has no plans to allow the Seoul delegation to verify the safety of the discharge and will proceed with the plan in July, regardless of the team’s actions. This means that the inspection team is just a formality.
On May 21, the experts arrived in Japan. On May 22 they met with the Tokyo Electric Power Corporation (TEPCO), the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), presenting them with a list of facilities they want to inspect. Before the meeting, Yoo Guk-hee noted that the experts will check with their own eyes the K4 tanks intended for storing and measuring the radioactive substance and will ask the Japanese authorities for the necessary data. Yoo also promised to study the ALPS treatment system, and assess whether the treated water is safe enough to discharge into the sea.
In brief, the purification process is as follows: contaminated water goes through the procedure of preliminary purification from suspended solids and then enters the ALPS unit, which removes radionuclides except tritium. Then its samples are evaluated, and if they meet the established safety parameters, the water is diluted with pure seawater in a separate facility to reduce the concentration of tritium. Later, it is supposed to be discharged into the ocean.
On May 23-24, experts inspected the damaged Fukushima Daiichi NPP. As Yoo Guk-hee noted, the main focus was on the radioactive water storage tanks and treatment system.
On May 23, the ALPS equipment, the central control room, the K4 tank for measuring water concentration before discharge, and the transportation equipment were inspected.
On May 24, the experts inspected the first power unit of the plant, including the radiological analysis laboratory. Additionally, by comparing the concentration of water before and after treatment, the experts evaluated the effectiveness of the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS).
The team visited the nuclide analysis facility and inspected the seawater dilution system and discharge facilities, including the capacity of the dilution pumps and how they functioned. The experts took a close look at the shut-off valves that would be triggered if the water contamination level exceeded the norm.
Additionally, Tokyo gave them reports from IAEA officials it had invited to observe the procedure and data it had collected on water control.
After the inspection, Yoo told reporters that “we examined all the facilities we wanted to see … but we need to engage in additional analysis of their function and role.” Although the team was not able to collect water samples on their own, they analyzed those previously collected by the IAEA.
When asked whether the South Korean government would release its security assessment before the IAEA releases its final report, Yoo declined to comment.
On May 25, the delegation held consultations with Japanese counterparts, and Yoo Guk-hee reported that the commission had completed its task by requesting additional data to be sent from Japan and analyzed. Only then will the final report be made public.
On May 26, the group returned home. The opposition and some civil society organizations criticized the visit, calling it “government-led tourism,” saying that the Yoon Seok-yeol government was simply following Japan’s lead and risking the health of Koreans. South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin rejected such criticism, saying that experts were carefully examining the sites, resolving all concerns with the Japanese authorities, and obtaining scientific data. “It is not right to devalue the work of our team that is working hard (in Japan).”
On May 30, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo asked the group of experts to present the results of their inspection transparently and comprehensively. On May 31, the group held a press conference to announce the main results of the visit.
The specialists spoke in detail about TEPCO’s procedure for cleaning and testing radiation-contaminated water, as well as the sites visited as part of the inspection. They also learned the procedures to stop water discharge in case of emergency and the process of maintaining the machinery used in water treatment. The unique cleaning technique and the equipment for assessing radiation levels received special attention.
In the process of familiarization with the water treatment facilities at the damaged Fukushima Daiichi NPP, the South Korean expert group received data from the Japanese side on the performance of the ALPS for the last four years. This includes data regarding the water’s chemical composition at the ALPS system’s input and exit, which made it possible to assess the system’s effectiveness and gauge the degree of pollution before and after treatment. The experts made sure that all major equipment was installed in accordance with current standards, and that the system for preventing leakage of contaminated water was operating normally. In particular, there are emergency valves to automatically stop water discharge in case of a sudden power and communication failure. In addition, equipment for double-checking the composition of water is in operation. However, there has not been a “yes or no” answer: significant progress has been made during the Fukushima inspection, but further analysis is needed for a more accurate conclusion.
This did not dampen the excitement, and on June 22, Hahn Pil-soo, a South Korean nuclear energy expert who formerly served as director of the IAEA’s radiation, transport and waste safety division, said that IAEA investigation reports have reliable objectivity and credibility. “The credibility of the final report is directly related to the status of the IAEA. Thus lawyers and experts are involved to ensure that not a single word is misspelled,” he said, stressing that the agency works hard to produce professional, objective and reliable results.
On June 26, Park Ku-yeon said that there is no alternative to Japan’s decision to release contaminated water from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant because there is no other way to dispose the water. In the mid-2010s, there were extremely complex discussions in Japan, with various options for water disposal (solidifying water in concrete or storing water in massive tanks), but “the current water discharge method was finalized as the most realistic alternative when scientific precedents and safety were fully taken into account.” Therefore, the IAEA approved the method to be implemented, taking into account its safety and based on scientific data.
Park Koo-yeon noted that the NRA would begin trial operation of the water dilution and pumping units on June 28.
On June 27, after a month of his group’s return, Yoo Guk-hee, reported that South Korea is in the final stages of analysis: “We have been scientifically and technologically reviewing Japan’s plan based on the results of the on-site inspection and additional data obtained afterward.” In addition, Yoo said six types of radionuclides have been detected in the water stored in the tanks at concentrations in excess of acceptable limits, even after treatment with ALPS, but most cases occurred before 2019, so “this is the aspect of radionuclide that we need to closely examine.”
The final report will eventually be published in early July. However, in a politicized environment, its meaning becomes a matter of trust, particularly because the opposition prematurely declared the commission’s findings invalid and launched a loud campaign, which the author will discuss in the section after this one.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
