Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has begun his first trip abroad after his latest inauguration – a visit to the internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). After that trip he will visit Azerbaijan.
It could hardly be said that Ankara has opened a completely new, and hitherto unsuspected page in the agenda of Turkish diplomacy. For example, while speaking in North Nicosia he reaffirmed his commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem, and warned the Greek Cypriot authorities that Turkey was in a position to resolve the issue “by other means.” The only “other” solution that the Turks could possibly have in mind would be a military one, using their military (or occupying) forces based in Northern Cyprus.
The TRNC is recognized by Turkey and by no other country. Ankara, naturally, is hoping for the recognition of Northern Cyprus by the member states of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), especially Azerbaijan, which was only able to achieve its successes in Nagorno-Karabakh in the fall of 2020 with help from the Turkish leader Recep Erdoğan. So far the OTS has lent Turkey its moral support, but is concerned about a potentially negative reaction from the rest of the international community, headed by the USA.
It is also hard to see how Azerbaijan, led by Ilham Aliyev – who graduated from Moscow’s Institute of International Relations – could justify adopting very different approaches in relation to Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh. During his most recent meeting with his Turkish counterpart Baku, on the subject of bilateral relations in the field of security Ilham Aliyev repeated his view that in this world everything is decided by force. But the question is – do Turkey and Azerbaijan together have the military muscle to defy pressure from the West?
As for Kazakhstan, it is unlikely that it will recognize the TRNC – after all, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (himself also a graduate of Moscow’s Institute of International Relations) has already stated on the subject of the Peoples’ Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk that Kazakhstan could not recognize these entities as to do so would be to undermine the principle of territorial integrity.
Nevertheless, in Cyprus, Erdoğan spoke out in favor of maintaining stability and continuing with the interminable political consultations, clearly understanding that the world today is concerned with certain very active conflicts, and the question of Cyprus is very low down on the international action list.
In Baku the Turkish president held lengthy talks with his Azerbaijani counterpart, in which the two parties naturally touched on a range of issues across the entire agenda of bilateral and regional relations. The bilateral talks covered such issues as the trends in and potential of relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan in the fields of trade and energy, the relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the future of the peace treaty, the Karabakh and Zangezur corridor issue, the opening of the Turkish consulate in Shusha, Karabakh, tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran, the future of the Great Turan project and Azerbaijan’s bridging role in this project, regional ties (with Russia, the West and the South Caucasus), the transit of gas from the Caspian Sea via Turkey to the European market, and military and technical cooperation between Ankara and Baku, both this year and in the future.
All the issues listed on the agenda of the talks between Turkey and Azerbaijan concern the interests of both countries and have also attracted the attention of external parties, both in the region and further afield. Erdoğan arrived in Baku with a broadly representative delegation, including the new Foreign and Defense ministers. This was an opportunity not only to introduce the new members of the Turkish government to their Azerbaijani counterparts, but also to explore the new areas in which the two countries will work together over the next five years.
While flying back to Ankara, the Turkish leader gave a remarkable mid-air interview in which he emphasized the need to open the Zangezur corridor in the Syunik region of Armenia in order to create the shortest possible communications link between Turkey (specifically, Ikdir province) and Nakhichevan and mainland Azerbaijan, and then with the other Turkic countries of Central Asia. This communications integration of the Turkic world (the members and observers of the Organization of Turkic States) is a core element of the Great Turan project.
However, he also admitted for the first time that the main obstacle to the creation of the Zangezur corridor is not Armenia (the Zangezur region is part of Armenia’s Syunik region) but the neighboring Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, Recep Erdoğan’s main opponent, who is a pro-Western Kemalist, said very much the same thing during the second round of the presidential election campaign. Specifically, he stated that he considered that Yerevan government’s opposition to the Zangezur corridor was in effect dictated by Iran, and that this opposition was the main obstacle to the restoration of good relations between Turkey and Armenia. The opposition leader therefore called for direct talks between Turkey and Iran on the corridor issue.
Even before the above statements by Turkish politicians on the Zangezur corridor issue, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdolahian, had all stated this position in no uncertain terms. For Iran preserving the sovereignty of the Caucasus states is a red line and it opposes the Zangezur corridor as it foresees that this international route would be controlled by the allied states of Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Why is Iran so opposed to the Zangezur corridor? Experts and political analysts tend to agree that Tehran is particularly concerned about the following risks:
a) that the balance of powers in the region would change, with Turkey’s influence increasing, which, in turn, would boost its pan-Turkic program;
b) Iran’s northern border and its land access route to Russia and the EU could be blocked;
c) NATO would put more pressure on Iran both from the South (Iraqi Kurdistan) and the north (Azerbaijan, as a country controlled by Turkey and Israel);
d) the risk of increased separatism and the collapse of the traditional values that underlie the Iranian state, under pressure from Turkic and Kurdish forces.
In terms of communications routes, Iran also sees Armenia (including Zangezur itself) as a key link with Georgia, and then with the Russian Federation and the EU. It is no secret that Iran is working together with India on communications projects. As far as Europe is concerned, it is clearly significant that President Raisi recently had a 90-minute telephone discussion with his French counterpart, Emmanuel Macron. Despite France’s concerns about future cooperation between Iran and Russia on military hardware matters, particularly in relation to the crisis in Ukraine, it is even more concerned to develop its trade and economic relations with Tehran.
So, the Zangezur corridor has clearly caused a rift between Turkey and Iran. Erdoğan believes that the opening of this corridor will have a positive impact on the economies of all participants in the project, including Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran, as it will reduce transit distances and freight costs, increase the flow of goods and expand market. He also insists that the corridor will form part of a road link between Beijing and London. It is difficult to deny the pragmatism of the Turkish leader – he is a person who can count costs and benefits and find the resources he needs. So this is a political rather than an economic problem.
The US and its allies in Europe have largely avoided raising the issue of the Zangezur corridor in the talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia, on the other hand is in favor of opening up all the transport links in the South Caucasus, in accordance with point 9 of the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia, concluded on November 9, 2020
Russia is in favor of opening the Zangezur corridor (with its road and railroad routes) under the control of its border troops, as this would guarantee the safe transit of goods and help to restore trade, economic and political ties between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moscow’s interest in this communications route, and also in the North-South route (Russia – Azerbaijan – Iran), is motivated by its desire to increase trade links with the countries of the Middle East (especially given the anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the West) and to retain its traditional geopolitical influence in the South Caucasus.
The US, on the other hand, has no particular interest in the opening of the Zangezur corridor, as this would make Turkey more independent of the West, create new transit opportunities for Russia, and provide China with a land route to Europe, thus contributing to its One Belt, One Road project. The EU and Britain take the leading positions in China’s foreign trade. In view of Europe’s strong financial standing, it is natural that China, India, Turkey and Russia, among others, all want to have access to its market. The US is reluctant to strengthen the position of China, which is its main competitor, especially given the two countries’ diametrically opposed views about the status of Taiwan.
In other words, the future Zangezur corridor is a matter of concern not just to the countries in the region, such as Turkey and Iran, but to the main global decision makers, including the US, EU, Russia and China.
Armenia, however, is unwilling to cede its sovereignty over the Zangezur road to anyone else, including foreign customs and border control officials. And it is quite within its rights. Azerbaijan, with the tacit support of the outside world, including the US, OSCE, Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, has repeatedly tried, and failed, to shift Yerevan’s position in its favor and resolve this issue by mounting minor aggressions against Armenia’s border territories. In fact, by exerting military and political pressure on Armenia in relation to the Zangezur issue, Azerbaijan and its satellites have effectively pushed Armenia into developing an active partnership with Tehran. It is no coincidence that in response to the military escalation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, Iran has launched large military exercises with the participation of both Revolutionary Guards and Ministry of Defense forces along the River Aras, which runs along its borders with Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Shortly after Erdoğan’s comments on the Zangezur corridor and his criticism of Iran’s position, Abbas Badakhshan Zohuri, Iran’s ambassador to Armenia, reaching the end of his diplomatic mission in the country, held a farewell meeting with Armenia’s Defense Minister Suren Papikyan, in which they discussed, among other issues, regional security and bilateral cooperation on defense issues. In holding this meeting Tehran was sending a clear message to Azerbaijan and Turkey – that it considers Armenia to be a key party in any issues related to regional security.
Significantly, Abbas Badakhshan Zohuri will be replaced as ambassador to Yerevan by Mehdi Sobhani, who previously headed Iran’s diplomatic mission in Syria. This change of ambassadors is unlikely to be just a question of staff rotation, and probably has a political element. After all, a diplomat with a successful record in conflict zones is being sent as ambassador to Armenia. One of his main goals in Armenia will be to raise the level and standard of cooperation on regional security issues between Armenia and Iran. In view of the fact that Iran is demonstrating significant progress in the development of defense hardware (its latest version of the Fattah missile has a range of up to 1400 km), Turkey and Azerbaijan cannot afford to ignore Tehran’s position in regional affairs and its military partnership with Armenia.
Ibrahim Kalin, the new head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MIT) has expressed Ankara’s dissatisfaction concerning Tehran’s position in relation to the Zangezur corridor. According to Kalin, there had earlier been talk of organizing a visit by Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi to Turkey for discussions on a wide range of issues pertaining to relations between the two countries and with the wider region, including the recent disputes between Azerbaijan and Iran. Trilateral talks between the presidents of Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan were also to have been held in Ankara. However, this visit has been postponed due to the strained relations between Tehran and Baku, including Iran’s accusations the Azerbaijan is receiving support from Israel. Nevertheless, after the Turkish elections Erdoğan did not rule out the possibility of holding a similar meeting with his Iranian counterpart to discuss the Zangezur corridor issue and to try and restore good relations between Tehran and Baku.
But simply holding a meeting for a meeting’s sake is obviously unlikely to suit either Tehran or Baku. Erdoğan understands that Iran needs to offer something concrete both in terms of economic ties and regional politics, and that it needs to provide security guarantees. A number of factors suggest that the Iranians are expecting concrete proposals and respect for their interests from their Turkish and Azerbaijani colleagues. These include the growing interest in Turkey shown by Iran’s information and analytical services, both in the run-up to the elections and afterwards, the Iranian Oil Minister’s announcement that Tehran plans to build a gas hub in the Persian Gulf, the replacement of Iran’s ambassador to Baku and the talks between the Iranian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers.
In order to build up a regional security architecture in the South Caucasus it is essential that Iran and Russia are included in this process, and if this does not happen the series of renewed conflicts in the region will continue and the balance of power will change as a result. As you can see, the Zangezur corridor issue is likely to trigger new changes in the South Caucasus and affect the state of play in the wider region and globally.
Aleksandr SVARANTS, PhD in political science, professor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
