In their assessments of Iran’s foreign policy after the 1979 February Revolution, experts often tend to have a one-sided and biased perception of Tehran’s diplomacy. In particular, a certain stereotype has emerged, according to which Iran, as the main Shiite Islamic state by religion, is the flagship of world Shiism, strives for absolute hegemony in the Islamic (primarily Shiite) world and preaches the ideology of pan-Islamism with a Shiite tinge.
Of course, the religious factor does play a major role in Iran’s politics and diplomacy (otherwise the state would not be called the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the ruling regime would not be determined by the supremacy of the Ayatollah). In fact, the overthrow of the Shah’s regime in February 1979 under the slogans of the Islamic revolution in Iran pursued two key goals:
1) external – to exclude the external (Western – Anglo-Saxon) dominance from the life of Iran, the corrupting influence of Western immoral anti-values and the exploitation by Western companies of Iran’s strategic natural resources of oil and gas;
2) internal – through Islamic consolidation to preserve the territorial integrity and internal political unity of the Iranian state and multi-ethnic society (in particular, to localize the basis of ethnic separatism of a part of the Muslim, but not the Persian population of the country – Azeri, Kurds, Baluchis, Pashtuns, Arabs).
It is only natural that Iran, historically and traditionally occupying a key place in the Middle East, considers the idea of consolidating the Shiite world in this space as a priority strategy. Accordingly, countries such as Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan (where Shiite Muslims live in various proportions) are objects of increased interest for Iran. At the same time, Tehran proceeds in its diplomacy not only from the standpoint of religious preferences, but also tries to take a comprehensive approach to the topic of bilateral relations (in particular, to take into account the totality of historical, geographical, economic, military-political and other features).
Unlike neighboring Turkey and the Arab monarchies (KSA, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait), Iran does not have such significant ethno-religious external relations (as, say, the Turkic peoples and countries for Turkey, the Arab and Sunni world for Saudi Arabia).
Perhaps if the democratic regime of electing a national government had been preserved in Iran based on the experience of the first half of the 1950s (in particular, the government of Mohammad Mosaddegh of 1951-1953), then the political fate of the Iranian state would have gone a different route. However, the United Kingdom and the United States, proceeding from colonial goals and imperial ambitions, did not agree with the nationalization of the oil industry (fields) of Iran and organized a coup (a secret CIA operation Ajax). The overthrow of Mosaddegh led to the fact that General Fazlollah Zahedi, who came to power, returned oil concessions to the United States and Great Britain. Under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the West continued to exploit Iranian resources and introduced laws incompatible with local moral values.
More than 40 years of Iran’s stay under severe economic sanctions by Western countries and their satellites have not broken the will of the Iranian people and political leadership to independence. The Islamic Republic had to adapt to new realities and build a new course of survival and development. Over the past decades, Iran has been able to create and develop a national industry, education, science, and defense complex. In today’s conditions, Tehran continues to oppose the global hegemony of the United States, positively perceives the course towards a multipolar world proclaimed by Russian President Vladimir Putin in February 2007, increases its foreign policy and foreign economic ties with key countries (primarily China, India and Russia) and respects the interests of small (including neighboring) countries.
In this regard, attention is drawn to Iran’s independent course in a situation of aggravation of Russian-Ukrainian relations, where Iranian diplomacy, on the one hand, recognizes the sovereignty of Ukraine, on the other hand, condemns the expansionist policy of NATO led by the United States, the aggressive aspirations of the North Atlantic Bloc in the post–Soviet space and the anti-Russian militarism of the West on the Ukrainian soil.
Iran, regardless of the opinion of Kyiv and its Western allies, is developing independent diplomacy and a pragmatic policy of strategic partnership with Russia (including in the field of military-technical and high-tech cooperation). Tehran appreciates Russia’s role in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Moscow’s policy of preserving regional peace and security in the Transcaucasian and Central Asian regions bordering Iran. A positive Russian-Iranian partnership has also developed in Syria, in the joint confrontation with the forces of international terrorism (for example, ISIS, an international terrorist organization banned in Russia), on the Astana platform of diplomatic cooperation.
The spectrum of Russian-Iranian economic relations will soon be enriched through the growth of tourist demand and the interest of Russians in Iran (in particular, this will be facilitated by the signing of a visa-free exchange agreement between our countries), the prospect of cooperation in the field of mechanical engineering (especially automotive after confirming the certification of Iranian cars).
Iran and Russia remain the largest owners of natural gas (respectively, they control 17% and 24% of the world’s gas reserves). More than 40% of the world’s gas reserves are able to exert a key influence on the pricing process in foreign gas markets.
In an effort to overcome the artificial isolation imposed by Western sanctions, Iran began to show an active interest in mutually beneficial cooperation with the EAEU, to increase trade turnover with the countries of Eurasian integration, joined the key international organization of Asian cooperation SCO.
China and India are important areas of Iran’s multi-vector economic cooperation in the fields of investment, energy, high technology, industry, agriculture, logistics and transport communications. Iran has received large investments of $450 billion from China for the development of infrastructure, energy and tourism, which in the foreseeable future can change the face of Iran in favor of an industrially developed state.
Beijing and New Delhi are also actively developing military and military-technical cooperation with Tehran at the bilateral level (including through the special services). As Chinese President Xi Jinping stated, “China supports Iran in protecting its national sovereignty and countering unilateral actions and intimidation.” Accordingly, Beijing warns the NATO countries and Israel about the inadmissibility of aggressive actions against Iran.
The official visit of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to China, which took place from February 14 to 16 this year, was evidence of a new stage of the Iranian-Chinese strategic partnership. The parties signed 20 agreements on cooperation in the field of information technology, healthcare, agriculture, trade, tourism, sports and other spheres.
Tehran is trying to revive the historical traditions of trade relations between Persia and Asian centers, because in ancient times one of the key routes of the “Silk Road” from China and India passed through Persia. Everything is returning to normal, because Iran is not only a country with traditions of the past, but also a key subject of the modern Middle East and an equally promising pole of the future multipolar world.
Aleksandr SVARANTS, PhD in political science, professor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
