On May 9, the Philippines held presidential and vice presidential elections, which were a significant event in the development of the situation in the Indo-Pacific region. The course and results of these elections attracted close attention of such leading regional (and world) players as the United States and China.
As one of the main participants, the Philippines is a member of ASEAN, that is, an association that unites all 10 countries of the Southeast Asian (SEA) subregion. The struggle for dominant influence both on ASEAN as a whole and on its individual members is becoming more acute. The eponymous archipelago on which the Philippines is located occupies an extremely important strategic position. The most fierce battles took place on the territory of this country during the war in the Pacific (1941-1945).
The Philippine archipelago closes the so-called “First Island Line” from the south, which also includes the Kuril Islands, the chain of islands on which Japan is located, and Taiwan. Today, American military planners see the First Island Line as a natural barrier that can be used (“if necessary”) to block the exit of the rapidly growing Chinese Navy into the Pacific Ocean.
The Philippine archipelago additionally forms the eastern coast of the South China Sea, through which one of the world’s most important trade routes runs. Most of the fossil fuel coming to China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan is delivered via this route. Related to this is the ever-increasing relevance of control over the South China Sea, as well as over the numerous island archipelagos located there.
It is precisely the claims to possess these latter that are at the center of problems in China’s relations with almost all (with the exception of Cambodia) Southeast Asian countries. Among the latter, China’s territorial claims overlap with Vietnam and the Philippines to the greatest extent.
In 2013, then President of the Philippines Benigno Aquino III (an absolutely pro-American politician), submitted a request to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague with a request to consider the eligibility of China’s claims to 80-90% of the SCS water area, enclosed within the so-called “nine-dotted line” (about whose validity there are different opinions).
It should be noted that from the very beginning Beijing ignored the PCA and announced in advance that it would not recognize any of its decisions. Which (positive for the Philippines and negative for the PRC) followed in July 2016, that is, two months after the inauguration of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who won the then general elections.
Initially declaring the need for a sharp change in the country’s foreign policy and the intention to improve relations with the PRC, Rodrigo Duterte, after the said decision by the PCA, found himself in a rather delicate situation. It is possible that it was precisely with the aim of creating a similar situation for the “anti-Western” politician who came to power in the Philippines that the date of the PCA’s decision was chosen. By which, again, Beijing was practically denied the aforementioned claims in general and, in particular, the possession of the Spratly Islands, as well as the Scarborough Shoal. The latter almost adjoins the coast of the Philippines.
In the first few months after assuming the presidency, Rodrigo Duterte, while continuing to quickly improve relations with the PRC and declare his intention to break the military-political alliance the country’s had with the USA since 1951, did not publicly touch upon the PCA’s decision at all. This decision, however, was welcomed by the head of the Foreign Ministry formed by the new president.
But Rodrigo Duterte failed to remain silent on the territorial problem for a long time and (almost in connection with it) to engage in “public anti-Americanism.” At the end of 2016, he first spoke positively about the said decision by the PCA and, second, confirmed the need to maintain various kinds of relations with the USA. For which there were good, specific reasons previously discussed in the New Eastern Outlook.
Then there was a process of rapid restoration (to almost the previous state) of US-Philippine relations. This was confirmed by US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s recent visit to the Philippines during which his own negotiations with Rodrigo Duterte took place, as well as the resumption of the joint military exercises known as “Balikatan”.
It seems appropriate to briefly dwell on the position of the USA regarding territorial problems in the Southeast Asian subregion. It is of a general nature and extends to the Taiwan problem, as well as to the situation surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Washington’s official position boils down to an outwardly strange thesis: “We have no position on the issue of ownership of certain disputed territories.”
At the same time, it is declared categorically unacceptable, first, to resolve “local” territorial disputes by force and, second, to impose any restrictions on the stay of foreign ships (including military vessels) in “international waters.” This is used to justify the frequent appearance of US Navy ships in the South China Sea. Reasons are additionally drawn to the existence of certain agreements with several countries of Southeast Asia. In the clearest form, this reason is used in the case of the Philippines.
Once again, let’s pay attention to the increasingly noticeable process of Japan resuming its presence in this subregion. Which has been observed since the beginning of the last century. Even then, the Philippines was among those countries of particular interest to Tokyo. During the Second World War, this interest was of such a “specific” nature that the process of normalizing bilateral relations only took shape in the last two or three decades. They began to develop especially rapidly after Japan provided assistance to Filipinos in early 2014, in the wake of a catastrophic (“super”) typhoon.
From Tokyo, Rodrigo Duterte’s initial “anti-American, pro-Chinese” rhetoric was observed with a certain wariness. However, just six months later, the new Philippine president paid a visit to Japan. This was followed by fairly routine exchanges of visits at the ministerial level.
A Japanese-Philippine meeting of foreign and defense ministers (that is, in the so-called “2 + 2” format) was held in Tokyo on April 9, 2022. The significance of the existence of such a format almost always indicates a particularly trusted state of relations between a pair of countries. The Philippine delegation agreed with the almost sacral (for Washington and Tokyo) formula of “freedom and openness of the Indo-Pacific region,” containing a fairly obvious anti-Chinese implication. China reacted to such passages in an understandable manner (including graphically).
It’s also important to note that the rapid metamorphosis in Rodrigo Duterte’s foreign policy rhetoric outlined above didn’t cause any noticeable damage to the then emerging process of establishing Sino-Philippine relations. Because by that time, the element that the West hastened to designate with the word “assertiveness” had almost disappeared from Beijing’s initial political course vis-a-vis relations with its neighbors in Southeast Asia. On the contrary, a positive element that may be defined as “patience,” or “taking into account the interests of partners,” has become much more clearly defined. Which, in particular, was manifested in the continuation of negotiations with the countries of Southeast Asia with a view to resolving various kinds of political issues and a sharp expansion of trade and economic relations with them.
The foreign policy component of the general “cost” linked to the May 9 presidential elections in the Philippines was reduced to possible shifts in Manila’s policy toward that (very conditional) “balance point” between Washington (as well as Tokyo) and Beijing that gradually formed during Rodrigo Duterte’s time in power.
Naturally, this issue was to a certain extent tied to those candidates competing for the highest posts in the government. This issue would have largely lost its relevance if Rodrigo Duterte followed his own intention in the fall of 2021 to run for vice president because the current Constitution of the Philippines doesn’t permit him to run for president again.
However, he soon announced his retirement from politics altogether. But his daughter Sara expressed her desire to compete for the post of vice president. At first, her ambitions extended to the presidency. But as a result of negotiations with the influential Marcos clan, it was decided to give the candidacy for the highest public office to Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son of former President Ferdinand Marcos Sr., who is still revered in the Philippines. The latter was also once defined in Washington with such bad epithets as “dictator.”
The tandem of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Sara Duterte won a landslide victory. Congratulations to the winners were sent by the heads of both China and the USA.
This fact indicates that no significant innovations in Philippine foreign policy should be expected. Because for countries of this level of importance it isn’t so much determined by the personalities in power, as by the harsh reality.
And the latter is subject to influence from states of a significantly higher rung of importance.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.
