It appears that the institutional framework established during the tenure of the late Ali Larijani, comprising approximately 15 specialised working groups covering areas such as oil and gas, transportation, communications, and other sectors, could potentially serve as the principal institutional mechanisms underpinning Iran–China relations under Mr. Ghalibaf.

Iran seeks to deepen and transform its strategic relationship with China, moving beyond traditional trade to focus on multifaceted cooperation in the realms of security, the economy, and technology, in order to advance its national interests.
From the Leader’s perspective, engagement with major powers, particularly China, should not be limited to ceremonial agreements or formal diplomatic arrangements. Rather, it should be grounded in a balanced and sustainable framework based on mutual interests and tangible outcomes. In this regard, the systematic and continuous follow-up of existing measures and
agreements, together with the assessment and evaluation of their ultimate implementation and their tangible and substantive contributions to national interests, is of fundamental importance.
Iranian decision-making and policy-formulating institutions are increasingly directing their attention towards cooperation with China. An operational roadmap for Iran–China relations has been prepared and placed at the disposal of the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament. Experts in the Iranian Parliament broadly agree that China has gradually evolved from an actor focused primarily on economics and energy into a more multifaceted player on the global stage.
Recently, Alaaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the Iran–China Friendship Association and a member of Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, stated that it is essential to establish a conviction on the Chinese side that Iran will not trade its relations with China in exchange for its relations with the West.
Dr. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s Special Representative for China Affairs, has also recently reviewed the operational roadmap for developing Iran–China relations under the new international circumstances.
From Ghalibaf’s perspective, bilateral relations must be transformed into deeper and more sustainable forms of cooperation in response to changing global circumstances. Accordingly, he envisages an operational roadmap for engagement with China structured around four principal pillars.
- 1. China’s Role in Ending the War and Moving Beyond the Neither-War-Nor-Peace Situation
The priority concerns China’s role in facilitating a transition beyond the prevailing neither-war-nor-peace situation.
Given its political and economic relations with Iran, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and Western states, Beijing possesses considerable diplomatic capacity to contribute to the process of ending the war.
In other words, although China does not seek direct involvement in military conflicts, its capacity to mobilise the potential of BRICS and establish a contact group involving China, Russia, India, and other relevant actors could play an important role in preventing the recurrence of crises.
- China’s Role in a New Regional Security Architecture
The second priority, from Iran’s perspective, concerns China’s role in shaping a new regional security architecture in the post-war environment.
Against the backdrop of continuing instability and tensions in the Middle East, Chinese President Xi Jinping has put forward a series of initiatives and perspectives, articulated through four proposals, aimed at establishing peace and stability in the region.
From Tehran’s perspective, China’s extensive relations with Iran and the Arab countries of the region provide it with considerable potential to influence the emerging security order and contribute to greater stability.
- The Transition towards a Multipolar International System and the Growing Importance of Emerging Economies
The third priority emphasized by Tehran concerns the international system’s transition towards multipolarity and the increasing share and influence of Asia, developing countries, and emerging economies in global affairs.
For many observers in Iran, China’s position in global affairs, supported by long-term strategic planning and its ambition to become the world’s largest economy by 2030, is of considerable importance. Consequently, strengthening relations with Beijing is a matter of substantial strategic significance.
The convergence of Iranian and Chinese positions on national sovereignty, the independence of states, multilateralism, and opposition to unilateralism makes the utilization of multilateral institutions and platforms, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, essential for enhancing Iran’s international standing.
In other words, Iran can capitalise on the opportunities offered by cooperation with China to advance its national interests and promote domestic development, while preserving its independence and diversifying its foreign relations.
- 4. Adapting Bilateral Relations to Rapid Global Economy, Technology, and International Relations
At a time when the center of global production and consumption is gradually shifting from the Atlantic Ocean towards the Pacific and Indian Oceans, economic relations between Tehran and Beijing can move beyond trade exchanges.
Iran’s requirements in the energy and infrastructure sectors are estimated at approximately USD 250 billion. Furthermore, many observers in Iran consider cooperation with Chinese investors to be important for rebuilding and upgrading the country’s infrastructure, particularly in energy, transportation, port, industrial, and electricity-grid sectors.
Recently, Iran’s Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance announced that it had prepared a portfolio of approximately 150 projects across 11 strategic sectors, with an estimated USD 300 billion, for presentation to China.
The central objective is to move beyond traditional trade towards joint production, technology transfer, and value-added chains.Also, the ultimate objective should be to transform China from a trading partner into a partner for Iran.
Challenges and Structural Constraints
Key obstacles to the development of Iran–China relations arise from the multiplicity of decision-making institutions, overlapping responsibilities, conflicting priorities, and the absence of an accountability mechanism.
Iran’s geographical position has not yet been adequately leveraged in its relations with Beijing. Likewise, the potential of the Iranian diaspora and Chinese nationals residing in Iran has not been effectively utilized.
Effective coordination between foreign and economic policy, consistency in decision-making, proactive diplomacy, and a thorough understanding of China’s policy-making institutions and decision-making processes in Beijing are all essential.
Iran is simultaneously confronted with several fundamental challenges: managing the consequences of war, redefining regional security arrangements, and restoring and strengthening the country’s economic capacities.
The ultimate assessment of bilateral cooperation shouldn’t be based merely on policy documents and strategic declarations, but rather on tangible outcomes, operational projects, and their actual value to the country’s national interests.
The existence of long-term cooperation agreements does not necessarily translate into the establishment of an effective strategic partnership. Furthermore, Iran–China relations have not yet acquired a particularly distinctive position within China’s broader foreign policy strategy.
Strategic Requirements and Priorities
The martyred Supreme Leader placed particular emphasis on relations with China. Given the constitutional responsibility for formulating the country’s overarching policy framework, it is evident that leveraging China’s potential constitutes a strategic component of Iran’s foreign policy.
From the perspective of many observers, there is an absence of a common and sustainable understanding of China’s position within Iran’s broader foreign policy and development strategy. Consequently, the establishment of a high-level strategic body to oversee and coordinate Tehran–Beijing relations could be essential.
It appears that the institutional framework established during the tenure of the late Ali Larijani, comprising approximately 15 specialised working groups covering areas such as oil and gas, transportation, communications, and other sectors, could potentially serve as the principal institutional mechanisms underpinning Iran–China relations under Mr. Ghalibaf.
The redefinition of relations with China should be situated within the framework of balanced transformation and incorporated into a comprehensive and coordinated programme encompassing foreign policy and economic diplomacy. Greater coherence between Iran’s political and economic diplomacy towards China, together with the precise identification and prioritization of the country’s economic interests, is of considerable importance.
Moving beyond the current limitations of bilateral relations and interactions also requires political will, particularly on the Chinese side. Like Pakistan or other Middle Eastern countries, Iran can seek to transform its engagement with China into a multidimensional framework of cooperation.
In this regard, Russia’s recent experience of commercial cooperation with China, particularly bilateral settlement mechanisms based on the use of national currencies, could provide a useful model for Iran. The volume of actual investment, Iran’s share in projects, and its participation in China’s international projects and initiatives should become measurable indicators of the substance and effectiveness of bilateral relations.
The identification and presentation of priority projects, the establishment of a joint fund or financing mechanism, and the development of institutional arrangements—including joint commissions, investment funds, and projects involving the private sectors of both countries—could prove beneficial.
If Iran–China cooperation is redefined in the post-war period in the near future, the establishment of sustainable financial and banking mechanisms based on national currencies could strengthen bilateral cooperation and facilitate the financing of joint projects.
In this context, completing and expanding the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), connecting Iran’s railway and port networks to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and developing the country’s transit capacities could be prioritized within the framework of Iran–China relations.
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
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