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Europe Cannot Afford Its Geopolitical Ambitions

Salman Rafi Sheikh, November 17, 2026

Europe is paying an increasingly unaffordable economic price for geopolitical choices that have left it confronting Russia militarily, China commercially and the United States economically.

Europe Cannot Afford Its Geopolitical Ambitions

The Cost of Strategic Choices

Europe’s economic predicament is becoming increasingly difficult to separate from its geopolitical ambitions. Across the continent, households continue to struggle with elevated living costs, industries face declining competitiveness, and governments confront mounting fiscal pressures. Yet European leaders are simultaneously committing unprecedented resources to military expenditure, sustaining Ukraine against Russia, and defending their economies against growing trade pressures from China and the United States. The contradiction is particularly striking because some of these pressures arise from strategic choices that European governments themselves helped make.

Consider the conflict in Ukraine. In the months preceding the start of the conflict in February 2022, European governments and their American allies had opportunities to negotiate a broader security settlement. Moscow’s December 2021 proposals sought, among other things, binding guarantees against further NATO enlargement. NATO rejected this proposal. Instead, a more flexible approach to Europe’s security architecture might have reduced the likelihood of military confrontation. Ukraine was not close to joining NATO, yet Western governments maintained a principle, i.e., the so-called “open door” policy of NATO membership, whose immediate practical value was limited and whose geopolitical consequences were potentially enormous.

Europe seeks greater geopolitical influence while remaining dependent on American military power, vulnerable to Chinese industrial competition, constrained by its own economic performance, and willingness to support conflicts that could have been avoided

Four years later, Europe is bearing substantial costs. According to the European Council, the EU agreed in April 2026 to provide Ukraine with another €90 billion in loans for 2026–27, including €60 billion intended for defence. This comes alongside Europe’s expanding national military budgets and the longer-term costs of rebuilding its defence-industrial capacity.

The economic consequences extend beyond military assistance. Europe’s break with Russian energy supplies required a costly restructuring of its energy markets, contributing to pressures on energy-intensive industries. Although diversification may have improved energy security, the transition has exposed longstanding weaknesses in European industrial competitiveness.

The European Central Bank estimates that additional euro-area defence spending incorporated into its projections amounts to 1.5% of GDP cumulatively over 2025–28. Such expenditure can stimulate investment and manufacturing, but it also creates fiscal obligations that compete with other priorities. Europe is therefore confronting a difficult question: how much economic capacity can it commit to an increasingly expensive security strategy without weakening the domestic foundations of its own political stability?

A Trade Confrontation on Two Fronts

Europe’s predicament becomes more serious when its security commitments are considered alongside its worsening trade environment. For decades, European prosperity depended on a relatively favourable international economic arrangement: access to affordable energy, expanding trade with China, and a transatlantic partnership that combined American security guarantees with substantial commercial opportunities. All three foundations have come under pressure.

China presents a formidable industrial challenge. Chinese manufacturers have become increasingly competitive in electric vehicles, batteries, renewable-energy technologies and other industries central to Europe’s economic future. European governments have responded with trade-defence measures, including additional tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles.

Such measures may protect particular industries from subsidised competition, but they cannot substitute for the investment, technological innovation and productivity improvements required to restore Europe’s competitiveness. Protection also carries costs, particularly when European manufacturers depend on Chinese components and supply chains.

The United States presents an altogether different challenge. Washington remains Europe’s most important security partner, yet its increasingly protectionist trade policies directly threaten European commercial interests. The EU-US trade agreement concluded in July 2025, and implemented in 2026, established a ceiling of 15% on American tariffs covering most European exports. In return, the EU agreed to eliminate tariffs on American industrial goods. Although the agreement helped prevent further escalation, it also demonstrated the asymmetry in the transatlantic economic relationship. The European Commission’s own account confirms these arrangements. Rather than negotiating from a position of strategic autonomy, Brussels has found itself managing the economic consequences of Washington’s protectionism.

The contradiction is difficult to overlook. Europe depends heavily on Washington for its security while simultaneously having to negotiate against Washington to protect its economic interests. This dependence also constrains Europe’s strategic autonomy. A continent seeking to strengthen its economic position against China cannot easily disregard American security priorities. Yet aligning more closely with Washington risks limiting the commercial relationships Europe needs to sustain its industrial competitiveness.

Europe is consequently attempting to achieve three demanding objectives simultaneously: finance a more militarised security order, defend its industries against Chinese competition, and preserve access to an increasing protectionist American market. Each objective has an economic rationale. Pursued together, however, they risk imposing costs that Europe’s already strained economies may struggle to absorb.

The Domestic Price of Geopolitical Ambition

The greatest danger to Europe’s geopolitical strategy may ultimately emerge from within its own societies. The economic numbers are increasingly troubling. The European Commission’s May 2026 forecast projected EU growth of just 1.1% in 2026, with euro-area growth falling to 0.9%. EU inflation was expected to reach 3.1%, partly reflecting another energy shock arising from conflict in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the EU’s fiscal deficit was projected to rise from 3.1% of GDP in 2025 to 3.6% by 2027.

These pressures are not distributed equally. According to Eurostat’s 2026 report on living conditions, 7.7% of EU residents lived in households spending at least 40% of their disposable income on housing in 2025. In Greece, the proportion reached 26.4%. Housing costs, alongside persistent pressure on household budgets, expose the distance between Europe’s international aspirations and the everyday economic concerns of its citizens.

Higher military expenditure does not automatically mean reduced social spending. Governments can borrow, raise taxes or redirect expenditure, while defence investment can generate employment. Nevertheless, these choices involve trade-offs, especially when growth remains weak and public finances are already under strain.

The political consequences could be profound. Governments that justify expanding military commitments through appeals to European security must also convince voters that those commitments will not come at the expense of their economic security. This becomes increasingly difficult when households face expensive housing, uncertain employment prospects and pressure on public services.

The deeper problem is one of strategic priorities. Europe’s leaders have increasingly defined security in military and geopolitical terms, even as the economic foundations of European influence have become more vulnerable. Yet, a continent struggling to maintain industrial competitiveness and domestic prosperity cannot indefinitely expand its external commitments without confronting the question of affordability.

Europe’s predicament thus exposes a fundamental weakness in its approach to strategic autonomy. It seeks greater geopolitical influence while remaining dependent on American military power, vulnerable to Chinese industrial competition, constrained by its own economic performance, and willingness to support conflicts that could have been avoided.

The danger is not simply that Europe may fail to achieve its geopolitical objectives. It is that the pursuit of those objectives, without a corresponding economic strategy, could progressively erode the prosperity and political consensus on which European power ultimately depends.

 

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

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