The latest visit by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to India, on 20–22 October 2026, attests to the US authorities’ desire to take dynamically developing bilateral relations with New Delhi to a new level.
This US interest in the oil agenda is largely dictated by persistent bids to hinder the development of India–Russia cooperation in this sphere, which has proceeded at unprecedented rates, especially after 2022. Constant sanctions pressure on New Delhi from Washington, Brussels and London, regularly imposed restrictions against Russian oil companies, and threats to expand trade tariffs should India fail to curtail or substantially reduce imports of Russian fuel are certainly taken into account by the Indian leadership, introducing certain adjustments into its energy policy.
The design of the United States and its European allies is obvious: to reduce to a minimum, and ideally to stop altogether, India’s purchases of Russian oil and, in exchange, to increase supplies from the United States, including heavy Venezuelan oil, as well as from traditional Middle Eastern countries—Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It is known that, to these ends, Washington has in effect launched a tariff war against India, first raising import duties by 25%, then bringing them to 50% and, finally, threatening to impose a 100% duty on Indian goods should India continue importing Russian oil.
Why India Ignores American Sanctions
It must nevertheless be acknowledged, to the Indians’ credit, that they did not yield to such overt pressure and sanctions threats and continued to buy Russian oil, which is advantageous to them because of the discount, although at times in smaller volumes, so as not to irritate the opponents in the Western camp too much. On the whole, for India, renouncing imports of cheaper Russian oil remains a sensitive issue. In addition to the growing bilateral strategic partnership, another important circumstance must be taken into account: the United States is India’s largest trading partner, accounting for about 20% of all the Indian exports—almost USD 80 billion. Trade between the two countries this year has reached approximately USD 150 billion, and by 2030 the sides intend to bring it to USD 500 billion.
It should be noted that Russian oil supplies to India have their own history and represent a complex, ambiguous process. Suffice it to say that prior to the launch of the special military operation in 2022, Russian oil supplies to India were extremely insignificant. A sharp increase took place in 2022–2023, when the share of Russian oil in India’s import structure reached approximately 30% and higher. In 2024–2025, further growth was observed—to 40–45% (about 2–2.5 million barrels per day), which, of course, caused serious concern primarily among the Americans, who resorted to new threats and measures of pressure.
National Interests Above All
This circumstance, as well as the European Union’s ban on imports of fuel produced from Russian oil and restrictions on the re-export of petroleum products, dealt a serious blow to India’s interests. India directed a significant part of its refined petroleum products precisely to EU countries, deriving multibillion-dollar profits from this. The European Union’s new measures noticeably reduced the attractiveness of such supplies for India. All this led in early 2026 to a sharp reduction in imports of Russian oil: purchases at times decreased substantially, and the phased reduction of supplies was naturally welcomed in the West.
However, the situation changed again after the outbreak of the conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran, when oil supplies to India from Middle Eastern countries sharply declined and purchases of Russian oil again moved upward. In certain periods they reached 40%, and sometimes 50%, of total crude imports. And, despite fluctuations, Russia again became India’s main oil supplier, while India, in turn, took second place after China among the main buyers of Russian oil. According to some estimates, with India’s annual oil demand at around 130 million tonnes, Russian supplies in certain years amounted to between 50 and 70 million tonnes.
In addition to energy and calls for a radical diversification of oil imports, M. Rubio discussed with his Indian partners—above all with Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar—the earliest conclusion of a new trade agreement, the launch of major investment projects and the expansion of cooperation in the spheres of defence, security, peaceful nuclear energy and high technologies. The sides also exchanged substantive views on key global and regional problems, paying special attention to the situation around Iran and Ukraine, as well as to stepping up work in the Quad format.
What Makes India Ignore Washington
Despite the closeness of positions on many international issues, Washington has still not succeeded in persuading New Delhi to join anti-Russian sanctions, to renounce purchases of Russian oil and other energy resources, or to abandon military supplies. India consistently strengthens its specially privileged strategic partnership with Russia, including within BRICS, the SCO and the G20. The Indian leadership’s position on the Ukrainian crisis also remains balanced and well-weighed.
At the same time, New Delhi, while expanding its dialogue with Washington, remains faithful to its multi-vector, pragmatic and independent foreign policy, continuing to bolster close ties with Russia and simultaneously improving its difficult relations with China. Ultimately, India’s independent and multi-vector course as an influential world power remains unchanged. Exerting external pressure on it is futile and counterproductive: in its foreign and economic policy, New Delhi is guided exclusively by pragmatic national interests.
Anvar Azimov, diplomat and political scientist; ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary; Ph.D. in History; senior research fellow at the Eurasian Educational Institute of MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia
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