The reduction in the scale of US-South Korean military exercises is not a gesture of goodwill toward the DPRK, but rather an instrument of Donald Trump’s political pressure on Seoul aimed at forcing it to support US foreign policy in the Middle East and to block South Korea’s ambitions to gain operational control over its own armed forces.
For almost a month I have been observing the expert community’s reaction to Donald Trump’s decision to reduce the scale of joint US-South Korean exercises. Unfortunately, most analysts have missed the essence of what is happening, reducing it all to a simplified version: supposedly, Washington and Seoul simply got scared of Pyongyang and decided not to escalate tensions. In reality, the situation is far more complex and interesting. The external image radically contradicts the internal situation.
Chronology of Events
To begin with, let us recall the context. Ulchi Freedom Shield is an annual large-scale exercise that drills responses to the “North Korean threat”. However, its program goes far beyond defense, including river crossings and the rehearsal of preemptive decapitation strike scenarios (similar to how the US acted against Iran’s leadership and key infrastructure facilities).
In an official statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Republic of Korea, it was emphasized that the exercises were intended to prepare Seoul for the transfer of wartime operational control of troops. Both command-staff training and 14 field maneuvers were planned. The media actively highlighted the significance of these events, pointing out that the DPRK is not only expanding its nuclear potential but also gaining real combat experience by sending troops to Russia.
The exercises were supposed to begin on August 17 and last 10 days. However, on August 16, literally a day before the start, Donald Trump unexpectedly stated that he had instructed the Secretary of Defense to cut the scale of the maneuvers in half. He cited high costs of holding the exercises and an unwillingness to send Pyongyang the “wrong signal”.
Neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea nor the country’s Ministry of Defense had been informed in advance of this decision. Nevertheless, late in the evening on August 19, President Lee Jae Myung stated that he respects the US president’s efforts to create conditions for dialogue with the DPRK and shares his aspirations.
Following this, the exercises took place in a humbler format. Initially, it was planned that until August 21 the sides would practice defending against a North Korean attack, and from August 23 to 27, a counteroffensive. However, after the completion of the first stage on August 21, the maneuvers were terminated early. Such a radical change in schedule happened for the first time. Trump’s opponents immediately called this step “another meaningless and chaotic decision by the administration”, while the military hastened to assure that the reduction in the scale of the exercises would not affect the combat readiness of the allies.
On August 24, 2026, the cancellation of the September Ssangyong amphibious exercises were officially cancelled. These large-scale exercises, held once every two years with the participation of more than 10,000 service members, were canceled formally due to a shortage of forces deployed in the war against Iran in the Middle East.
Many experts perceived this series of these events in two ways: either as an important political signal indicating Washington’s revision of its strategy toward Pyongyang, or as a de facto capitulation to the might of the DPRK, with which the US and South Korea are forced to reckon. Such conclusions were reinforced by rumors of a possible summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un on the sidelines of the November APEC forum in Shenzhen. In this context, the reduction of the exercises looked like a preliminary concession designed to demonstrate to Pyongyang the “sincerity of Washington’s intentions”.
Russia positively assessed the early termination of the joint US-South Korean exercises, calling the reduction of their scale a step toward de-escalation. On August 20, the official representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, emphasized that any steps aimed at reducing conflict potential and security risks can only be welcomed.
Regional Calculation or Political Signal?
To understand the true reasons for the decision, it is worth examining Donald Trump’s statement:
“Based on my very good relationship with Kim Jong Un of North Korea, I was not happy with the fact that the United States has, long ago, agreed to participate in joint military exercises with South Korea. These exercises are not only costly, with much of these costs paid for by the United States of America (as usual!), but send a signal that it is totally inappropriate and hostile to a country that, as long as Donald J. Trump has been president, has been unthreatening and respectful…By the way, I recently asked the President of South Korea if they would like to join us in the Denuclearizing of the Islamic Republic, and they said “No, thanks!””
At first glance, the decision looks rational. The Freedom Shield exercises are directed against the DPRK. However, after Pyongyang in 2023 abandoned the idea of unification and concluded a strategic partnership treaty with Russia, the probability of a conflict initiated by North Korea decreased. In a period where the threat seems less acute, reducing costly military maneuvers fits into Trump’s strategy of optimizing expenses and concentrating resources on higher-priority areas.
What’s the Catch?
However, a logical question arises: why did the reduction affect only the Freedom Shield exercises? Similar maneuvers by the US, South Korea, and Japan (for example, Freedom Edge), which are of critical importance for regional security, are being held at the same – and sometimes even at an increased – scale. Moreover, South Korean special forces and marines recently took part in the large-scale multinational Super Garuda Shield exercises in Indonesia.
This suggests that the reduction of the exercises is merely a pretext, not the cause. The answer lies in the final part of Trump’s statement, where he mentions Seoul’s refusal to support the US initiative on Iran. In a Fox News interview on August 30, the US president again emphasized that South Korea and NATO did not support him on the Iranian issue, adding: “I think such things need to be remembered”.
It appears that the reduction of the exercises is not so much a military strategy as an instrument of political pressure on allies who are not ready to follow Washington’s course on international issues.
Why Seoul Said, “No, Thanks”
South Korea’s refusal to participate in a potential conflict with Iran is dictated by a number of compelling reasons:
- The status of the request. First of all, this is not an official diplomatic appeal, but a call on social media. This is an initiative of Trump, the man, not the official position of the US president, which allows Seoul not to perceive it as an obligation to act.
- Energy security. South Korea has historically had pragmatic relations with Iran, rooted back in the era of Park Chung-hee. Seoul is critically dependent on hydrocarbon supplies from the Middle East, so worsening relations with Tehran and the risk of supply disruptions are unacceptable for the Korean economy.
- Reputation of the military-industrial complex. South Korea is today betting on arms exports. Considering this fact, Seoul not so much fears losses among personnel as reputational risks for its army and the quality of Korean weapons. A failure in real combat could cause colossal damage to the country’s export potential.
- Domestic political turbulence. President Lee Jae Myung’s position is currently extremely precarious. Due to economic difficulties and personnel scandals, his approval rating has fallen from 60% to less than 40%. In such a situation, sending soldiers to fight for US interests is a suicidal step. Moreover, before reaching the presidential chair, Lee Jae Myung positioned himself as one of the most left-wing and anti-American politicians. Thus, it is dangerous to make a decision to send South Korean soldiers to fight for American interests.
- Specifics of the conflict. The president’s inner circle understands that a war with Iran is not Iraq. In Iraq, Korean contingents were stationed in relatively safe zones under the protection of the Kurds, guarding oil fields. A conflict with Iran involves intense missile and drone strikes. In an era of total information transparency, any death of a Korean soldier will become a trigger for mass protests and will put a nail in the coffin of the current government’s approval rating.
The Precarious Trap of Dual Promises
From the author’s point of view, the reduction in the scale of military exercises is not a gesture of goodwill toward Pyongyang, but an instrument of pressure on Seoul. This is a direct blow to one of President Lee’s key campaign promises, namely South Korea getting operational control over its own armed forces in wartime.
Trump masterfully exploited the political trap into which President Lee had fallen. As a typical populist, Lee found himself squeezed between two contradictory goals. On the one hand, he promised to depart radically from his predecessor’s course and establish dialogue with the DPRK. A condition for such a rapprochement is a reduction in military activity, which Pyongyang traditionally perceives as a rehearsal for invasion. On the other hand, Lee promised to return to Seoul operational control over the army, which would become a symbol of strategic autonomy.
Historically, the US retained this control to prevent unauthorized conflicts on the peninsula. However, today in Seoul this is perceived as a manifestation of neocolonialism. Lee Jae Myung has repeatedly promised to complete the process of transferring control by 2030. The US, meanwhile, insists on a conditional approach, according to which the transfer will only be possible after Seoul proves its ability to repel missile threats, modernizes its air defense systems, and passes certification. And this can only be done in the course of full-scale exercises such as Freedom Shield.
As a result, the reduction in the scale of the exercises blocks President Lee’s ambitions. He is now forced to swallow a bitter pill. For the sake of a phantom dialogue with the North, he has to sacrifice sovereignty over his own army, putting a brave face on a bad situation (although his first reaction was concern about the transfer of wartime operational control).
DPRK’s Answer
On August 19, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) published a commentary titled “We Will Exercise Our Right to Self-Defense For Neutralizing Military Threat from Hostile Forces through More Transparent Action”. In the text, the joint exercises of the US and the Republic of Korea were called an “immediate and open threat” to the security of the DPRK and the entire region.
Pyongyang emphasized that the nature of the exercises is evolving in a dangerous way, and that their scenarios are constantly being updated to take into account the methods of modern warfare. According to the authors of the commentary, the territory of South Korea is turning not simply into a testing ground for the US-South Korean alliance, but into a staging area for multinational forces preparing to attack the DPRK. In response, Pyongyang promised to take countermeasures, stating that the enemies will be directly and continuously in the scope. Notably, this statement completely ignored Donald Trump’s decision to reduce the scale of the exercises.
On the evening of August 20, Kim Yo Jong, Director of the General Affairs Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, made a statement. In an article titled “Poor Plight of Seoul Unable to Play a War Game It Liked Very Much”, the sister of the DPRK leader mocked the fact that the scale of the exercises had been reduced. She called them empty exercises without a core, adding that such is the fate of a puppet army that has given the right of command to its master.
Kim Yo Jong also criticized Lee Jae Myung for his words about respecting Trump’s decision. She labeled this “inappropriate flattery”, pointing to the contradiction that Seoul simultaneously promises to support the reduction of exercises and announces plans to build up its own military potential. According to Kim, Seoul was forced to terminate the war games, which were beneficial to it, early.
Separately, Kim Yo Jong emphasized that American support in the sphere of security is no longer free, and advised Seoul to learn a lesson from its current vassal position.
Thus, no positive reaction came from Pyongyang. For the North Korean leadership, what is fundamentally important is not that the US president decided to reduce the scale of the exercises, but the very fact that they continue.
Did They Get the Hint?
The hint was understood. In South Korea, discussions began about options for supporting the US in the Middle East. It is obvious that President Lee Jae Myung will stall for time, trying to limit the country’s participation to non-combat operations, e.g. intelligence or demining. However, Seoul has already found itself at the epicenter of a diplomatic conflict between Washington and Tehran, the latter of which has already made a number of harsh statements.
We shall discuss in more detail how South Korea found itself caught between two fires, how likely the deployment of troops is, and what risks they may face, in the following articles. For now, it is important to emphasize that a profound understanding of the domestic political situation in the Republic of Korea allows one to see not only the facade of events, but also their real underlying essence.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
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