Even with the full-scale involvement of Saudi Arabia and its regional allies in the conflict against Ansar Allah, the fighting could develop into a protracted war of attrition. Any large-scale escalation could also trigger a chain of reactions that would be difficult to contain.
Introduction
The data indicate an increase in missile and drone attacks, greater use of fighter jets, and increased attacks on military targets and critical infrastructure over the past month.
With several conflict fronts active simultaneously, Yemen is now closer to all-out war and a deeper conflict over the country’s future power-sharing arrangements than at any point since the April 2022 ceasefire.
Sanaa’s Approach
Alongside Tehran’s approach to expanding the scope of the conflict across the region, Major General Mohammed al-Atifi, minister of Defense, and Major General Yousef Al-Madani, chief of the general staff of the Sana’a Armed Forces, recently announced that the nature of Yemen’s conflict has shifted from a “defensive” posture to an “offensive and preemptive” one.
In a last speech, Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, the leader of Ansar Allah, while expressing support for Iran, emphasized strengthening the “unity of the fronts” and cooperation among the fronts of the Axis of Resistance, the need to end the blockade, and the use of “all legitimate means” to bring it to an end.
Previously, the leader of Ansar Allah called on the public to liberate the occupied territories, lift the blockade, and restore Yemen’s sovereignty and independence over all its territories, wealth, and energy resources. In addition, Sana’a has so far provided military training to more than one million members of the general mobilization forces.
Ansar Allah’s current priority fronts are Marib, Yemen’s most important energy-producing region, and the southwestern coast, including the coasts of Taiz and southern Al-Hodeidah Province. Accordingly, Yemen’s southern and eastern provinces are currently not among Ansar Allah’s priorities.
Despite efforts by Saudi-Western actors to involve southern forces in confronting Ansar Allah, the Sana’a authorities are seeking to prevent clashes between Ansar Allah and the Southern Council.
Sana’a’s objective and approach are to thwart foreign plans – plans that fuel internal conflicts in Yemen. From Sana’a’s perspective, therefore, what is taking place in Yemen is not merely an intra-Yemeni conflict but one in which Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel are also involved.
At the regional level, Sana’a has also intensified its military confrontation with Riyadh by adopting the equations of “blockade for blockade” and “escalation for escalation” through direct clashes involving the naval forces of Yemeni and regional actors near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, as well as operations against sensitive sites in Saudi Arabia.
Sana’a views any cooperation with Saudi Arabia as “complicity in the aggression against Yemen” and considers it a red line.
As the Riyadh-led “Multinational Maritime Defense Coalition” began operations, direct attacks by Sana’a in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait contributed to a sharp decline in Saudi crude oil exports, which fell to their lowest level in nine years.
From Sana’a’s perspective, meeting its demands unconditionally entails paying salaries, lifting Yemen’s naval and air blockade, implementing the agreed roadmap, the immediate withdrawal of Saudi Arabia from all Yemeni territory, and ending funding and support for militias.
There have also been reports that Israel is preparing for a major operation in Yemen. Meanwhile, the United States has strengthened its position on the African side of the Bab al-Mandab through its engagement with Eritrea.
Ansar Allah has also been preparing for the next round of confrontation with Israel and the United States by conducting new military exercises in the Red Sea, improving the range and accuracy of its missiles, enhancing its intelligence capabilities, and expanding its drone capabilities.
Field Developments and Conditions in the South
Over the past month, reports have indicated the deployment of new military equipment and forces to the Taiz fronts, as well as the reinforcement of positions by both sides along the western coast.
Recently, Sana’a announced the launch of a large-scale operation along the strategic coastal fronts in Taiz Province, southwestern Yemen. Ansar Allah views these attacks as preemptive measures aimed at preventing the implementation of Saudi-backed military plans.
Ansar Allah’s aim in its operations along the western coast appears to be to restrict or cut off the Presidential Leadership Council’s (PLC) access to the western coastline and areas near the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
Saudi Arabia, in turn, is seeking to strengthen the positions of its allies in strategic areas. However, the rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates persists.
Rashad al-Alimi, Chairman of the government’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), has stated that the government is now more unified and that its military and security forces operate under a unified command.
Despite the restructuring of the Aden government’s military and security apparatus in 2026 and extensive changes to the Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) command structures, personnel systems, and revenue networks, the simultaneous pressure on the western front and the STC’s activities have posed significant challenges for the Aden government.
Despite external support, southern Yemen continues facing challenges such as the fragmentation of political and security forces and the multiple centers of power.
Supporters of the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen’s southern provinces, backed by considerable domestic support, have launched a broad range of activities and will seek to restore their influence in Yemeni politics.
They are increasingly critical of Saudi Arabia’s role. Meanwhile, despite Riyadh’s efforts to expand its influence within the Southern Transitional Council, many in southern Yemen oppose the involvement of southern forces in the conflict against Sana’a and the north.
There has also been a growing divide, along with increased tensions and mutual accusations, between factions aligned with Tariq Saleh and the al-Islah Party along the western coast.
Outlook
As the conflict expands beyond ground conflicts, Yemen’s western coast, given its proximity to the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, has become one of the most important focal points in the future course of the war.
Also, any capture of Al-Mukha and Taiz by Ansar Allah could bring the group closer to the Bab al-Mandab Strait and mark a significant shift in Yemen’s military and political dynamics.
Since last year, the United States has shown a willingness to support ground operations against Ansar Allah in Yemen’s western coastal areas overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait. However, despite Saudi–U.S. consultations and Saudi Arabia’s request to lead a new round of fighting against Ansar Allah, Washington appears willing to support only a large-scale military operation led by Saudi Arabia against Sana’a.
Meanwhile, Ansar Allah’s military capabilities, centralized command structure, force-mobilization networks, cohesive military organization, and economic network linked to its power structure have made it a more resilient and formidable force.
Although Aden has called for a unified Arab strategy to address trade wars, threats to international shipping routes, and Houthi missile and drone attacks, the Houthis continue to possess tactical military superiority, offensive drone capabilities, asymmetric warfare capabilities, significant strategic reach, and industrial depth, as well as the ability to inflict strategic damage, despite US support for the Aden government. Therefore, even with the full-scale involvement of Saudi Arabia and its regional allies in the conflict against Ansar Allah, the fighting could develop into a protracted war of attrition. Any large-scale escalation could also trigger a chain of reactions that would be difficult to contain.
Moreover, if Sana’a enters into on-the-ground cooperation and a win-win game with the Southern Transitional Council, it could shift the course of developments to Saudi Arabia’s disadvantage.
If the conflict spreads, the role of international and regional actors (Saudi Arabia and Iran) will become more prominent.
With mediation efforts backed by Oman and the United Nations, a viable roadmap could focus on a power-sharing agreement among the parties, the participation of southern separatists, and continued dialogue toward a political solution, rather than repeating past military approaches.
However, domestic actors have so far refrained from fully employing their capabilities within the framework of a broader strategy of “escalation management.”
With rising displacement, disruptions to fuel supply chains and essential services, damage to ports, growing pressure on infrastructure, and 18.3 million people facing food insecurity, Yemen is under a short-term risk of returning to full-scale war, with potentially severe social and economic consequences.
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
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