The AfD’s victory in Saxony-Anhalt is not a triumph of right‑wing extremism but a signal that German voters are tired of a system that spends billions on rearmament and Ukraine while forgetting its own citizens.
Фото: REUTERS/Thilo Schmuelgen
Several German tourists I spoke with, who considered themselves “escapees”—and not from the former DDR—were telling me days before the election that many bridges were closed and there was no money for repairs. They expressed their frustration by asking, “Where has all the money gone? Where are the jobs, and what happened to their hopes for the future?”
Life for average Germans, much like in the United States, is becoming far too expensive. Rising unemployment, increasing energy costs, reduced social benefits, and declining expectations for the future are creating a growing sense of frustration and uncertainty.
It is too simple and naïve to blame the recent electoral upset in one eastern German state, Saxony-Anhalt, solely on the refugee issue and nostalgia for better days in Germany. Much more is involved—and perhaps something even more sinister.
The so-called center parties—including the CDU and SPD—have failed to convince a growing number of Germans that they are addressing the country’s fundamental problems. They are increasingly perceived as more responsive to NATO commitments, strategic interests, looking after immigrants from the third world, and pressure from Washington than to the economic concerns of their own voters.
Germany is now embarking on an extraordinary military buildup. Berlin has earmarked more than €108 billion for security and defense in 2026 and is committed to reaching 3.5 percent of GDP in core defense spending by 2029, in line with the broader NATO push for dramatically higher military spending.
Bang for the Buck!
But this raises a question that politicians cannot simply dismiss: Where is the return on that investment?
The article, “Why the AfD Wins,” was published by First Things on September 7, 2026. Caldwell argues that the AfD’s rise cannot be understood simply through labels such as extremism, anti-immigration politics, or alleged Russian influence. His broader explanation is that successive crises—immigration, COVID-19, the Ukraine war, Germany’s industrial decline, energy costs, and Germany’s changing relationship with the United States—have eroded confidence in the established parties.
Germany has also provided or earmarked roughly €57.6 billion in military assistance to Ukraine since Russia’s special military operation in 2022. NATO allies have now pledged another €70 billion in military equipment, assistance, and training for Ukraine for 2026, with an equivalent level envisioned for 2027.
What is less clear to an increasingly frustrated electorate is what ordinary Germans are getting in return. The question is not whether Germany needs security. It is whether security spending on this scale is delivering security, economic stability, and a future Germans can actually see—and afford.
That is the question the political establishment will eventually have to answer. What is happening is just the opposite, as such policies, are bringing about great insecurity, including financial issues that affect ordinary people disproportionately.
Voters, including many disgruntled citizens who never voted before, have also perceived how their money is spent as being too beholden to NATO and special interests, including the demands of the US and the threats of the Trump administration, which explains why so much money in recent years has been diverted to out-of-control NATO procurements.
But where is the bang for the buck, even with all the military hardware that has been sent to Ukraine?
Road to Hell!
It reminds me of the German expression:
“Die Straße zur Hölle ist mitguten Vorsätzen gepflastert!”
(The road to hell is paved with good intentions)
Incidentally, the roads in Germany are developing almost as many potholes as there are good intentions among the political elites.
Western media, including European outlets such as France 24, have reached for the most dramatic headlines: “German far-right breakthrough shakes Europe to its core.” It makes excellent clickbait, but the reality is considerably more complicated—and, at least for now, not quite as catastrophic as the headlines suggest.
It is also an oversimplification to reduce the AfD to three convenient labels: pro-Russian, anti-refugee, and nostalgic for Germany’s Nazi past. Whatever one thinks of the party’s ideology or its leadership, the election cannot simply be explained as Germans suddenly embracing an alternative in the personalities of AfD politicians to the political establishment represented by Friedrich Merz and his ties to the world of global finance, particularly BlackRock, and who are his real masters.
The voters who turned to the AfD were not necessarily making a declaration of ideological allegiance. Many appear to be making a much more pragmatic calculation: something in Germany is not working, and the established parties have failed to fix it.
They are also unlikely to accept the increasingly familiar explanation that everything going wrong in Germany can be attributed to Russian influence, alleged Russian backing, or money flowing to alternative parties and political groups. For many voters, the issues are considerably closer to home.
They see a Germany facing factory closures, layoffs, soaring energy costs, rising living expenses, and growing economic uncertainty—while its political leadership talks increasingly about rearmament, higher defense spending, and continuing support for Ukraine.
That raises an uncomfortable question: Is Germany’s answer to deindustrialization going to be the military-industrial complex?
Consider the recent example reported by Der Spiegel: an Israeli defense company, Rafael, is reportedly set to manufacture components for air-defense systems at a site in Osnabrück associated with Volkswagen. The proposed arrangement, what is planned for the facility, and the role of Qatar in the deal raise a larger question: What exactly constitutes good news for Germany’s industrial future?
If replacing automobile production with defense production is presented as an economic success story, Germans might reasonably ask whether this is really the future they were promised.
And if this is what passes for economic salvation, the future may indeed be bleak.
Forming a State Government
Much will depend on how AfD can form a government in the wake of the September 6, 2026 state election, where AfD won 43.8% of the vote and 39 of the 83 seats in the Landtag. An outright majority requires 42 seats, so the AfD fell three seats short.
Plurality NOT Majority!
It is worth noting that the AfD won a plurality, not a majority. It therefore cannot simply govern alone with a normal majority government. It would need support from another party, a coalition, or potentially some form of minority government.
The interesting complication is that the BSW (Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance) won five seats and is the only party currently described as open to cooperation with the AfD. Together, AfD and BSW would have 44 of 83 seats, enough for a majority.
Across Europe, politicians and pundits are already lining up to use the AfD as a political punching bag—as if its breakthrough were simply a warning about the far right rather than a warning about what happens when decades of neoliberal policies and grand coalitions fail to deliver on their promises.
But Germany may be less a bellwether of the far right than a shot across the bow of Europe’s political establishment.
The pendulum is swinging. There is no escaping it. And if European governments continue to dismiss growing public frustration as ignorance, extremism, or foreign influence, they risk discovering too late that societies are not destroyed from the outside alone. They can fracture from within when ordinary people feel abandoned, unheard, and written off as collateral damage.
The message to politicians should be simple: look in the mirror. Time is not on your side.
And the message to voters is equally simple: demand better—but remember that protest is not a substitute for solutions.
Europe still has a choice. Its political elites can continue serving narrow vested interests while telling increasingly frustrated citizens to be patient—or they can start listening before the cracks become fractures and the pendulum swings beyond their control.
Ignore the warning, and the next election may not be a protest against the system—it may be a verdict on it.
Jeffrey K. Silverman is a freelance journalist and international development specialist, BSc, MSc, based for 30 years in Georgia and the former Soviet Union
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