Despite nominal opposition to the canal from downstream countries, there are advantages to co-operating with the Taliban government on this issue.
For more than 50 years, Afghanistan has been pursuing the design and construction of the Amu Darya Sea Water Canal for the northern plains of the country. Qosh Tepa irrigation canal, whose feasibility studies were started in 2018 with the support of USAID (banned in Russia), was started during the time of Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, but the presence of the Taliban in power gave it scope and importance.
The construction of Qosh Tepa Channel, or the largest water transfer project in Afghanistan, with a length of 285 km, a width of 100 meters, and a depth of 8.5 meters, is to be completed in three phases by 2028 and will bring the water of Amu Darya from Balkh province to Jawzjan province and Faryab province.
The first phase of this project was completed in October 2023 with a length of 108 km. The second phase of the channel with a length of 177 kilometers was completed last fall during the visit of senior Taliban officials, and more than half of this phase has been completed.
In October 2023, Abdul Ghani Baradar, the economic deputy of the Taliban prime minister, called its completion “the fulfillment of the decades-long dream of the Afghan people.”
The Qosh Tepa Channel with an annual capacity of about 20.5 billion cubic meters of Amu Darya water and irrigation of 550 thousand hectares of agricultural land may even divert up a third of the Amu Darya’s water.
In the last two decades, Kabul has tried to manage its internal water, but Afghanistan uses only 25-30% of surface water internally. Amu Darya can be considered one of the basic sources of infrastructure development in the country.
The Taliban’s approach to Amu Darya is to use the positive economic effects water resources are one of Afghanistan’s top priorities, and the Qosh Tepa Canal is considered a vital project that contributes to economic growth and other major projects.in Afghanistan as well. Considering the fundamental importance of water and energy in the development and self-sufficiency of the country, the Taliban considers water resource management, the only way to save Afghanistan from poverty and dependence on the expansion of energy production.
Canal construction is the only way to save Afghanistan from poverty
About 80 percent of the people in Afghanistan rely on agriculture for their livelihood, and about 23million people, or more than half of Afghanistan’s population, are in need of humanitarian assistance in 2024.
By pursuing the construction of the channel, the Taliban is seeking to reduce dependence on imported energy, increase domestic production, self-sufficiency in electricity production and control water.
Cultivation of 550-700 thousand hectares of land in the region, economic prosperity and provision of many agricultural items, and creation of job opportunities for 250 thousand people, can be a step to reduce the economic and human crisis of Afghanistan, independence of food self-sufficiency in barley, corn, cotton, wheat, rice, etc
Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzadeh, the leader of the Taliban, who recently visited the Qosh Tepa channel, said that the implementation of national projects like Qosh Tepa will save Afghanistan from the need for foreign aid and make the country self-sufficient.
In fact, water resources are among the main priorities of Afghanistan, and the Qosh Tepa Channel is considered a vital project that facilitates economic growth and other big projects.
Afghanistan’s approach and policy regarding the Amu Darya River, has become much more erious. The Amu Darya is the largest river in the region and has a high level of water.
In fact, the construction of this channel has been the biggest economic project of the Taliban government in the last two years. It seems that in the Taliban’s water policy, “water is a political and honorable issue, and it can be used in domestic and foreign policies”
In this approach, accurate and efficient management in the Qosh Tepa Channel can have important effects on the public opinion of the people, show the government efficiently, deal with the opposition and satisfy nationalist feelings.
The Taliban claim that they have put the first phase of the channel into operation in the shortest possible time and only using internal resources and forces. Their seriousness and insistence in the continuation of the second phase was highlighted by securing the security of the Qosh Tepa Channel and forming a protective section to ensure the security of the channel.
Also, the hydropolitical policy will give the Taliban multi-layer bargaining power (in political-ideological-economic-commercial-cultural-social dimensions and diplomatic recognition) with the northern neighbors.
Complexity of the situation and relations with neighbours
On the other hand, the rulers of Kabul have tried to stand in front of the opponents of the plan with two diplomatic approaches and threats. Regarding the “drought” and insufficient water, they have talked about solving the problem through diplomacy and discourse. As Mansour, Acting Minister of Energy and Water, said that if a country has a problem related to the construction of the Qosh Tepa Channel, it can solve the problem through dialogue with government officials.
In another dimension, Mohammad Yaqub Mujahid, the Minister of Defense of the Taliban, said: “We are not violating the rights of our neighbors regarding the Amu Darya water, but we are taking our right and no one should prevent this.” From this point of view, the armed forces of the Taliban government will strongly resist any attempt to prevent the implementation of this project.
Meanwhile, the construction and completion of the Qosh Tepa Channel may lead to regional tensions and conflicts. The transfer of Amu Darya water to the plains of northern Afghanistan may result in a sharper reaction from Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan and strain relations.
The degree of water dependence of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on the Amu Darya is very high. The channel can severely affect the economy, water-based industries and hydro-agriculture of the downstream countries of Amu Darya, namely Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Last year, the presidents of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan pointed out the “possibility of pressure on the Amu Darya River” and the need to further improve multilateral interaction mechanisms.
In the middle of September, 2023, the President of Uzbekistan, Mr. Mirziyoyev, said: “The formation of a joint working group to examine all aspects of the construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal and its impact on the water status of the Amu Sea with the participation of Central Asian countries and Afghanistan is necessary“. In response, the Taliban emphasized the absence of a treaty in the Amu Darya area and dismissed the concern as pointless.
This is despite the fact that in September 2023, from the Taliban’s point of view, the construction of the Qosh Tepa Channel and the use of Amu Darya water is Afghanistan’s right, and there is no treaty that has been violated in the Amu Darya basin. Therefore, the water of the river also belongs to Afghanistan.
Сonsequences and prospects
According to the opponents, the Qosh Tepa Channel will “change the regime and balance of water resources in Central Asia, and it will undoubtedly harm the agriculture and environment of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the Aral Basin.”
Legally, the 1946 agreement between the four republics of the Soviet Union did not reflect Afghanistan’s interests in Amu Darya. The absence of Afghanistan in the United Nations Convention on Transboundary Waters (1992), and the agreements governing the Amu Darya between Afghanistan and Central Asian countries such as the Almaty Agreement (1992) do not include Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, there is no pre-determined dispute resolution procedure to handle, and Afghanistan’s water rights as a country in the Amu Darya basin cannot be rejected either.
However, the opponents of the channel point to the lack of knowledge necessary for the effective completion of this canal, the “primitive” construction methods and the lack of cement coating, the occurrence of a large gap and leakage of 9 kilometers along the Qosh Tepa Channel, the deterioration of the Aral Sea and negative social, economic and environmental impacts for downstream countries.
Even the officials of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) say that the completion of the Qosh Tepa Channel with low technological standards will waste a lot of water during operation and will cause a severe water shortage in Central Asia.
It seems that despite the lack of treaties and agreements on transboundary waters, with the opening and completion of phases 2 and 3, the Qosh Tepa Channel can intensify the complexity of the hydropolitical issues of Amu Darya. There is even potential for controversy.
Qosh Tepa channel is “the national security problem of Uzbekistan” and a disaster for Turkmenistan. But in a fair view, Afghanistan’s water rights must also be respected.
Afghanistan’s efforts to operationalize the surface water control policy and the implementation of the hydro-hegemony policy will increase the need for water diplomacy of neighbors and follow up on the negotiation process. With this comprehensive management of countries in water resources, attention to the effects of climate change, sustainable agriculture, the use of institutional and legal regulations and efforts for a water sharing agreement, it can be a geo-economic, geopolitical, diplomatic and regional win for all actors in the Amu Darya basin.
Samyar Rostami is a political observer and senior researcher in international relations, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
