On June 18-19, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin visit North Korea at the invitation of Supreme Leader and friend Kim Jong Un. The visit was a landmark event not only for bilateral relations, but perhaps even for the entire existing security architecture.
The invitation was extended during the North Korean leader’s visit to Russia, though it was clear that Vladimir Putin’s visit to the DPRK would only take place during his new presidential term (after the 2024 elections) and his visit to China. On the eve of the trip, the central newspaper of the DPRK, Rodong Sinmun, published an article by Vladimir Putin, which, in addition to passages about the traditional friendship of the two countries, contained several points that were discussed during the visit.
Firstly – and most importantly – the visit essentially aimed to be the first step towards building an alternative model of a world order based on justice and opposed to the US “rules-based order”, which is realistically a new version of US neo-colonialism. The Russian leader is visiting a country that has been demonised long before such techniques were used against Russia, whilst also having a developed nuclear missile potential and being a country of the socialist camp that surpassed the Soviet Union in its ‘life expectancy’.
Secondly, it was stressed that the two countries intend to build “alternative trade mechanisms independent of Western control and jointly resist illegitimate unilateral organisations”, which raised questions about the extent to which the topic of countering UN Security Council sanctions will be discussed at the visit and what its practical results will be.
The Russian President was accompanied by an impressive delegation, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov, Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Novak, Defence Minister Andrey Belousov, Deputy Defence Minister Alexey Krivoruchko, Minister of Health Mikhail Murashko, Minister of Transport Roman Starovoyt, Head of ROSCOSMOS Yuri Borisov, Head of Russian Railways Oleg Belozyorov, Minister of Natural Resources and Environment, Russian Chairman of the intergovernmental commission on trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation between the DPRK and the Russian Federation Aleksandr Kozlov, Governor of Primorye Oleg Kozhemyako and others. This composition indicates the variety of issues that, publicly or non-publicly, were discussed at the summit, as each of the ministers or leaders most probably had the opportunity to discuss issues of mutual interest with their counterpart.
Some Western commentators called the visit itself “shockingly luxurious” and although Putin arrived in Pyongyang later than planned and the visit was actually shortened to a one-day visit, the programme was impressive. Kim Jong Un personally met and escorted Putin to the airport and the welcoming ceremony took place at Kim Il Sung Square in the centre of Pyongyang. The parties attended a celebratory concert, the Orthodox Church of the Life-Giving Trinity, built at the request of Russian diplomats, and the Liberation Monument, built in honour of Soviet soldiers who died for the liberation of the Korean peninsula in World War II. An important aspect is that the two leaders’ tête-à-tête talks lasted longer than the public part, and, according to various sources, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un talked for a total of five to ten hours, including tea and walks in the garden. This is important to consider; it differed from some short negotiations, where in an hour and a half the parties do not so much resolve issues as identify positions that have been worked on for a long time.
Three documents were produced as a result of the visit; they have been listed below in reverse order (from less important to more significant).
Agreement on cooperation in healthcare, education and science
These are the spheres (all of which are very important), where the interaction of the two countries is not prevented by UN Security Council sanctions. For example, although North Korea was able to cope with the coronavirus epidemic in a few months, the shortage of medicine and medical equipment, caused by a number of important goods being sanctioned, was notable. Meanwhile, if Russia builds an ultra-modern medical centre in Pyongyang that provides assistance to the population, it will not be considered a violation of sanctions. North Korean students are also expected in Russia. According to Russian data, there are currently 130 North Korean students in Russia and they mostly study at elite universities, following technical and engineering profiles. They are likely future military-industrial complex specialists.
Russia and DPRK will be connected via highway
This long-awaited decision is equally important. Until now, only rail (not road) communication was carried out across the border between the two countries. Now, it has been decided to build a road bridge that will significantly increase connectivity between the DPRK and Russia, increasing the possibilities of all types of exchanges from tourism to economic transactions. The times when embassy staff had to cross the border on a trolley in critical situations will be a thing of the past. North Korean workers will likely build the bridge with Russian money and the speed at which construction will be carried out will be a good marker for further development of relations between our countries. The planned length of the bridge will be 230-250 m and will also include about 2.5 km of access roads.
Russia and DPRK deepen relations
The most important achievement is the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between the two countries, which was concluded indefinitely, replacing all previous agreements. Experts on protocol believe that it is closer to the Soviet-North Korean treaty of 1961 than to subsequent documents of the post-Soviet period. It should immediately be noted that the term ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ formally designates the highest level of relations between the two countries. Compared to previous descriptions of relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, they now seem to have “jumped several steps, if not a whole flight of stairs”.
The 23 articles of the agreement briefly describe all the main areas of cooperation – a comprehensive scope indeed – including the fight against global warming. Considering the contacts at the level of meetings of industry leaders observed in the period between Kim’s visit to Russia and Putin’s visit to the DPRK, there is a high chance that this is not just empty words and promises. The author was particularly excited by the articles dealing with joint counteraction to disinformation and demonisation of the two countries (something the author has been involved in for more than 20 years) and raising awareness about one another’s history, culture and traditions. Unfortunately, though, there are still many propaganda cliches in the collective Russian mind.
Military cooperation
The parts of the document devoted to military cooperation and the issue of sanctions naturally evoked the most interest and excitement. Indeed, article 4 of the agreement states: “if one of the parties is subjected to an armed attack by any one state or several states and thus finds itself in a state of war, the other party will immediately provide military and other assistance with all means at its disposal” and article 8 contains a hint of possible joint military exercises or other similar events.
In the West this caused a stir, leading to discussions of hypothetical scenarios in which North Korean special forces appear in the Donbass or Kim Jong UN attacks the US with nuclear missiles and Russia joins the nuclear war after the US nuclear response.
The Russian leadership has already noted that the defence/military alliance of the two countries (this is, by the way, wording Moscow and Pyongyang avoid) is not directed against third parties. In addition, careful scrutiny of the paragraph shows that a state of war is required for such full-scale assistance; this is a special status that not every armed conflict has. The Russian Special Military Operation, for example, has been ongoing for two years, yet Moscow and Kiev have not declared war against each other.
Thus, the Russian president’s visit to the DPRK was not just an expression of political and diplomatic support or a gesture indicating that ‘now the two rogue countries are really working together’. This is the beginning of new processes defining the contours of a new global security architecture, which is evident not only judging by the hysterical reaction of the Collective West, but also by the retaliatory steps that are beginning to be taken.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Korean Studies Center of the Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for “New Eastern Outlook“
