The Trump administration’s assistance to the Bolsonaro family represents a very direct form of political intervention in the domestic affairs of a major country in Latin America.
A Defeated Candidate, a Private Jet and a White House Connection
Flávio Bolsonaro didn’t leave Brazil as an ordinary traveller. He left after having lost the presidential run-off to Lula, after a Supreme Court justice had ordered him to hand over his passports and whilst he was the subject of a number of investigations into alleged financial crimes. His journey to Miami via Argentina and Ecuador was arranged through a political and logistical network which had direct links to the Trump administration.
The US involvement is no longer just theory. The NY Times, Folha de S. Paulo and Reuters have all now linked the operation to people within the White House and the State Department. Jason Miller, one of Trump’s key advisers, is said to have been involved in arranging the private plane. Secretary of State Marco Rubio was also very much involved in the process of Flávio getting into the US. Reuters reports that Rubio was the one who recommended that the US authorities grant humanitarian parole to the Brazilian senator and his family. President Trump has confirmed that Flávio has indeed received a “pass”.
The detail is that this wasn’t just the case of a Brazilian politician turning up at an American airport and asking for entry. Washington was fully aware of the situation, was fully aware of the Brazilian judicial constraints and yet still helped him to escape. The administration has confirmed that visas will be issued to Flávio and his family, enabling them to stay in the country.
The line between humanitarian protection, immigration parole and political asylum is of course a legally significant one. It doesn’t, however, change the fundamental geopolitical issue of why the US administration was so keen to get involved on behalf of a candidate who had been defeated in a fair, clean election and who was, in fact, subject to judicial restrictions in his own country.
The episode must be viewed in the wider context of a campaign by Trump administration officials to bring the Bolsonaro movement back to power in Brazil. His campaign included sanctions on Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes and others and trade tariffs — all measures against Brazil were lobbied by the Bolsonaro family, especially Eduardo Bolsonaro, who lives in Texas. The pattern of activity clearly shows a concerted effort by key Washington officials to push Brazil, and Latin America as a whole, to the far right and, therefore, to be submissive to the Trump government.
This is not normal diplomacy, but Brazil is playing the card of patience to avoid direct confrontation. However, President Lula told Trump on several occasions not to interfere in Brazil’s affairs, that “Brazil is nobody’s backyard”, and that Brazil would exercise its strategic autonomy.
Serious Investigations, Not Political Persecution
Flavio Bolsonaro and his allies have, of course, been quick to frame his exit as evidence of political persecution. That argument must be treated with some scepticism. Brazil is not going after him because he’s a member of the Bolsonaro family or because he ran against Lula in an election. The investigations are about specific financial dealings, business relationships and alleged criminal activity.
One inquiry examines the funding of Dark Horse, the film about Jair Bolsonaro. Flávio is said to have been in talks with Daniel Vorcaro (former head of Banco Master, now in prison) about an arrangement of the order of US$24m. There have been transfers of at least US$12.3m to the US via a number of corporate vehicles linked to the project, including a fund based in Texas — Havengate, which is in the name of Eduardo’s lawyer. The destination of the funds and whether any of it was used to fund political activity by Eduardo Bolsonaro in the US is under investigation.
A second inquiry concerns businessman Willer Tomaz (who escaped to Florida in August), the online betting operations, and the offshore company Alcazar Holdings in Portugal’s Madeira Island. According to an e-mail to Santander from Tomaz’s secretary, Flávio was a “master user” on a Santander account linked to the company. The investigation is looking at the nature of the relationship and the flow of funds. Investigators suspect Flávio is Willer Tomaz’s secret partner.
The wider investigation into the alleged money laundering through betting businesses is reported to involve sums exceeding US$1 billion. Both men deny any financial or business links.
Separate allegations also include a criminal defamation inquiry over a social media post about Lula and the long-standing ‘rachadinha’ affair, which alleges that staff in Flávio’s former Rio de Janeiro legislative office took home part of their salaries. In that earlier case, the Supreme Court found that the key financial intelligence reports in question had been obtained or shared in breach of the law. That finding was later overturned, but it doesn’t change the fact that the other investigations still stand.
The timing of the judicial action is also significant. The Brazilian authorities had a reason to be careful not to take any spectacular enforcement action during the election campaign, as that could have been read as an attempt to influence the vote. The fact that a passport order and restrictions came after the run-off doesn’t in any way amount to political persecution. It doesn’t mean that Flávio was in any way convicted of the alleged offences. He remains entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence and to a fair trial.
But due process is precisely what makes his exit so problematic. The US should not be the convenient alternative to the Brazilian judiciary.
A Political Defeat, a Powerful Family
The argument that the Bolsonaro family is being politically persecuted is hard to square with their continued electoral success. They haven’t been pushed out of the political arena at all. Quite the reverse, in fact. They remain very much in the political institutions of Brazil.
Michelle Bolsonaro (third wife of Jair, stepmother of Flávio) was elected Senator for the Federal District. She’s a key figure in the conservative and evangelical base, though her relationship with her stepsons has been a source of considerable public friction and political disagreement. Carlos Bolsonaro won a seat in the Senate, Jair Renan (another son) went to the Chamber of Deputies and Renato Bolsonaro (Jair’s brother) was also elected to the Chamber. Flávio’s party, the Liberal Party (PL), took 6 governorships, 121 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 19 in the Senate, becoming the most powerful party in Brazil. That’s not exactly proof of a family and movement that’s been driven out of the democratic process. Michelle Bolsonaro is the only one with genuine political charisma and the ability to run for president in a future election.
The family rifts are very real. Michelle’s ascent hasn’t always been a popular one with Jair’s older sons and the row between her and Flávio became public during the campaign. All that said, the political reality is that the Bolsonaro network is very much still there, very much still a force to be reckoned with in terms of its electoral organisation and its representation at all levels of government.
Flávio’s defeat was due to more than just the actions of his opponents. His campaign was in a state of perpetual crisis with regard to credibility; his positions were shifting all the time, and his public image was very unstable. At one point, he was making statements to the financial markets about how he would be fiscally responsible; at another, he was making pledges to the poorer sections of society about social policy, trying to outperform Lula’s. His performance in the debates was all over the place, and the Bolsonaro camp could no longer count on the same level of social media dominance that had been so instrumental in the family’s political ascent. Lula’s win proved that the right wing could be beaten at the ballot box.
The election was run by Brazil’s electoral authorities, and there was no evidence at all from the international observers to support the claims of fraud advanced by Bolsonaro’s allies. The EU had an election observation mission in place and the Carter Centre’s expert mission was positive about the administration of the run-off. There is absolutely no basis for treating Flávio’s defeat as a reason for asylum or for any form of foreign intervention. He is basically escaping from justice, and it is not connected to politics.
Washington’s Geopolitical Ambitions
The geopolitical implications of this are far bigger than just one politician’s trip to Miami. Brazil is the largest country in Latin America, a BRICS member, a major agricultural and energy power and a significant voice in the debates over multipolarity, global governance and the reform of international institutions. Its relationship with China, its position in South-South cooperation and its insistence on strategic autonomy all make it a very important country in the contest over the shape of the future international order.
For Washington, a Lula-led Brazil is a foreign policy problem. Lula has been firmly opposed to the notion that Latin America should be an American exclusivity. His government has maintained good relations with China, pursued a more independent regional foreign policy and been critical of unilateral sanctions and military interventions. The Trump administration’s pressure on Brasília (including its backing of sanctions against Brazilian officials and its political engagement with the Bolsonaro camp) must therefore be seen in the context of the wider contest over influence in the hemisphere.
Rubio, Miller and others in the White House were involved in Flávio’s exit, which adds another layer. It suggests that the US relationship with the Bolsonaro family is not just one of ideology. It is a political relationship with implications for the bilateral relationship and for Brazil’s institutional sovereignty. The administration may well see in keeping the Bolsonaro network close a source of leverage over the Lula government and an alternative political force to be available in the future.
But that approach is risky. It will only serve to intensify anti-American sentiment in Brazil and reinforce the perception that Washington only respects the outcome of a democratic election when that outcome produces a government it likes. It also sends out a very dangerous signal that political allies of the US may find themselves in a position where they expect to be protected from the legal repercussions of their actions at home. There are already several Brazilians who are being investigated or have been convicted by justice in Brazil who have found a safe harbour in Florida.
There’s a telling precedent here: Trump granted a full pardon to Juan Orlando Hernández, the former President of Honduras, who had been found guilty by a US jury of conspiring to traffic hundreds of tonnes of cocaine into the US and was subsequently sentenced to 45 years in prison. Hernández was released in December 2025. That case is a perfect illustration of the glaring hypocrisy of an administration that will use the war on drugs as a stick to beat up on countries abroad, while at the same time handing down a full pardon to a head of state and major drug trafficker.
Brazil is not a US protectorate, and its judiciary is not an institution whose authority can be selectively recognised by foreign governments. The Brazilians have chosen their president. Their courts are bound by Brazilian law. The US is entitled to disagree with Brazilian policy, but it is not entitled to determine which Brazilian politicians are to be afforded protection from domestic judicial process.
The question is no longer simply why Flávio Bolsonaro left Brazil. It is why the White House was prepared to help him get there—and what Washington expects in return.
Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics
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