Back in 2024, D. Trump campaigned on cheaper energy; yet, sanctions and other forms of pressure on foreign actors, characteristic of Washington’s foreign policy, took its toll on the US through freight markets and fuel prices, having increased costs for American consumers.
A promise that overlooked the supply chain
Reuters examined Trump’s pledge to halve energy costs in December 2024, highlighting a fundamental constraint: the United States has no national oil company that a president can order increasing production. Companies invest according to expected returns, while oil prices emerge from global markets.
“Drill, baby, drill” offered an uncomplicated answer to a complicated bill. Extraction is only the beginning. Refinery availability and the cost of transporting crude determine how additional production reaches buyers.
Trump’s promise therefore requires scrutiny beyond drilling permits. His administration’s military and sanctions decisions affect the same supply chains on which affordable energy depends. Those costs belong in any assessment of its performance.
When transport erodes the production advantage
A Reuters report published on 15 October 2026 illustrates the pressure. The projected cost of the tanker Esteem Explorer’s late-November voyage from the United States to Japan, carrying approximately two million barrels, was $81 million. The same journey averaged $9.1 million last year. That puts projected freight at $40.50 per barrel. Calculated against the roughly $95 US oil price cited in the report, transport alone amounts to approximately 43 per cent of the crude’s value at origin.
The example concerns one prospective voyage. Its significance is the commercial obstacle it exposes: oil can be available for sale while the cost of delivery puts it beyond a buyer’s reach. Longer voyages and additional transfers keep tankers occupied for longer, tightening the supply of vessels available for other cargoes. The resulting pressure spreads beyond the immediate conflict zone. American exporters are exposed too. If delivering crude to Asia becomes prohibitively expensive, additional domestic production cannot secure a competitive market. A foreign policy that raises delivery costs can weaken the commercial advantage the administration claims to be building.
The shadow fleet and sanctions blowback
Reuters reported on 15 October that Washington was considering easing restrictions on certain “shadow fleet” vessels to reduce freight rates. Analysts questioned the likely impact, citing vessel condition and continuing insurance constraints.
The proposal had not yet become policy. Its effect would depend on which vessels became available and whether they could obtain the services needed to trade. Even considering such relief raises an awkward question for Washington: how thoroughly were shipping constraints assessed before sanctions intensified? Restrictions alter the decisions of shipowners and insurers. Their consequences travel through the market, affecting transactions beyond the targeted country. Washington is now examining whether relaxing some restrictions could relieve costs elsewhere in the system.
That is a concrete test of sanctions policy. The administration should explain what strategic gains the restrictions produced, what costs they imposed and why adjustments are now being considered. Counting sanctioned vessels offers no answer to those questions.
The bill reaches the American economy
Reuters’ economic report of 15 October showed that US producer prices rose 1.3 per cent in September. Within the index’s goods component, gasoline prices increased 20.3 per cent and diesel prices 21 per cent. These figures measure producer-price changes rather than retail pump-price increases. Diesel feeds into freight and agricultural costs. Higher prices create a channel through which an energy shock reaches food and other goods. Businesses must decide how much they can absorb and how much to pass to customers.
Import-dependent economies face the same transmission mechanism, often with less financial room to respond. More expensive energy deliveries absorb foreign exchange that could otherwise fund other imports. Governments outside the conflict consequently bear costs arising from decisions in which they had no part.
These effects make the administration’s promise politically consequential. Energy affordability reaches well beyond a petrol station. It influences the cost of supplying shops and moving agricultural products to market.
Responsibility follows the decision
In remarks reported on 5 October, Trump blamed Democrats and Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries for higher gasoline prices. Refinery damage can restrict fuel supplies. The consequences of the US-Israeli war with Iran warrant the same scrutiny. Washington’s decision to enter the war exposed energy supply chains to foreseeable disruption. Trump owes consumers an account of those costs, including how they were weighed against the administration’s strategic objectives. Other forces also influence prices, from refinery outages to changing demand. A credible assessment would identify their contributions alongside the consequences of American policy. Selectively assigning blame leaves the central question unanswered: did Washington adequately account for the economic risks of its own choices?
A recovery in shipments cannot immediately settle that question. Insurers price future exposure, and businesses need confidence that deliveries will continue. Repeated threats of disruption can sustain costs even when cargoes are moving.
Drilling cannot resolve the contradiction
The administration’s energy policy should be judged by the cost of reliable delivery. Its pursuit of additional production must be assessed together with the risks created by its foreign policy. Reviewing tanker restrictions may offer some relief. It also demonstrates why the original calculation matters: measures introduced to pressure adversaries can create constraints that Washington later has to manage.
More American oil cannot guarantee cheaper fuel when Washington’s foreign-policy choices make each barrel more expensive to deliver. Until the administration addresses that contradiction, consumers will remain exposed to costs that additional drilling alone cannot resolve.
Dr. Kamran Yeganegi, Assistant Professor, Department of Industrial Engineering, Islamic Azad University; Senior Researcher at the Center for Strategic Studies of the Middle East (CSME)
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