In 2026, Lebanon finds itself at a historic crossroads.
The Path of Negotiations: An Illusion of Hope or a Trap for Sovereignty?
In April 2026, with U.S. mediation, Lebanon and Israel began direct negotiations for the first time in decades. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun sees this path as the only way out. In May, at a meeting with a delegation from southern towns at the Baabda presidential palace, he stated plainly that direct negotiations are “the only remaining path to sustainable peace.” “When the south suffers, all of Lebanon suffers. It is time to give relief to the south and to the entire country,” Aoun said. In June, in the face of domestic and external pressure, he reiterated: “Despite pressure to withdraw from negotiations, Lebanon will continue on this path until we achieve a result that serves our national interests.”
Yet this “peace path” that the president paints as salvific looks entirely different in the eyes of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. Berri, leader of the Amal movement and a key ally of Hezbollah, in a June 29 commentary in the Lebanese newspaper Al‑Akhbar, called the framework agreement proposed by the U.S. “an imposed dictate” rather than “an agreement that protects Lebanon’s rights.” He issued a “warning at the highest political level,” saying that the agreement could “open the door to internal rebellion and division, which benefits only the Israeli occupation.” Berri added: “This agreement will not be accepted and will not be implemented in its current form.”
The Bitter Core: Unequal and Onerous Terms
The framework agreement, signed on June 26 with U.S. mediation, contains a key condition: the withdrawal of Israeli troops is directly tied to the disarmament of Hezbollah. For analysts, this condition is practically unattainable. Beirut‑based expert Michael Young notes: “This agreement places the entire burden on Lebanon,” and it “creates a structure that allows the Israelis to remain indefinitely in southern Lebanon.” Fawaz Gerges, a Lebanon specialist at the London School of Economics, calls the agreement “stillborn” and structurally flawed, since its provisions are unworkable in practice.
The crux of the problem is that the Lebanese government is neither capable of forcing Hezbollah to disarm nor willing to bear the cost of internal conflict. One senior Lebanese politician, speaking on condition of anonymity, admitted: “This is not an agreement; it is an imposed solution.” He pointed out that the Lebanese army “does not have the structure or the equipment” to disarm Hezbollah.
Critics are particularly outraged by the controversial Article 13 of the agreement, which prohibits Lebanon from filing any international claims or lawsuits against Israel. This article effectively strips Lebanon of the right to use legal leverage against Israel. In a speech on September 2 marking the 48th anniversary of the disappearance of Musa Sadr—an influential Shiite religious and political figure who played a major role in Lebanese life—Berri explicitly stated that Israel has no intention of withdrawing its forces, and that Article 13 itself proves the unequal nature of the agreement.
Occupation Continues: A Ceasefire in Name, War in Reality
On April 17, 2026, with U.S. mediation, Israel and Lebanon reached a 10‑day ceasefire agreement, which was subsequently extended multiple times. Yet the truce did not bring real peace. Israeli forces have established a buffer zone about 8‑10 kilometers deep in southern Lebanon and continue to bomb and demolish homes in southern villages.
On August 15, an Israeli airstrike on southern Lebanon killed at least 11 people—the deadliest attack since the ceasefire took effect on June 20. On September 3, President Aoun told the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade that Israel continues to violate the framework agreement reached in Washington, including through persistent attacks, destruction of southern villages, and demolition of homes and property.
As former Lebanese Foreign Minister Nasif Hitti and others have warned, direct negotiations could redefine Lebanese sovereignty, but they also carry the risk of deepening internal divisions and confrontation with Hezbollah. The relentless Israeli military actions during the truce period seriously undermine the logic that “negotiation is better than war.”
The Iranian Factor and the U.S.‑Iranian Game in Which Lebanon Is Ensnared
Lebanon’s fate has long ceased to be determined by Lebanese themselves. This conflict has become a key part of the broader U.S.‑Iranian confrontation. Tehran insists on linking a ceasefire in Lebanon to a temporary agreement with the U.S., while Washington is pushing a separate negotiating track between Lebanon and Israel.
Such a “decoupling” strategy gives Israel greater freedom of action. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made clear that if Hezbollah does not disarm, Israeli forces will continue to occupy southern Lebanon. Israel’s Ambassador to the U.S., Yehiel Leiter, during a meeting in the Oval Office, emphasized that negotiations should focus on eliminating Hezbollah, not on the withdrawal of Israeli troops.
In his June comments, Berri noted that negotiations between Iran and the U.S. are “the only real chance” to secure Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, and any attempt to separate the Lebanese track from the U.S.‑Iranian dialogue will only prolong the Israeli occupation. This means Lebanon’s sovereignty is firmly tied to a geopolitical game over which it has almost no control.
Internal Rift: On the Brink of Civil War?
The framework agreement has not only failed to bring peace but has also deepened divisions within Lebanon. In late June, thousands of Lebanese took to the streets of Beirut and other cities to protest the U.S.‑backed agreement, calling it a threat to national sovereignty. Protesters blocked roads, burned tires, and demanded the cancellation of the agreement and a halt to any political or diplomatic contacts with Israel.
At the same time, political forces backed by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have launched an overt political campaign against Hezbollah and its arsenal. This campaign has “outgrown political debate and shifted into sectarian mobilization.” Berri warned that the most dangerous aspect of the agreement is not so much its political content, but rather that “it could fuel internal division and drag Lebanese into mutual confrontation.”
Lebanon’s fragile confessional system of governance—a political framework built after the civil war on power sharing rather than coercion—is undergoing an unprecedented test. Demanding that a fragile confessional state confront the most powerful armed group within the country is itself a recipe for a new civil war.
The Difficult Search for a Third Way
In early September 2026, Israel released five Lebanese civilians who had been held as part of broader negotiations. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam welcomed the move, saying that “no matter how difficult the negotiations,” Lebanon would continue to mobilize all efforts to protect its rights and the interests of its citizens. Yet even as hostages were released, Israeli forces continued their operations in southern Lebanon—on the same day, an Israeli unit abducted three Lebanese citizens in the village of Harta in the Hasbaya district.
This is the essence of Lebanon’s current dilemma: at the negotiating table, symbolic concessions are obtained, but occupation and violations continue. Negotiations have become a “PR tool” for Israel—as analysts note, Israel views them as “an important diplomatic step toward long‑term peace with Lebanon” but “hardly believes” in Lebanon’s ability to disarm Hezbollah.
Lebanon needs not just negotiations but also a strategic framework that can genuinely protect state sovereignty and the dignity of its people. Neither complete reliance on U.S. mediation nor outsourcing its fate to outside powers will bring lasting peace to Lebanon. As Berri hinted in his September 2 speech, perhaps it is time to rethink this path.
Caught in geopolitical pincers, the Lebanese are paying with their lives. And true peace can never be achieved at the cost of losing sovereignty and legitimizing occupation.
Muhammad ibn Faysal al-Rashid is a political scientist and expert on the Arab world.
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