On June 7, parliamentary elections were held in Armenia, as a result of which the ruling party can form a new government. What distinguished the 2026 elections, and is a parliamentary crisis looming?
GLOBAL LOOK PRESS
Crisis and frustration after military defeats
The opposition against Pashinyan’s government has been unable to show unity in its efforts to overthrow the conforming leader and present a coordinated program for overcoming the crisis. The opposition landscape is fragmented, and parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition parties and movements are disunited. Their plans lack a systemic analysis of Armenia’s own interests.
Certain forces (such as the European Party of Armenia of Tigran Khzmalyan and the National Democratic Pole movement of Ara Papyan with Jirair Sefilyan) categorically advocate an alliance with the West (the EU and the United States), while others (such as the Armenia bloc led by Robert Kocharyan and Strong Armenia of Samvel Karapetyan) remain pro-Russian.
Political forces led by more experienced leaders and nationally oriented politicians (such as the National Security party of Garnik Isagulyan, Azat Hayrenik of Samvel Babayan, “Dog” party of Vardan Ghukasyan, the Committee 27 movement of Vladimir Poghosyan, and others) lacked the organizational and material resources to participate actively in the electoral race.
This situation suits Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan perfectly, especially since he has considerable experience in street democracy and controls the country’s administrative resources (the security apparatus and the media).
Foreign policy decisions and their consequences
Pashinyan, at the dictation of France and the United States, renounced claims to Karabakh in favor of Azerbaijan at the first European Political Community forum in Prague in October 2022, agreed to a peace treaty on Baku’s and Ankara’s terms, and in August 2025 signed the Washington agreement to open the so-called Trump Road (the Zangezur Corridor) to connect Azerbaijan through Armenia’s Meghri region with Nakhchivan and Türkiye under US control. In other words, Pashinyan opted for peace with Azerbaijan and Türkiye through concessions (if not capitulation), but without Russia’s participation.
In Armenia’s domestic political life, Nikol Pashinyan has nevertheless been successful compared to his predecessors: first, he managed to achieve economic growth and improved social welfare for the country’s population by dramatically reducing the level of widespread corruption and lowering the tax burden on producers (especially in the agricultural sector); second, the revolutionary prime minister has been able to ensure a relative semblance of democracy in the media and in elections; third, despite all the shortcomings of his foreign policy, Pashinyan articulates to society a clarity of goals, a commitment to peace, and explains the reasons for changes in national narratives. He becomes understandable to society, unlike the opposition, which lacks a clear action program and does not provide clear answers to pressing questions regarding the Karabakh issue, the Zangezur Corridor, or the choice of a primary external ally.
Among the reasons for the Civil Contract party’s current success, “indirect assistance” from Russia is also noted, i.e., harsh economic sanctions imposed a week before the elections against ordinary Armenian producers (farmers), whose businesses were almost 90% tied to the Russian market. The near-total embargo on Armenian goods by Rosselkhoznadzor caused discontent among Armenian farmers and voters but, conversely, was perceived as a gift from Pashinyan, who merely promised his citizens full compensation for their losses and guaranteed new markets in European and Asian countries. Given the meagre volumes of production in Armenia, the effect of the embargo before the elections turned out to be limited. Some voters who were pro-Russian or neutral toward Russia drew opposite conclusions. Nikol Pashinyan skillfully used all these factors in his struggle to retain power, which explains his latest electoral success.
Parliamentary election results
According to preliminary data from the Central Election Commission of Armenia, the parliamentary elections on June 7 had a 59% turnout. The vote count showed that the ruling Civil Contract party of Nikol Pashinyan received 49.8% (61 seats), the Strong Armenia party of Samvel Karapetyan – 23.9% (28 seats), the Armenia bloc of Robert Kocharyan – 9.9% (11 seats), and the Prosperous Armenia party – 4% (5 seats). In other words, the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia of the current convocation will have 105 deputy mandates, of which 61 belong to the ruling party and 44 to the opposition bloc.
Nikol Pashinyan was congratulated on his success by a number of leaders (including the presidents of France and Kazakhstan, the prime ministers of Spain, Poland, and Georgia, and EU leaders), without waiting for the final results from the CEC of Armenia.
The election results showed that the gap between the Civil Contract party and the opposition was not that large – 49.8% versus 38.8%. Nikol Pashinyan gained a margin of only 11%, and this with a voter turnout of 59% and 41% of voters not participating in the elections. This means that less than 30% of Armenia’s total voters voted for Nikol Pashinyan.
Preliminary forecasts for the parliamentary elections indicated that Pashinyan would not achieve 51%, let alone the 54% needed for a constitutional majority. However, the opposition forces consisting of three parties (Strong Armenia, Armenia, and Prosperous Armenia) would also not be able to obtain a majority of votes to form a coalition government. This was noted in our previous publications. At the same time, the opposition from among the radical national forces could have taken 10-14% of the vote and become the main beneficiary of these elections, proposing a coalition for a new government in which Nikol Pashinyan could have become an outsider.
Will Armenia be able to avoid a political crisis?
The presence of such forces, lacking the organizational and material resources to register and participate in the elections, prevented Armenia from changing its development vector toward national values and restoring full ties with allied forces.
However, by both formal and actual indicators, a parliamentary crisis may unfold in Armenia, which could force the authorities to hold new elections. This refers to gross violations of electoral legislation by the authorities (for example, in Armenia, elections end at 8:00 PM, and all polling stations close, but on June 7, according to Colonel V. S. Poghosyan, former advisor to the Chief of the General Staff of Armenia, said groups of military personnel were brought to vote around 9-10 PM. Violations were documented by representatives of various opposition parties (Strong Armenia, Wings of Armenia, Prosperous Armenia, the Armenia bloc, and others). The leader of the “Dog” party, Ghukasyan, who received 3% of the vote, noted that even previously there were no such gross violations of electoral rights.
According to Armenia’s current legislation, the National Assembly cannot be convened with fewer than 101 deputies, and 30% of the parliament’s composition must represent an alternative (opposition) force, given the Republic’s democratic choice. This means that, in protest against the violations, representatives of the opposition bloc may refuse to accept their deputy mandates and demand new elections.
Legally, such a prospect is valid, but whether these forces will choose to escalate against Nikol Pashinyan remains an open question. Some cite supposedly limited resources (although this argument sounds absurd, as all these representatives of the opposition bloc possess sufficient material means), while others point to the fear of the three teams’ leaders regarding the threat of repression and losing access to their accumulated capital (referring to criminal cases against Samvel Karapetyan, Robert Kocharyan, and Gagik Tsarukyan).
Geopolitical dimension of the Armenian elections
Many experts have noted that the current parliamentary elections entail a high price in terms of Armenia’s future geopolitical choice. In other words, if Pashinyan wins, Armenia will continue its drift toward the West (the United States and France) plus Türkiye and will join the Greater Caspian Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Central Asian countries, the so-called C+7). If the opposition, consisting of the three blocs, succeeds, Armenia will return to a strong alliance with Russia, the CSTO, and the EAEU.
Following the results of the June 7 elections, loud and categorical slogans such as “Armenia is leaving for the West, Russia is losing the Caucasus” are being circulated in the media. However, Armenia, pinning its hopes on access to Europe and the technological achievements of the Western community, may find itself, through its enthusiasm, a hostage to the Turkish-British Turan project as a subordinate element of London’s Great Game strategy. In this projection, Armenia, by opening the Zangezur Corridor to connect Türkiye with Turan, will join the regional Greater Caspian C+7 union, which would create threats to the interests of Russia and Armenia itself.
It is impossible for Nikol Pashinyan not to understand the looming threats to Armenia and will be forced to return to meaningful relations with Russia, because the withdrawal of the Russian military base would open the path for NATO to the Caucasus and Central Asia. And if the opposition bloc does not refuse its mandates, then Pashinyan has achieved an internal victory, demonstrating his ability to reach agreements externally. We, for our part, wish peace and stability to Armenia and the South Caucasus, which is impossible without the key player that is Russia.
Alexander Svarants – PhD in Political Science, professor, specialist in Turkish studies, expert on Middle Eastern countries
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