As it has been previously noted in the New Eastern Outlook, the situation in the Indo-Pacific region is becoming increasingly complex. This trend is clearly manifested in a series of recent events in the relations among the key regional players.
One of these problems, representing today the main challenge to stability within the “US – China – Japan” triangle, is the Taiwan issue. In recent years, India has solidified its position in the tringle and has been quite active, although the transformation of India’s political course deserves a separate look. The particular importance of control over Taiwan is determined by its strategic location. Taiwan constitutes the central unit of the so-called “First Island Chain,” which is acquiring exceptional geopolitical significance.
Finally, it is important to reiterate how inadequate it is to apply the bipolar “Cold War” analogy in order to describe the current situation in the Indo-Pacific region. The present stage of the “Great World Game” is far more complex, primarily due to the growing autonomy in actions not only of India, but also of Japan.
Tokyo is increasingly confident in asserting itself as an independent player, actively expanding the scope of its interests. At the same time, the importance of preserving the military-political alliance with the United States is invariably emphasised, with the “American presence” remaining its part and parcel. For obvious reasons, it is Japan itself that is primarily interested in the continuation of this presence. The financial costs of such cooperation are negligible compared to the political and strategic objectives achieved.
Recent Developments in the “US – China – Japan” Triangle
An important event reflecting the evolution of the regional situation was the adoption of the new US National Security Strategy. Although the NSS-2025 merely enshrined in paper the trends that had long been evident in Washington’s positioning as the leading global power, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, the strategic document is of fundamental significance. Among other aspects, the NSS-2025 was particularly innovative in including Taiwan issue at the very top of the list of US foreign policy and security priorities.
This conceptual innovation was subsequently confirmed by practical steps. Above all, these include the shift in focus of the defense budget for fiscal year 2026, signed by President D. Trump on December 19, towards the Indo-Pacific region in general and the situation around Taiwan in particular. A total of $1.1 billion has been allocated for various types of assistance to Taiwan in defense. The day before, it was announced that the United States would sell weapons to Taiwan totaling $11 billion.
What should be added here is the intention voiced by Taiwan’s president Lai Ching-te this August to increase defense spending to 5% of the island’s GDP. At the end of November, plans were confirmed to allocate $40 billion over the next seven years in addition to already planned military expenditures. Such saber-rattling, especially in the context of the Taiwan issue, which is extremely sensitive for Beijing, has elicited an entirely predictable reaction from China.
Rising Tensions and Fragile Hopes in the Asia-Pacific Region
Nevertheless, the US administration has also demonstrated some positive steps. The partial lifting of restrictions on operations in China by the American technology giant Nvidia serves as one of the examples. The step also worth paying attention to is a joint operation by US and China law enforcement agencies in order to seize 430 kilograms of cocaine, which is an important contribution to addressing the drug problem common in the United States.
At the final press conference, Secretary of State M. Rubio commented in a restrained and neutral manner on a request to clarify the situation regarding the “escalation of tensions between Japan and China.” This pertained to abrupt deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations sparked by an imprudent statement by Prime Minister S. Takaichi regarding Japan’s possible response to a Chinese military operation against Taiwan.
Unfortunately, no significant positive shift is yet visible in relations between Japan and China. Despite the “conciliatory” statement made by S. Takaichi two weeks after the dangerous incident involving Japanese and Chinese fighter jets near Okinawa in early December, it merely expressed a desire to “build constructive and stable relations with China.” The Taiwan issue, which is of key importance for Beijing, was neglected in the statement, which was probably the reason for the statement having so far remained “hanging in the air.” Beijing, for its part, is actively bringing up the complex of aggravated relations with Japan at the UN platform.
Nor does Tokyo’s political practice towards Taiwan facilitate de-escalation of the suddenly heightened tensions. In addition to the functioning of a de facto Japanese embassy in Taipei, it is worth noting the protest lodged by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with a visit to Taiwan by retired Japanese General S. Iwasaki, who was present in the status of a “military adviser” to Taiwan’s president. Prior to the recent deterioration in relations, Beijing had preferred to turn a blind eye to this, which contrasted with the image of a “Chinese aggressor ready to seize” the island.
Escalation of the Political Situation in Taiwan per se
Meanwhile, on the Taiwan island per se, the confrontation between the opposition, which controls the parliament and is represented by the Kuomintang, and the executive branch, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has sharply escalated. The judicial and prosecutorial branches support the DPP and are blocking the opposing forces’ attempts to pass a vote of no confidence in the executive authorities, including the president.
The current contradictions between the Kuomintang and the DPP are centering around the “additional” defense budget. And the opposition is consistently blocking the approval. Public attacks on the Kuomintang are also linked to the party’s multifaceted contacts with mainland China, including the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This process has continued under the party’s new leader, Cheng Li-wun, who assumed leadership of the Kuomintang on November 1 through a democratic procedure. Already under her leadership, a group of Kuomintang deputies visited the PRC, in particular the harbour city of Xiamen, located on the opposite side of the strait.
All in all, the general image of China’s relations with the other two “corners” of the strategic regional triangle is painted in dark tones. Only in relations between Beijing and Washington are there some glimmers of improvement, yet even Sino-American relations remain unstable.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific region issues.
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