The conviction of Jair Bolsonaro and his top allies for plotting a coup marks a historic turning point in Brazil, as the judiciary asserts itself as guardian of democracy against authoritarian threats.
This time, however, the judiciary assumed a preeminent role in defending the rule of law, refusing the post-dictatorship pattern of “conciliation” and ensuring that those who plotted to subvert democracy were held accountable.
The Prosecutor General’s Office presented a robust case that convinced the majority of the Supreme Court justices to convict Bolsonaro and seven major figures, including three four-star generals. The central objective of the criminal organisation was to prevent Bolsonaro from handing over the presidency after losing the 2022 elections, and a structured organisation was created to achieve this aim.
Phase One: Discrediting the Electoral System
The first step in the attempted coup aimed to undermine public confidence in Brazil’s electronic voting system. Before the elections, civil society organisations, universities, and even the armed forces were invited to inspect the system for vulnerabilities—and found none. Dissatisfied with these findings, Bolsonaro pressured the Minister of Defence to alter their conclusions and summoned foreign ambassadors to question the credibility of the elections. These efforts, coupled with disinformation campaigns and fake news, sought to delegitimise the election outcome preemptively, creating a rationale to cancel elections in case of defeat.
A four-star general and the Chief Security Advisor were caught on camera saying, “We have to do something before the elections; afterwards it will be too late. If we have to upend the table, let’s do it.” In Brazilian military parlance, “virar a mesa”—literally “to turn over the table”—signals carrying out a coup or forcibly provoking regime change.
Phase Two: Post-Election Organisation and Threats
After losing to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the plot intensified. Bolsonaro’s network sought to prevent Lula’s inauguration, allegedly planning the assassination of the president-elect, his vice president Geraldo Alckmin, and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes. The operation was codenamed “Punhal Verde-Amarelo” (Green-and-Yellow Dagger), invoking Brazil’s national colours. Surveillance of the Justice’s movements and the creation of parallel intelligence channels were central to the strategy of intimidation and institutional manipulation.
Phase Three: Mobilisation and the January 8, 2023, Invasion
Bolsonaro supporters were mobilised to violently invade Brazil’s three branches of government on January 8, 2023. The plan aimed to provoke sufficient chaos for the incoming administration to declare a state of emergency, enabling the military to seize control. The attempt failed, in part because the newly sworn-in President Lula was absent from Brasília, attending to natural disaster relief, and the government refused to grant exceptional powers to the military.
Judicial Outcome and Notable Votes
Bolsonaro and his aides—including generals, the former Justice Minister, the former Defence Minister, the former Vice President candidate, and heads of the navy and army—were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 16 years and one month to 27 years and three months.
Bolsonaro, as the leader of the criminal organisation, received the maximum penalty, to be initially served in a closed regime under Brazilian law. All defendants have been stripped of political rights for eight years, and military personnel will receive formal marks of dishonour and pay fines for damages to public property, besides a collective fine of roughly USD 5.5 million.
An unusual and striking divergence emerged in the vote of Justice Luís Fux, who defended aspects of the accused’s position more effectively than their lawyers, highlighting both the complexity and transparency of the judicial process.
Significance: Brazil as a Warning for Global Democracy
Televised and public, as all Supreme Court trials are, because of transparency and accountability, the trial sets a precedent for the rule of law in Brazil and globally. It demonstrates that even the highest officeholders, especially military, can be held accountable under civil law for attempting to subvert democratic institutions.
By prosecuting a former president and high-ranking generals, Brazil’s judiciary reinforced the principle that no individual is above the law—a cornerstone of constitutional democracy.
The implications extend far beyond Brazil. In Europe, Hungary and Poland illustrate systematic attempts by leaders to weaken judicial independence. In the U.S., post-2020 election manoeuvres echo aspects of Bolsonaro’s coup attempt. Brazil demonstrates the importance of independent courts capable of resisting both domestic and international pressures and that democracy is not only about elections but also about credible rule-of-law mechanisms, electoral integrity, and transparent accountability.
Disinformation campaigns, attempts to delegitimise elections, and foreign lobbying—visible in Eduardo Bolsonaro’s engagement in the U.S.—underscore the transnational nature of threats to democracy. Brazil’s trial sends a clear message: democracies can withstand assaults on institutions, but only with a vigilant, independent judiciary and political courage.
The Brazilian Supreme Court on Display
An aspect of the Bolsonaro trial was its full public broadcast. The entire process was streamed live on television and YouTube, reflecting a longstanding practice of the Brazilian Supreme Court: all sessions are televised to ensure transparency and accountability.
Across the country, citizens watched on phones or TVs as justices read their opinions, debated among themselves, and voted individually.
In Brazil, each justice must deliver their own vote, either in full or as a summary, and may discuss points with colleagues during the process. This is a marked contrast with the United States, where deliberations occur behind closed doors and rulings are published collectively, often weeks later.
In Brazil, the “sausage-making” of judicial decision-making is entirely public, exposing both the rigor and the theatricality of high-stakes trials.
The live format has its pros and cons. It allows citizens to witness the judicial process firsthand, reinforcing accountability and demystifying legal reasoning. Yet it also turns justices into public figures: their rhetoric, timing, and style are observed and scrutinized in real time.
During the Bolsonaro trial, one justice spent more than 13 hours presenting his vote, while at one point even Brazil’s attorney general briefly nodded off. Moments like these illustrate both the human dimension of the judiciary and the intensity of the process.
The live broadcasts offer an additional layer of significance: public perception becomes part of the trial itself. Citizens not only follow the legal arguments but also form opinions on the personalities and credibility of the justices.
In a politically charged case like Bolsonaro’s, the visibility of deliberations adds a new dimension to accountability, making transparency inseparable from the performance of justice.
Impact on Brazil’s Political Landscape and the Future of Bolsonarism
Domestically, the conviction undermines the credibility of Bolsonaro’s core network and signals that anti-democratic actions carry legal consequences. While Bolsonarism retains strong grassroots and evangelical support, the trial is fracturing its leadership and reducing its institutional influence.
Traditional elites—industrial, financial, and parts of agribusiness—had already abandoned Bolsonaro, seeing him as uncivilised and confrontational, and now rally around Tarcísio de Freitas, governor of São Paulo and a rising centre-right presidential candidate. Bolsonaro and his family remain popular among far-right and evangelical voters, but external pressures, including Trump-era sanctions and Eduardo Bolsonaro’s lobbying in the U.S., amplify the perception of international interference.
The Independence Day celebrations on September 7, featuring a massive American flag in São Paulo, provoked more tensions between the far-right that used to portray themselves as patriotic and national institutions. While Tarcísio de Freitas, at the event, courted Bolsonaro’s base with hardline rhetoric, criticism from mainstream right-wing media forced him to distance himself, further fragmenting the movement.
Looking ahead, Bolsonarism may concentrate on maintaining regional power bases and mobilising the evangelical and far-right electorate, particularly in elections for representatives and senators. These lawmakers could attempt to influence legislation, including amnesty measures for Bolsonaro, despite the Constitution explicitly barring pardons or amnesties for crimes against democracy.
Yet the trial also conveys a didactic lesson: efforts to subvert democracy will face judicial scrutiny, tempering extreme strategies even as populist and ideological appeals continue to shape Brazil’s political debate.
Ricardo Martins, PhD in Sociology, specializing in International Relations and Geopolitics
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