Tokyo’s increasing willingness to play a role in Taiwan issues will undoubtedly further weaken the political-legal foundation of Sino-Japanese relations.
Although the two countries have important diplomatic channels, the Taiwan variable in Sino-Japanese relations has become more prominent after the swearing-in of Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae in Tokyo.
Takaichi, the new Japanese Prime Minister, met with Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in late October, and the two leaders agreed to build a “mutually beneficial strategic relationship.”
However, Takaichi, less than a month into his term as prime minister, told the Japanese parliament on November 7 that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be considered a “survival-threatening situation” and could lead to Tokyo’s military response and the exercise of the right of collective defense.
China also summoned the Japanese ambassador in Beijing in protest. The filthy neck that interferes must be cut off, wrote China’s top diplomat in Osaka, a statement that prompted an official Japanese protest.
Takaichi’s view
Sanae Takaichi’s view of Japan’s history includes visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, changing the constitution and Japan’s forces into a “national army,” removing “renunciation of war” from the constitution, and transforming Japan into a military power. Takaichi and some cabinet members have close ties to Taiwan. He visited Taipei in April and met with some figures.
Previous Japanese leaders have avoided discussing Taiwan. But Takaichi is not like that. Takaichi has long advocated for expanding security cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, and she met with US President Donald Trump after his election victory. With US President Donald Trump’s recent visit to Japan and the signing of a deal, coordination on Beijing’s “rare earth” exports has increased.
The Japanese government’s approach marks a departure from the relatively moderate approaches of previous governments. The new coalition government envisages a revision of the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the Defense Force Development Plan, regulations on foreigners, and an anti-espionage law. This also has broad implications for China.
Geopolitically, projecting an image of a more responsible global player, a departure from traditional foreign policy trends, and a significant shift in its approach to crises are some of the reasons for Tokyo’s recent policy towards Taiwan.
Sinophobia also plays a significant role in Japan’s approach to Taiwan. Japan’s stance on supporting Taiwan comes at a time when Japan has a long history of territorial disputes with China. In this view, the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands are an integral part of Japan’s territory, and China has not provided any credible reasons.
Chinese Reactions
Since early 2025, both countries have taken initiatives to strengthen relations. In addition to the many previous high-level developments between Beijing and Tokyo, people-to-people exchanges have increased, and Beijing has established a visa-free regime for short-term Japanese visitors.
Even Japanese and Chinese officials held their first high-level meeting in six years in March 2025 to strengthen economic cooperation and resolve disputes.
Prime Minister Takaichi met with Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the APEC summit in South Korea. However, with the new government’s approach in Tokyo in recent weeks, the reaction of Chinese media, historical grievances, and Beijing’s strong sensitivity towards Taiwan and China have become more evident.
In Beijing’s overall approach, any military intervention by Japan in Taiwan is contrary to the principles of international law, international order, the one-China principle, and the provisions of the four political documents between China and Japan, as well as the feelings of the Chinese people.
The Taiwan issue is at the center of China’s vital interests, and it is a sacred territory for the Chinese people. Therefore, resolving the problem and its related matters is entirely internal, and the West and Japan have no right to interfere in this matter.
From China’s perspective, Japan’s recent approach and words on Taiwan are “dangerous,” and if Japan tries to intervene in the Taiwan issue by force, it will face China’s military response. Therefore, China hopes that the Japanese government will adhere to political-legal principles and commitments on important issues such as history and Taiwan. Many in Beijing see the slogans and some actions of the Japanese army, government, media, and political forces on the Taiwan issue as an excuse to escape constitutional restrictions and expand militarism.
Beijing also has concerns about whitewashing history, the Nanjing Massacre, and hurting the public sentiment of 1.4 billion Chinese people. As many as 87.7 percent of Chinese respondents had a bad impression of Japan in 2024.
Despite bilateral trade of over $300 billion with China, vast potential for cooperation, and nearly $140 billion in bilateral investment, China is also concerned about the Japanese business community’s misuse of economic activities for espionage purposes.
While Japan and Taiwan have maintained informal relations and the Group of Seven (G7), including Japan, has a positive view of supporting Taiwan, Beijing is also concerned about the formation of an “informal security alliance” between Japan and Taiwan and Japan’s increasingly variable presence in China-Taiwan internal affairs.
Outlook
From Beijing’s perspective, China’s policy towards Japan remains stable. It is even willing to comprehensively advance strategic relations based on mutual benefits, a constructive and stable relationship that aligns with the requirements of the new era. However, the role of new global and geopolitical variables and the approach of the new government in Japan can certainly increase the scope of tension.
Washington’s position on Taiwan is one of “strategic ambiguity.” Takaichi has so far distanced himself from the “strategic ambiguity” of the 1972 Japan-China Joint Statement on Taiwan. Tokyo’s increasing willingness to play a role in Taiwan issues will undoubtedly further weaken the political-legal foundation of Sino-Japanese relations.
The effects of the current tensions may be reduced in tourism, the return of migrants, the reduction of flights and cultural interactions, bilateral trade, Sino-Japanese military exchanges, the review of relations, and the neglect of common interests such as climate change, energy transition, and global trade.
If Takaichi follows pragmatic approaches, relations are likely to remain “relatively stable.” However, Beijing’s “crossing of red lines” on sensitive issues such as the bilateral territorial dispute and Taiwan, in addition to the possibility of sanctions and a trade war, will also lead to restrictions on China’s exports of rare earth elements. However, the possibility of a military confrontation over Taiwan and broader Chinese reactions is also not far-fetched.
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
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