The “Reflections” of outgoing Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba on “Japan in World War II,” coupled with the death of the author of the landmark “Murayama Statement” on October 17, 2025, at the age of 100, have once again evoked debates about the country’s place and role in the greatest man-made catastrophe of the 20th century.
Preliminary Remarks
As for the 1995 “Statement,” which expressed “wholehearted remorse and profound apology” to the Asian nations for Japan’s expansionism in the first half of the 20th century, it became a crucial milestone in the evolution of the postwar Japanese leadership’s position on the country’s role in WWII. The authorship of the “Statement” belongs to the then-Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. To this day, it remains subject to starkly opposing assessments.
It is these two events that have served in Japan as a pretext and sparked, two months after the “main round of debates,” another tour of deliberations, which are being conducted, taking into account the current domestic and external realities of modern Japan.
On S. Ishiba’s “Reflections” and the “Murayama Statement”
Commentators point out that the five-page “Reflections” of the outgoing prime minister contain no innovations compared to what had been said on the topic by S. Ishiba’s predecessors. Half a year prior to the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII, a group of experts appointed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe meticulously carried out this work, taking into account the domestic and international situation on the eve of the war, as well as the needs of current policy. The document prepared at that time was talked through at a cabinet meeting.
In this regard, S. Ishiba’s “Reflections” constitute nothing more than a personal improvisation, in which nothing fundamentally new could have appeared. Indeed, during the press conference where S. Ishiba presented his text, the prime minister expressed “his support of the positions formulated by previous cabinets” while insisting that the question of “why we failed to avert war” had previously been addressed insufficiently.
In particular, he believes that there is a fundamental thesis that ten years ago was neglected, having failed to be elaborated on. The thesis is the following: “(Japan) sought to overcome its diplomatic and economic impasse by means of using force. Its domestic political system failed to serve as a brake to prevent such attempts.” And by saying “domestic political system,” he implies all branches of government, as well as the media of the time, specifically those referred to in Russia as a “power bloc,” whose activities were not exposed to reliable and solid public oversight. This, for S. Ishiba, constitutes the main lesson of the events of 80 years ago.
He would almost certainly have paid attention to the issue of Japan’s responsibility for the “excesses” during WWII, had he been able to foresee that a week after the above-mentioned press conference, the author of the landmark “Murayama Statement,” the Prime Minister of Japan from June 1994 to January 1996, would pass away. Meanwhile, it is precisely the topic raised by T. Murayama in 1995 that remains one of the most sensitive in Japan’s relations with the People’s Republic of China, as well as with both Koreas.
Therefore, we will afford making only the most general remarks on the matter. The first and foremost one boils down to stating that, unfortunately, the information space is dominated by the “history of the victors,” rather than history as a science. Meanwhile, building any kind of solid relations between peoples and states is impossible when based on a lie, even a small one or the one “for the good,” that is to say, an immutable element of propaganda serving pressing political needs. Hardly anything else is as cluttered with fakes as the issue of responsibility for various crimes that go along with all the wars, where truth and falsehood become so intertwined to such an extent that it is already difficult to tell them apart.
Nowadays, discussions on what actually happened in Nanjing at the end of 1937 are still being held at the high expert level. An indisputable fact is the “Three Alls” order (“Kill All, Burn All, Loot All”) issued by the Japanese army during its 1941 operations against Chinese insurgents in the north of the country. But the consequences of carrying out this order differed little from the realities of the civil war among the Chinese themselves, some of whom advocated for an alliance with Japan. The first “comfort women” were by no means Koreans or Chinese, but Japanese women, who viewed their “service” in the areas where army units were stationed “on the continent,” in part, as the fulfillment of their patriotic duty to the country.
Topic of Japan’s Recent History in a Contemporary Context
It should be reiterated that the discussion sparked by the events outlined above is taking place within the context of what is perhaps the problem modern Japan revolves around. And it resides in defining a strategy for both its own socio-economic development and its further positioning on the international stage.
As for the domestic aspects, a “rightward shift” in the general political climate in Japan is becoming increasingly obvious, even in the view of today’s various political movements finding their place on a “scale” from a century ago in a quite nominal way. For example, the terms “right-wing” and “fascist” today no longer carry any useful information. They are used primarily by propaganda for the purpose of discrediting the camp opposed to the absurdity of the “new normal.” Drawing parallels between the current domestic political situation in Japan and the period preceding WWII is equally unreasonable and groundless.
Meanwhile, the country today indeed finds itself facing a crucial choice regarding its positioning on the international stage. It is largely lucrative to “become like everyone else,” which means to acquire a “sharp tooth” for survival in the jungle of the modern world order. The long-standing process of “burden-sharing” among the participants of the US-Japan alliance, encouraged, incidentally, by the US, facilitates movement in this direction. But still, compared to other leading players, the scale of initiatives in this area does not yet give Japan grounds for defining them with the terms from 80 years ago, such as “militarisation”.
Bearing in mind the continual assertions about the “dependence” of modern Japan on the US, it should be noted that in this world, everyone is, to one degree or another, “dependent” on anybody else. And this is correct; this is how it should be in human society. No “independence,” in the semantic understanding of the word, exists as a matter of principle, just as there is no “security” and, consequently, no universal means of ensuring it.
This is exactly what the so-called “security paradox” can be attributed to, with it almost certainly coming into play, in the most catastrophic way for the region, should Japan not set any limits to the size of its “sharp tooth.” However, not only does it pertain to Japan but to all the participants of the current stage of the “Great World Game.” Either we all live more or less safely together, or we will perish prematurely. And even in this case, again, all together.
Meanwhile, the current undisputed international clout of Japan, which justifiably lays claim to participating in the reform of the UN Security Council as part of the “Group of Four” (together with India, Brazil, and Germany), is the fruit of implementing the postwar “Yoshida Doctrine.” And it is diametrically opposed to the doctrinal ideas of prewar Japan. It would not be an exaggeration to say that at the international stage of the postwar era, Japan, without firing a single shot, has to a significant extent achieved the goals that 80-90 years ago provoked spilling seas of blood with the endeavors to meet them.
And that apparently is the main lesson that can be drawn from an analysis of all the circumstances of the worldwide tragedy of the mid-20th century, in which Japan took part directly. And being universal by nature, the lesson is of value not only for Japan.
Vladimir Terekhov, Expert on Asia-Pacific Issues
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