Military professionalism, an emphasized principle in the Prussian model, is what created the mindset of the Arab officer corps that they represent the backbone of the state, or more correctly, “THEY ARE” the state.
Even worse to note, if the Arab world sheds the Ottoman-era governance models it inherited, it’s going to be as if they are shooting themselves in the foot, to try to build something they’ve never known how to operate: Democracy.
That’s how historical legacies work. Arabs thought they could simply declare “Authoritarianism” dead, but this campaign failed miserably during the Arab Spring, though millions really believed it would work.
So why did it fail so quickly?
The Illusion of Sovereign Choice
As reformers keep pushing in that direction, as it’s their habit, I bet they understand as well that they are confronting the integrity of state systems that have operated this way for over a century, systems that have become integral parts of the political infrastructure, controlling all aspects of governance, security, and administration.
Otherwise, if Arab states shed the Ottoman governance model wholesale, it’s actually going to be as if they are dismantling the very structures that have held their states together, trying to achieve transformation on terms that might work in theory, but give no credit to the complex realities of “Project Democracy” in the Middle East.
They are discussing democratic transitions, while they know the political repercussions that such systemic change would trigger, and more importantly, the chain reaction of instability that would hit the integrity of state institutions across the region.
When Principles Bend to Convenience
When you read about Western observers condemning Arab authoritarianism for the “heavy political toll” it causes through its repressive governance, and their denunciation of restrictions on civil society as a “serious violation of democratic principles”.
You begin to wonder: how can these same observers ignore the fact that it was European powers -particularly Germany in this case – who helped build these authoritarian systems in the first place?
How can they condemn what they themselves helped create?
Not only that, Arab leaders also find themselves forced to maintain these authoritarian structures, trying their best to find a path where their nations would not bear the burden alone of systemic transformation.
The Architecture of Borrowed Power
In the 1880s, the Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, was desperately looking for a lifeline, and he did find it in Germany. It started in 1882, when Lieutenant Colonel Otto Köhler arrived in Istanbul to act as a military advisor. This was the first step on the path of overhauling the Ottoman governance system, as it seemed then that the Sublime Porte wasn’t able to modernize its ruling system without help.
They absolutely needed to pool the expertise, and they needed to have Western European models. Seeing the challenges both politically and militarily, it was absolutely important to have a “coalition of the willing”, but then, it was actually related to imperial survival.
This transformation came through two possible paths the Ottomans could take. As historian Stanford Shaw noted, they could adopt a new “international framework” by imitating Western institutions completely, or take a “national approach” by adopting reforms to “Ottoman realities of the day.” The latter proved more effective, but it embedded authoritarian tendencies deeply into the system.
The Ottomans seemed “arm-twisted” to go along with the German-led European modernization direction while trying to preserve their imperial legitimacy.
The Prussian Blueprint Goes Global
Basically, what the German mission to Istanbul taught the Ottomans is Prussian discipline, hierarchical command structures, mechanisms of centralized control, and military supremacy on the expense of civil institutions.
Do these governance principles sound familiar across the Arab world to this very day?
Colmar von der Goltz, an officer who had led the German military mission for 12 years (1883 – 1895), trained the officers of the Ottoman army and even wrote textbooks for them, which created an entire generation of military commanders who were taught in the “Prussian” school of governance.
The bleed from this Prussian-schooled military attitude into civil political governance occurred due to the already blurred line between the Ottomans’ military and civilian authorities.
In 1914, Professor Franz Schmidt arrived with a mission: to reconstruct Turkish education according to German models. The German-Turkish Association, founded in Istanbul in 1915, worked to blend German organizational methods with local needs, but the underlying assumption was clear: education should serve the state, producing loyal, technically competent citizens who knew their place in the hierarchy.
The Long Shadow of Authoritarianism
When the Ottoman Empire fell after World War I, its former Arab provinces (Eyalets) inherited its German-inspired governance structures, and that’s why the Centralized Security State became the default model. This wasn’t some embedded or indigenous Arab tradition; this was the Ottoman-German model of state supremacy, perfected and passed down, and this is why military Primacy in politics became normalized.
Military professionalism, an emphasized principle in the Prussian model, is what created the mindset of the Arab officer corps that they represent the backbone of the state, or more correctly, “THEY ARE” the state. Arabi military officers who received their training under the Ottomans are the ones who formed the core of post-independence governments.
They drew directly from this Ottoman-German playbook, and “Bureaucratic Authoritarianism” became the operating system. The German love for efficient, hierarchical bureaucracy created what Historian Juan Cole identifies as “a thoroughly authoritarian political culture” resistant to democratic movements.
A system of top-down control, not bottom-up participation, administrative efficiency over popular representation, state security over individual rights.
The Failure to Accommodate Diversity left a toxic legacy and created lasting wounds, as the German-influenced Ottoman push for unified, homogeneous states through language policy and cultural standardization was adopted even by the Young Turks.
The post-independence Arab authoritarian culture emanated from the Ottomans’ inability to accommodate popular demands and lack of respect for democracy. Some historians also highlight that sectarian and ethnic tensions across the Arab world were partially a product of Ottoman policies, which overstressed uniformity and central control over the embrace of diversity.
So here we are in 2025, and the shadow of these Ottoman-German governance models still looms large over Arab politics. When we see persistent authoritarian rule, dominant security services, or weak democratic institutions across the region, we’re witnessing the long-term effects of state-building patterns established over a century ago.
The Spring that Didn’t Yield!
Those Arab Spring rebels were actually revolting against these very systems, as demonstrators across Arab “Maidans” demanded political participation, accountability, social justice, freedom, and “democracy”.
But was there really any hope for transformation?
Judging by the persistent patterns we see, the military coups, the security state apparatus, the suppression of dissent, and the centralized control, it seems that the Ottoman-German imprint runs deeper than many realize.
The legacy isn’t deterministic, sure, as some former Ottoman territories have found different paths. But the challenge remains massive, and the main question persists: Where Will These Historical Inheritances Lead?
Let me clearly iterate that this modest effort to understand this pessimistic trajectory is not designed to excuse contemporary Arab authoritarianism; it’s just an effort to illuminate a rarely discussed aspect of its deep, inherited roots.
As Eugene Rogan observes, the Ottomans “learned some important lessons from the experience” of implementing European-style reforms. But these lessons often reinforced authoritarian rather than democratic tendencies—and those tendencies persist.
This development has produced fundamental challenges for governance across the region. I’ll leave the full implications to the reader to deduce.
Yes, the Ottomans have fallen, and their marriage of convenience with the Germans ended more than a century ago, but the governance system they have bred is still very much alive and kicking.
This Ottoman/Prussian model is still suppressing possibilities across the Arab world, and recognizing this legacy is important for anybody who seeks to understand – or optimistically speaking, “transform” – the governance landscape of the Middle East.
Yet, the question still stands: Is there really any hope for that?
Tamer Mansour, Egyptian Independent Writer & Researcher
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