In 2025, Indonesia became a member of BRICS, and Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam received partner status. We will discuss the prospects and consequences of Laos, a strategically important country, joining BRICS in this article.
Laos’ Challenges and BRICS as a Potential Solution
For Laos, which is experiencing a critical increase in domestic and external debt, BRICS membership offers access to alternative financing sources. The BRICS New Development Bank, whose total approved project portfolio reached $39 billion by the end of 2024, could play a significant role in this regard. The New Development Bank adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, which aligns with Laos’ aspirations. Furthermore, if BRICS succeeds in creating an investment platform, this would also benefit Laos by helping to resolve its debt crisis. Additionally, BRICS’s emphasis on trade in local currencies could help Laos reduce its reliance on US dollar transactions and mitigate exchange rate volatility.
Another issue is Laos’s trade dependence on China. The country receives most of its investments from the PRC; it is Laos’ main trading partner, and the two countries are closely linked by transport routes: the railway connection launched in December 2021 and the China-Laos-Cambodia cross-border route opened in April 2025. However, not only is the degree of dependence (which is a subject of debate) important, but also its perception. Western countries view any Chinese initiatives towards its neighbors as a threat and, therefore, may exert pressure on Laos or on Indochina as a whole, which could destabilize the cautious balance characteristic of Southeast Asian diplomacy. Laos’ immediate neighbors and its partners in ASEAN, who strive to maneuver between the interests of great powers, might also react negatively to Laos drawing closer exclusively to China.
Consequently, Laos is forced to hedge. In this regard, cooperation with Western countries is complicated by logistical difficulties (Laos’ remoteness and lack of sea access), and, concerning specifically the US, also by Donald Trump’s high tariffs of 40%. Joining BRICS, in turn, would provide Laos with access to new markets with which the country has transport links through China and other neighbors and BRICS partners—Thailand and Vietnam. This would help diversify imports and exports, which would not only benefit the country’s economy but also make it appear less dependent on China in the eyes of other partners (and competitors of the PRC).
Access to BRICS technological cooperation programs could accelerate Laos’ achievement of its digital transformation goals. The announced start of construction for the China-ASEAN Artificial Intelligence Application Cooperation Center in September 2025 demonstrates the growing potential of regional technology initiatives, and closer cooperation between Indochinese countries, including Laos, with BRICS enhances this potential. BRICS membership would significantly simplify Laos’ access to the Indian IT sector and cooperation with Russia in cybersecurity.
Increased cooperation in the defense sphere is also possible. China and Laos already conduct annual joint military exercises, “Friendship Shield“; similar joint exercises are held annually with Russia as well, the most recent, “Laros 2025,” began in September 2025. Joining BRICS could increase the intensity of such joint activities and also open up the market for high-tech military equipment to Laos.
What Makes Laos Attractive to BRICS?
For BRICS members, Laos holds significant strategic and geographical interest. The country serves as a land bridge connecting China with Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, which is critical for the Belt and Road Initiative. Therefore, BRICS membership or partnership could promote trade expansion and, consequently, South-South cooperation.
Economic benefits include access to Laos’ energy resources, primarily its developed hydropower sector. The country, aiming to become the “Battery of Southeast Asia,” could also establish exports to energy-reliant China and India. Laos can develop this important sector through technological cooperation with Russia, which has extensive experience in the energy field.
The economic difficulties Laos faces may deter a number of potential BRICS investors. However, the Lao government had already planned a series of measures to address existing problems by the end of 2024, and by August 2025, an improvement in the situation was observable: decreasing inflation, stabilization of the Lao kip exchange rate, and increased efficiency in currency regulation. These measures will allow Laos to be a stronger and more useful partner for the BRICS group.
BRICS Partnership for Laos: Not Bandwagoning, but Hedging
I consider the scenario of Laos joining BRICS as a full member in the near future unrealistic due to potential pressure from Western countries and several ASEAN states, especially those that are neutrally positive towards the US and wary of China. However, joining the group as a partner country is quite possible and would be beneficial for both Laos and the BRICS states.
The partnership format would allow Laos, while remaining within the system of trade, transport routes, and cooperation with China, to attract goods and investments, increase exports, and establish joint projects with other partners of the “Eurasian Land Bridge.” In Laos’ case, such a decision would represent not bandwagoning, but rather hedging, and would not create tension with its immediate neighbors. Simultaneously, it would attract more investment from BRICS into Indochina and contribute to the development and integration of the peninsula’s countries with the BRICS group, a process in which Laos would play an important strategic and logistical role.
Daniil Romanenko, Japanologist researcher from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
