The leaders of the two countries agreed to respond jointly to the rapid changes in the international order and to strengthen cooperation by expanding the alliance beyond the military sphere.
In the run-up
South Korean media spent the entire summer debating how the visit would unfold and how President Lee should conduct himself. The expectation was that Trump would aggressively push his position, while Lee Jae-myung—who, back when he was an active opposition figure, often played the anti-American card—would have to prove to the U.S. president that he was “one of the good guys,” not some crypto-communist, as both South Korean and American conservatives had portrayed him. Commentators stressed that “an alliance requires mutual respect, not unilateral demands,” and that the President of the Republic of Korea must “firmly state that while Korea remains committed to the North Atlantic alliance, it cannot do so at the expense of national sovereignty or regional stability.” They added that “the summit offers South Korea an opportunity to strengthen the alliance’s predictability before global instability intensifies.”
It was also noted that since Trump’s talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin had ended without a concrete deal, he would be determined to secure a win.
On August 22, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed the agenda for the upcoming presidential summit. They emphasized that one of the main topics of the meeting would be the further development of the bilateral military alliance and reaffirmed the importance of trilateral security cooperation involving Japan. Meanwhile, President Lee, already aboard his plane, declared that he was “ready to discuss with the U.S. president all issues related to North Korea without any restrictions.” Lee Jae-myung stressed that he intended to brief Donald Trump on the details of a three-stage denuclearization plan for North Korea, which provides for freezing, reducing, and ultimately dismantling Pyongyang’s nuclear program, since peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula are crucial to South Korea’s security, and the situation is worsening due to growing hostility and the expansion of Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities.
How the Summit Unfolded
President Lee Jae-myung met with U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington on August 25, 82 days after taking office. This was the third attempt, as a planned meeting at the G7 summit in Canada in June was canceled when Trump abruptly returned to Washington, citing instability in the Middle East. Lee’s absence from the NATO summit in the Netherlands delayed the meeting even further, making it later than those with U.S. Presidents Moon Jae-in (51 days after taking office) and Yoon Suk-yeol (11 days). Coincidentally—or perhaps not—the summit took place in the middle of the Ulchi Freedom Shield military drills, which North Korea traditionally regards as an invasion rehearsal and denounces every time with fiery rhetoric.
Trump made the first move in his typical style: right before the summit, he dramatically raised the stakes and lashed out at Lee, posting on his social media platform TruthSocial: “What is going on in South Korea? It looks like a purge or a revolution. We cannot allow this and do business there. Today I’m meeting the new president at the White House.” While what Lee was doing in domestic politics could indeed be described as a “purge,” and Trump the Protestant may well have been genuinely irritated by Lee’s attempts to shake up Protestant sects that backed his rivals, something similar had already been done with Volodymyr Zelensky, and, in Trump’s previous term, with Kim Jong-un (remember all that “fire and fury” talk?). Before the negotiations even start, the tension must be cranked up to maximum, a sense of crisis must be created, enter the “hold me back, guys” mode—and then gradually start “backing off,” extracting maximum benefit for oneself and leaving the opponent feeling “well, at least we’re still alive.” And if, as with North Korea, the opponent doesn’t flinch, Trump moves to phase two: “Now let’s talk business.”
Lee had no right to get into a fight with Trump, so he began with excessive flattery and thanks, after which rapport was established. Then, during their 140-minute meeting, the two leaders discussed a very broad range of issues: trade, economic cooperation, investment, shipbuilding, advanced technologies, security cooperation, relations with Japan, prospects for resolving the North Korean issue, peace on the Korean Peninsula, and more.
The “unequal exchange” of gifts was also interesting. Lee presented Trump with a custom-made golf club engraved with his name, a model of a historic turtle ship, and a MAGA cowboy hat. According to the presidential administration, when Trump expressed interest in Lee’s signing pen, Lee immediately handed it over. Later, Trump escorted South Korean officials to the “gift room,” where he offered them items like MAGA caps, golf balls, and lapel pins—personally signing them—as well as distributing presidential coins.
Outcomes of the Meeting
Judging by joint statements and media reports, here is what they agreed upon:
North Korea. Lee Jae-myung urged Donald Trump to take on “a peacemaker role that could secure the U.S. president a place in world history,” opening a new path to peace on the Korean Peninsula, as the American leader expressed hope to meet with North Korea’s leader.
In this context, Trump appears ready to attend the APEC summit in late October 2025 in Gyeongju, South Korea — if Kim Jong-un is invited. Although, given the North’s policy toward the South, the chances of Kim showing up in Gyeongju are about the same as a 300-meter white kitten appearing in the middle of New York City.
Trilateral cooperation. “Improving relations between Korea and Japan is also important for Korea-U.S. relations,” Lee said.
Military cooperation. The issues of reducing the U.S. troop presence in South Korea or increasing Seoul’s payments for their deployment (which were a major concern in Seoul) were not discussed, but Trump said he wanted to ask Seoul to grant the U.S. “ownership rights” to the land on which American bases are located — instead of a lease. In addition, South Korea will indeed increase defense spending and purchase more U.S. equipment.
Economic cooperation. Trump and Lee emphasized the importance of bilateral economic cooperation, particularly in the shipbuilding sector. “The United States seems to be becoming great again,” Lee said. What went unsaid was that the project “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again” — which includes building new shipyards in the U.S., training shipbuilding personnel, restoring related supply chains, constructing American ships, and cooperating on maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) projects—was the result of arm-twisting and tariff war threats.
As for Seoul’s attempts to renegotiate the terms of previous deals, Trump’s response boiled down to, “You can try, but I’m not promising anything.” Ultimately, Seoul and Washington agreed to keep the existing tariff agreement unchanged, as the outstanding issues had been resolved during negotiations.
At the “Korea–U.S. Business Roundtable,” which took place after the leaders’ summit, a total of 11 Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) were signed—but everyone understands the difference between a finalized agreement and a “protocol of intent.”
The China factor. Hardly mentioned in the English-language media, but perhaps the MOST important statement by President Lee was that the policy of “security with the U.S., economy with China” is no longer viable: Seoul is compelled to follow Washington’s lead, maintaining only a managed minimum of relations with Beijing.
To Sum Up
Naturally, depending on how the reader feels about President Lee, one might conclude that either he had to set aside his principles and promises for the good of the nation, or that a cynical populist revealed his true colors, acting solely within a paradigm of personal gain.
The denuclearization concept that Lee hoped to “sell” to Trump as a way to rein in Pyongyang is not only morally obsolete (the North long ago moved beyond that framework, and what can be discussed now is arms control at best—if not de facto recognition), but it also put a final nail in Lee’s reputation in Pyongyang. From the KCNA’s perspective, he displayed “the essence of a hypocrite obsessed with a ‘denuclearization delusion.’” Without an attempt to latch on to Trump, dialogue will not happen.
We should also watch how Beijing reacts to the abandonment of a multi-vector policy.
On the other hand, a pro-American course will allow Lee to solve some problems with conservatives. Those who dislike him personally or are Yoon’s supporters will not change their minds, but the rest of the right will have to appreciate such a course.
Thus, in a world fragmented by global turbulence, South Korea now sits firmly on the American chair—even when the country is governed by a president with an anti-American image.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
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