Trump’s trade policy isn’t just breaking with decades of globalization built on free trade, it is effectively redirecting it.
Deals: Trade & Geopolitics
When President Donald Trump signed his series of trade deals, many were quick to label them as triumphs of free trade. On the surface, the numbers seemed to back that claim: US exports often entered foreign markets with zero tariffs, a textbook definition of trade liberalization. But scratch the surface, and a very different picture emerges—one in which “free” trade looks remarkably one-sided.
Take the US-EU trade deal. While American products cross into European markets tariff-free, European goods entering the US face tariffs of up to 15%. Steel-related exports from the EU are hit even harder, burdened with tariffs as high as 50%. These figures are not outliers. Rather, they signal a broader shift in Washington’s trade strategy—one that redefines reciprocity in America’s favor.
Vietnam’s recent agreement with the US is a case in point. Heralded as a milestone for US engagement in the Indo-Pacific, the deal gives American exports a zero-tariff gateway into Vietnamese markets. In exchange, Vietnamese exports to the US will carry tariffs as high as 20%. The imbalance, however, doesn’t end there. In a move likely aimed at ‘containing’ Beijing, Vietnam also accepted an additional 40% tariff on transshipments from third countries—a clause that could have far-reaching implications for regional trade flows. These deals mark a departure from traditional notions of mutual benefit. They establish a precedent: access to the American market now comes with strings attached, often in the form of economic concessions and strategic alignments.
If any country exemplifies the increasingly transactional nature of global trade, it is India. Nowhere is the fusion of commerce and geopolitics more explicit than in New Delhi’s ongoing tussle with Washington over market access and foreign policy alignment. When India declined to sign a deal that would have opened its markets—particularly its agricultural sector—to tariff-free US imports, the Trump administration responded with punitive force. A 25% tariff was slapped on Indian goods. The message was clear: reject our economic terms and face the consequences.
But that was not the end of it. A second 25% tariff followed, this time not over trade imbalances or domestic protectionism, but as punishment for India’s decision to continue purchasing oil from Russia. At the heart of this demand was a broader strategic aim, i.e., to weaken Moscow’s ability to sustain its military operations in Ukraine. India, in effect, was being asked to abandon a key pillar of its foreign policy to retain favorable access to American markets. That’s not just trade policy; that’s coercive diplomacy wearing the mask of economic negotiation. The combined 50% tariff now levied on Indian exports represents more than a trade dispute. In fact, it’s a signal that Washington is willing to use its market as leverage to enforce foreign policy compliance. As India grapples with this new reality, the space it once occupied in the US market could quickly become available to competitors eager to fill the gap.
Japan, once a staunch advocate of bilateral free trade on its own terms, has swiftly pivoted toward an economic and foreign policy trajectory closely aligned with Washington. The partnership now extends well beyond tariff negotiations or market access. It encompasses co-development of cutting-edge semiconductors, joint efforts on energy security, and expanded maritime defense cooperation across the Indo-Pacific. In effect, economic engagement has been redefined. Under Trump’s approach, trade is no longer just commerce; it’s a mechanism for forging deeper technological integration and cementing long-term strategic alliances.
Back to the Future of American Hegemony
While often packaged as a populist promise to restore American prosperity, Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) doctrine is, at its core and in the context explained above, an attempt to reassert US global hegemony. Though it masquerades as a nationalist agenda focused on protecting American workers and industries, the real battleground for MAGA is international—spanning trade deals, military alliances, and geopolitical influence.
Take Trump’s dealings with Europe. Often overlooked amid the bluster and soundbites is a strategic, albeit coercive, effort to solidify US dominance over its NATO allies. Under pressure from Washington, NATO members—most of them European—committed to increased defense spending, a long-standing Trump demand. While framed as a matter of fairness, this shift has only deepened Europe’s dependence on American military support. Far from bolstering European sovereignty, it reinforces a system in which the continent’s security is tethered to the whims of Washington.
Unless Europe finds the political will to invest in an independent security infrastructure, it risks remaining in the strategic shadow of the US—a reality MAGA not only accepts but actively cultivates.
Meanwhile, Trump’s trade negotiations with countries like Vietnam, Japan, and India reveal MAGA’s more global ambitions. These deals aren’t just about jobs or factories; they’re about shrinking the geopolitical and geo-economic space available to America’s chief rivals: China and Russia. In this sense, MAGA is less a blueprint for domestic revival than a containment strategy aimed at preserving US primacy in a rapidly shifting world order.
This isn’t the narrative Trump sells to his base, but it’s the one playing out in real time. The larger question now is not whether MAGA can deliver on its promises. Rather, it is whether the strategy is even sustainable. With Trump’s trade doctrine so personally branded, any shift in political leadership could unravel it. Countries currently making concessions to Washington may soon demand renegotiations if a new administration takes even a slightly different path. And the more resistance, MAGA encounters globally—from partners like India and Canada to adversaries like China—the more brittle and unsustainable it becomes. Three years from now, whether the United States continues down this path depends less on global dynamics and more on one simple variable: who sits in the Oval Office.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.
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