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Lee Jae-myung’s Diplomatic Debut at the G7 Summit

Konstantin Asmolov, June 26, 2025

The first steps of South Korea’s new president on the international stage are drawing attention, as many try to decipher his future foreign policy trajectory through them.
Lee Jae myung

First Calls: Japan Before China — A Move That Might Raise Eyebrows in Washington

It’s worth recalling that during his campaign, Lee Jae-myung’s message was a mix of “all good things against all bad ones.” On the one hand, he reiterated his progressive stance, emphasizing the need for a pragmatic foreign policy that serves national interests. On the other hand, he spoke of the importance of strengthening alliances with the U.S. and Japan.

Analysts have already noted that Lee’s “first three calls” lineup resembles that of conservative presidents. To clarify: the first call always goes to the U.S. president — even the liberal Moon Jae-in followed that tradition. But under conservative leaders, Japan typically came second, followed by China, whereas liberals reversed the order. Lee called Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba before Chinese President Xi. He has yet to speak with the Russian leader, and notably, there has been no formal message of congratulations from Moscow — unsurprising, given that South Korea is still classified as an “unfriendly country.”

Lee Jae-myung’s diplomatic debut was not a failure, but a half-success

There’s another point worth noting: Lee had his first phone call with Donald Trump three days after taking office. Trump congratulated him on the election victory. By contrast, Lee’s predecessors usually spoke with the U.S. president either on election day or the following day. Shortly after Lee’s election, the White House also issued a statement reiterating concerns over China’s growing influence in democratic countries. This raises a question: to what extent was Trump indirectly referring to South Korea, where conservatives allege such interference exists? In the past, Lee supported strategic cooperation between Washington and Beijing and was critical of the trilateral partnership among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan.

North Korea: A Slightly Open Door, Met With Silence

On the North Korean front, President Lee has taken a series of steps that, on the surface, open the door to dialogue. First, South Korea halted propaganda broadcasts to the North, and Pyongyang reciprocated. Second, Lee made a very public pledge to put an end to the balloon leaflet launches across the border. Whether that promise will be implemented in practice remains to be seen.

But for now, Pyongyang remains silent, with no direct response to Seoul’s overtures. Perhaps from the North’s perspective, these are minimal gestures — especially as military drills, including near the border, are still ongoing. Officially, this is due to the lack of new orders to halt them. This leaves the author with two questions: Will President Lee take more significant steps to reduce inter-Korean tensions? And what will he do if, in response to his efforts, Pyongyang signals that in its view, “hypocritical democrats” are no better than their openly hostile conservative counterparts?

Lee Jae-myung at the G7 Summit

But the most closely watched moment of Lee’s diplomatic debut was his appearance at the G7 Summit in Alberta, Canada, from June 15 to 17, 2025. As local media noted ahead of the visit, “For South Korea, this is more than just a symbolic return to the global stage after a period of diplomatic lull — it’s a vital opportunity to reaffirm its voice in international affairs through practical, principled, and proactive diplomacy.”

In the author’s view, the overall impression was somewhat weaker than that left by Yoon Suk-yeol, though Lee had two mitigating factors in his favor. First, he didn’t manage to meet Donald Trump — but for a good reason: the U.S. president left the summit early, citing the Israel-Iran conflict.

Second, Lee took office without a transition period, leaving him with limited time to develop a detailed foreign policy agenda or tailored proposals for each counterpart. As a result, most of his meetings were informal conversations with the leaders of Canada, the UK, Australia, South Africa, India, Brazil, and Mexico, as well as with UN Secretary-General António Guterres and top EU officials. According to South Korean experts, he managed to raise potential topics for future cooperation and left a generally positive impression.

At the summit, Lee did speak publicly — emphasizing the critical importance of energy security and the stabilization of key mineral supply chains. Speaking twice during the sessions, he presented his vision for building a reliable, cost-effective, and sustainable energy system as part of the “Future of Energy Security” agenda. He also reaffirmed South Korea’s strong commitment to helping shape a stable global AI ecosystem. In this way, he was able to introduce himself without getting drawn into political controversies.

Nevertheless, the author highlights three moments worth attention. First, during his meeting with the Japanese prime minister — arguably Lee’s most important engagement — the South Korean president did not raise historical or territorial disputes, not even with a formulaic “let’s work toward solutions.” South Korean media noted this shift, seeing it as a departure from Lee’s previously hardline stance toward Tokyo. When the Yoon Suk-yeol administration pushed for closer ties with Japan under the trilateral framework with the U.S., Lee accused Yoon of “submitting” to Japan and sidestepping unresolved historical issues.

Wi Sung-lak, the president’s national security adviser, characterized Lee’s participation in the G7 and his series of bilateral meetings as the administration’s first step toward pragmatic diplomacy rooted in national interest. In his words, “This was a meaningful opportunity to announce the restoration of democracy in the Republic of Korea.

In the author’s opinion, Lee Jae-myung’s diplomatic debut was not a failure, but a half-success. The mood in Seoul around the trip is mixed — but it’s likely the only chance for a face-to-face conversation with Donald Trump. However, the summit will inevitably bring up the topics of Russia and North Korea, and Lee will have to speak publicly about them. And while, as we’ve already noted, statements don’t always translate into action, the next steps of South Korea’s new president will be worth watching closely.

 

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences

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