In the extraordinary presidential election of the Republic of Korea, Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party of Korea emerged victorious.
Election Chronicle
Presidential election held in South Korea on June 3, 2025. As we outlined in our previous analysis of the political landscape, the Democratic Party’s candidate was the clear frontrunner—and indeed, this proved true. With 100% of ballots counted, Lee Jae-myung secured 49.42% of the vote, while Kim Moon-soo of the conservative People Power Party received 41.15%. Kim conceded defeat, stating he “humbly accepts the will of the people” and congratulated Lee on his victory.
Lee Jun-seok of the New Reform Party secured third place with a distant 8.34% of the vote. Kwon Young-gook of the Democratic Labor Party received 0.98%, while independent candidate Sohn Jin-ho garnered just 0.10%.
Democrats сelebrate victory. On June 4, National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik declared in a social media post that Lee Jae-myung has accepted responsibility for the people’s expectations, emphasizing that his election “restores constitutional order and ensures national stability.” Woo expressed gratitude to citizens who, “despite numerous challenges, united to overcome a national crisis and defend the Constitution.”
The first steps of the new government
On June 4 at 6:21 AM, Lee Jae-myung assumed office as President of the Republic of Korea—immediately after the National Election Commission certified the official results. In his inaugural statement, he vowed to do everything possible to shoulder this grave responsibility and fulfill [his] mission in meeting the people’s expectations. “I will devote all my efforts to reviving the economy and improving living standards,” Lee pledged.
At the inauguration ceremony, Lee promised to unify the nation, revitalize the economy and pursue policies with national interests in mind.
On foreign policy, Lee pledged to “strengthen cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan based on a solid ROK-U.S. alliance, while approaching relations with neighboring countries through pragmatism and national interests.” Emphasizing the need to counter North Korean threats, he left the door open for resuming dialogue with Pyongyang to build lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Lee Jae-myung has nominated Kim Min-seok for Prime Minister – a former student activist, four-term National Assembly member, and senior official of the Democratic Party of Korea. Kim, a close ally of the new president who played a key role in his election campaign, is touted as the leader who “can overcome any crisis and revive the economy.”
Former Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok has been appointed Director of the National Intelligence Service. Additionally, three-term National Assembly member Kang Hong-sik, who participated in Lee Jae-myung’s election campaign, has been named Chief of Staff to the President.
Wi Sung-rak, a seasoned diplomat and former South Korean ambassador to Russia, has been appointed as the head of the National Security Office (NSO) of the Presidential Administration. Wi previously led South Korea’s delegation to the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program. Additionally, retired General Hwang In-gwon has been named Chief of the Presidential Security Service.
The U.S. administration has extended congratulations to Lee Jae-myung on his election as President of the Republic of Korea, expressing hope for enhanced cooperation in security and economic affairs—including through trilateral engagement with Japan. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that Washington and Seoul remain committed to a military alliance anchored in the Mutual Defense Treaty, shared values, and deep economic ties.
Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba congratulated Lee Jae-myung on his election as President of South Korea, calling the outcome “a testament to Korean democracy.” Speaking at a press conference, Ishiba noted that this year marks the 60th anniversary of normalized diplomatic relations between Seoul and Tokyo. Japan stands ready to actively develop both bilateral cooperation with South Korea and trilateral collaboration with the United States, Ishiba stated, proposing an early summit with the newly elected president and suggesting the revival of “shuttle diplomacy” – regular reciprocal visits between the leaders of both nations to strengthen ties.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of bilateral relations and expressed readiness to strengthen ties with Seoul. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev congratulated Lee Jae-myung on his victory and invited the new leader to Uzbekistan.
Author’s Opinion
Commenting on the election results, the author might note that Chairman Lee’s (or more accurately, President-elect Lee’s) victory was expected, especially given the disarray among conservatives—namely, the failed attempt to replace their main candidate and their inability to unite behind a single nominee due to Lee Joon’s ambitions. However, two key points warrant attention.
Firstly, the margin between the candidates was just 8% nationwide—and even narrower in Seoul—which is remarkably small for an election following the impeachment of a president currently indicted for rebellion. “Park Geun-hye’s crimes” were technically less severe, yet in 2017, Moon Jae-in won by roughly 17%. This makes Lee’s claim that “the election served as the people’s verdict against those who trampled democracy” ring somewhat hollow.
It appears that, given the new president’s polarizing nature and deep societal divisions, conservative voters included not only traditional supporters but also anyone dissatisfied with Lee Jae-myung. Conversely, Democratic Party voters likely comprised both Lee loyalists and those simply eager to end the constitutional crisis. After all, had a conservative won, they would have faced the same predicament as Yoon Suk-yeol—a parliamentary opposition (now holding a majority) blocking all initiatives, with no legal means to override the National Assembly. The crisis would have dragged on for years.
Secondly, President Lee faces a looming conviction. Recall that on November 15, 2024, a court of first instance found him guilty. Although the sentence was suspended, it initially barred the Democratic leader from high office—precisely what triggered the acute phase of the crisis. However, following Yoon’s impeachment, an appeals court overturned the verdict, disregarding evidence. This “legal miracle”—coupled with the revelation that the exonerating judges belonged to an NGO tied to the Democrats—prompted the Supreme Court to annul the acquittal and order a retrial.
Russia has viewed Lee’s rise to power with relative favor, as he was the only candidate to even mention Russia—and in non-negative terms. However, the author adopts a more cautious stance. Firstly, Lee is a populist who, during the campaign, pledged to be for all things good and against all things bad—including on Russia policy. Secondly, media outlets tied to the Democrats have criticized the Special military operation no less harshly than conservative media.
In terms of actual policy, two major challenges loom. Firstly, given his frequent anti-American rhetoric, President Lee will need to actively convince Donald Trump that he’s a reliable partner. Secondly, if Lee seeks to revive engagement with North Korea, he’ll have to sacrifice something in return. Yoon Suk-yeol, in his time, traded away progress on North Korea to secure minimal flexibility with China and Russia. By the same logic, Lee may have to compromise relations with Beijing and Moscow to pursue friendship with Pyongyang. Thus, the new administration’s foreign policy may prove far more complicated than it appears.
In domestic politics, President Lee Jae-myung faces two distinct paths, both of which were outlined in his campaign pledges. The first would involve attempting to achieve national unity by breaking the vicious cycle of factional warfare. Or, taking advantage of a parliament absolutely loyal to him, capable of passing any law, to organize a “trial of the people over the enemies of democracy.” Regrettably, the second scenario seems more likely, given the unresolved problem with the Supreme Court.
Attempts to change the Constitution, which both candidates have talked about, are not excluded. But it is one thing to fight the imperial presidency once in opposition, and another to enjoy its benefits as the first person.
In conclusion, the author sincerely hopes not to have to chronicle yet another state of emergency. The constitutional crisis is formally resolved and a new season begins in the riveting drama.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
