The European Union has also repeatedly emphasized that it does not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Signs indicate initial steps for change.
Therefore, in the past few years, European diplomats have been operating in Afghanistan, and there have been official meetings and talks. For example, the Taliban participated in a meeting in Oslo in June 2023. The Taliban have repeatedly called for the reopening of European embassies in Kabul, but for various reasons, they have been inactive. The Taliban are also trying to align themselves with their policies by putting pressure on Afghanistan’s political representatives in Europe.
On July 30, 2024, the Taliban announced that the actions of the missions, consular services, and visas issued by the Afghan missions in London, Belgium, Berlin, Bonn, Switzerland, Austria, France, Italy, Greece, Poland, Sweden, Norway, are not acceptable.
However, several officials of the Afghan consulates in Europe, such as Germany, the embassy in the Netherlands, the embassy in Spain, in Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic, are acceptable to the Taliban due to their commitment to engaging with the Taliban.
In the European Union Security Union Strategy for the period 2020-2025 (the focus is on five areas: protecting physical and digital infrastructure, combating terrorism and extremism, combating organized crime, strengthening law enforcement and judicial cooperation, and cooperating with international partners), Afghanistan is also important.
The European Union wants a stable Afghanistan free from the threats of terrorism, forced displacement, and illegal migration. However, the EU has maintained an arms embargo, a ban on technical assistance and travel for individuals, and an asset freeze against the Taliban. Therefore, Europe has entered into dialogue with the Taliban to address the security challenges of counter-terrorism, the return of foreign terrorist fighters to the EU, and the Narcotics. However, with a pragmatic approach, despite the lack of recognition of the Taliban, the EU’s policy towards Afghanistan has so far focused on limited and conditional engagement.
The EU Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Thomas Nicholson, during his visit to Afghanistan from 8 to 12 December 2024, met with Taliban officials. He highlighted concerns about the restrictions imposed on EU implementing partners, the Taliban’s orders and instructions, readiness to trade with Afghanistan, and the lack of tariffs or quotas on Afghan exports to the EU.
In fact, instead of closing doors, attention has been paid to engagement and action to address priority issues and support the Afghan people. In this regard, the EU reacted very quickly to the Taliban’s Encouraging Good and Forbidding Evil law last year, but defended maintaining relations with the Taliban, and dialogue for the EU’s political priorities without recognizing the Taliban.
In another dimension, since 2021, the EU has allocated more than €903 million to meet the basic needs of Afghanistan and improve the livelihoods of Afghans. In 2024, the EU has financed projects worth more than €125 million, continuing to provide vital relief assistance, food assistance, health care and nutrition, and education. In January 2025, the EU also contributed €16.5 million to the World Food Programme in Afghanistan to help 6 million people.
Despite the challenge of financial transparency, the “leakage” of foreign aid and humanitarian aid to the Taliban, the EU wants to ensure that humanitarian aid reaches those in need without interference.
Moreover, while Afghans are the world’s largest refugee population, with around 3.2 million internally displaced within Afghanistan, many in Iran and Pakistan, supporting refugees inside Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, working with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) to assist the International Organization for Migration, long-term resilience, the risks faced by returning refugees and communities, are important for Europe.
The Taliban have also issued more than 70 decrees restricting or prohibiting many of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of women and girls. However, the EU remains committed to respecting, protecting, and fulfilling human rights, building an inclusive and representative government, and supporting the full participation of all Afghans (women and girls, ethnic and religious minorities, etc.).
In this regard, in March 2025, the EU called for the full and equal enjoyment of human rights by Afghan women and girls and condemned the Taliban’s systematic repression. Also in April 2025, EU and Central Asian leaders jointly called for the establishment of an inclusive government in Afghanistan based on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Outlook
For many, such as Benjamin Haddad, the EU’s Minister for European Affairs, the crisis of the unilateral US withdrawal from Afghanistan without consulting the Europeans requires Europe to exercise control over its own destiny and strategic independence.
While Thomas Nicholson, ended his mission in April 2025, he stressed that his departure did not signal a change in the EU’s approach to Afghanistan and that the EU would continue to be present and committed to the Afghan people and to protecting the EU’s interests and values.
However, there is disagreement about how to move faster or pressure the Taliban in Europe. Certainly, engagement with Afghanistan and the Taliban will be guided by decisions of the European Union Council and the more influential leaders and countries.
But the change of representation, along with geopolitical and political developments in the region and the world, and the type of public reaction, is likely to lead to an assessment and review of the EU’s future strategies on Afghan issues, while maintaining basic principles and commitments.
In early March 2025, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said that most European countries are interested in engaging with the Taliban. Taliban leaders hope that the gradual handover of Afghan embassies in Europe will pave the way for the Taliban to enter other European countries and lead to formal normalization.
However, despite the Taliban’s lack of movement towards the formation of an inclusive transitional government, girls’ education, women’s rights, etc., recognition of the Taliban government in the short term seems unlikely.
Meanwhile, despite concerns about security issues and the impact of Afghanistan’s instability on the region, terrorist threats, and the risk of increased migration, further development of diplomatic, political, and economic relations with the Taliban will be under consideration.
In this approach, Europe certainly supports a change in governance (change in Taliban behavior). The European Union has also repeatedly emphasized that it does not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Signs indicate initial steps for change.
The European Union has also repeatedly emphasized that it does not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Signs indicate initial steps for change. In fact, with the cessation of the political activity of many Afghan embassies in Europe and the Taliban’s request to operate in Europe, Afghan embassies may be handed over to the Taliban. Therefore, we may also witness the reopening of the representations of some EU members in Kabul, and more contact at various levels with the Taliban.
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
