India refuses to cede to mounting global pressure, skillfully balancing between East and West. As the U.S.-China rivalry deepens, New Delhi’s strategy is clear: play both sides for as long as it can, at the same time doubling down on its solo credentials.
At its core, India seeks a more prominent role on the world stage. As Foreign Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar recently declared at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, India aspires to become a true “world power.” In pursuit of this goal, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has laid out an ambitious plan: advancing the digital economy, ramping up hardware production, and developing twelve industrial zones backed by a sharper focus on human capital.
But great-power ambition often demands difficult choices. And increasingly, India’s choices seem to tilt toward Washington.
Playing America’s Game—For Now
The recent visit by U.S. Vice President JD Vance to India marked a significant turning point. India agreed to support the United States in its economic war against China by imposing a 12% safeguard tariff on Chinese steel. In return, India gained key concessions: easier immigration pathways for Indian talent, expanded opportunities for Indian service companies in the U.S., and promises of increased American foreign direct investment.
India’s participation in the Quad—alongside the U.S., Japan, and Australia—further cements its strategic tilt toward countering China militarily in the Indo-Pacific. From New Delhi’s perspective, strengthening ties with Washington offers access to technology, investment, defense cooperation, and a greater voice in global governance.
JD Vance, a strong critic of traditional globalization, envisions a new kind of economic relationship—one that, paradoxically, revives the old colonial logic of talent extraction. India, proud of its nationalist ethos under Modi, faces the real risk of falling into a “brain drain” trap, where its best and brightest are siphoned off to bolster the American economy.
This tension between nationalist pride and global economic pragmatism is a contradiction India must eventually confront.
But What About BRICS?
On the other side, India remains an integral member of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—alliances increasingly seen as alternative poles to Western power. These blocs, particularly post-Ukraine, have grown closer under China’s and Russia’s leadership.
Yet, India’s behavior within BRICS increasingly deviates from the bloc’s broader geopolitical orientation. For example:
- Ukraine Conflict: Despite claiming neutrality, Indian-manufactured artillery shells are finding their way to Ukraine through European intermediaries.
- Gaza Conflict: While much of the Global South condemns Israel’s actions as colonial, apartheid, and genocidal, India has tilted toward supporting Israel, driven partly by its domestic politics and its fraught relationship with its own Muslim minority.
India’s membership in BRICS appears, at times, more transactional than ideological. Unlike Brazil or South Africa, New Delhi does not seem eager to align itself fully with the bloc’s increasingly anti-Western tone.
And China—India’s supposed BRICS partner—is not a friend. Border tensions in Ladakh, economic rivalry, and distrust over China’s Belt and Road Initiative have made relations between the two giants strained.
Thus, while India remains officially in BRICS, it is clear that New Delhi no longer shares the group’s underlying vision of a unified Global South alternative front to the West. India does not see itself in this equation.
The Relation of India with China and the BRICS is still beneficial
In trade relations, China is still India’s largest trading partner. Despite tensions, trade volume between India and China is impressive, at $118.4 billion in fiscal year 2023-24. India imports crucial Chinese goods, especially electronics, machinery, pharmaceuticals, and raw materials needed for its industries, and relies heavily on China for items such as microprocessors, memory chips, and semiconductors.
India has a supply chain dependence on China, so a complete decoupling is not feasible yet. Many sectors in India — like telecom, electronics manufacturing, and chemicals — depend heavily on Chinese intermediate goods.
Through BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), India shares a platform with China where it can influence global governance debates (e.g., pushing for reform in the IMF, World Bank, and United Nations Security Council) and present itself as a Global South leader alongside China.
Being in BRICS and SCO gives India a form of “insurance” against total isolation if tensions with the U.S. were ever to escalate further. India keeps some leverage by maintaining open channels with China and Russia.
How Sustainable is India’s Balancing Act?
The core question remains: Can India continue to “play both sides” indefinitely?
Short-term, yes. India benefits from strategic ambiguity. It extracts concessions from both Washington and Beijing while maintaining strategic autonomy. But in the long term, as global competition between the U.S. and China intensifies, the space for fence-sitting will shrink.
Washington will eventually demand more explicit alignment—military, technological, and political. Already, U.S. policymakers view India not just as an economic partner, but as a potential “linchpin” in any future coalition to counterbalance China’s rise.
Likewise, China and Russia may grow increasingly wary of India’s duplicity within BRICS. If India is further seen in non-alignment with BRICS objectives, pressures to isolate New Delhi diplomatically—or even expel it—may mount.
Conclusion: Will India Cede to the Pressure of Choosing?
Today, India remains skillfully “on the fence” through a first-class diplomacy, maneuvering to maximize its strategic options. But fences are not permanent homes. As the U.S.-China rivalry hardens into a new Cold War, India will face increasing pressure to choose a side — or risk losing the trust of both.
While India aspires to become a “world power,” true great powers are defined not just by their size and economy, but by their ability to lead, to choose, and to stand for something.
However, India does not perceive an urgent need to make a definitive strategic choice between deepening its partnership with the U.S.-led West, with the inherent risk of becoming a junior partner, or emphasizing its role within BRICS.
Instead, India is determined to resist external pressure and maintain its dual alignment for as long as possible, continuing to play both sides to maximize its national interests, at the same time doubling down on its solo credentials.
Ricardo Martins ‒PhD in Sociology, specializing in policies, European and world politics and geopolitics
