A month into his second presidential term, Donald Trump has clearly demonstrated his intention to test the loyalty of US allies and whether cooperation with them is in line with America’s interests.
Philippines
Unlike many other US foreign aid programs suspended on January 20, security and drug control in the Philippines was not cut off (including $336 million for modernization of the Philippine military and coast guard). This demonstrates that Trump has remained committed to the US alliance with the Philippines, and, in turn, his approach to foreign policy towards other countries hints to Manila that it should also remain loyal to the US in the confrontation against China. At the same time, Donald Trump’s relations with other allies in the region are more complex.
Taiwan
The situation with Taiwan is more complicated. The US administration quietly unfroze $870 million in security aid to Taiwan in late February. At the same time, the US administration has made it clear that it will not allow Taiwan to rely solely on its support: Elbridge Colby, Trump’s nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, said on March 4 that Taiwan should quadruple its defense spending. In response, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, who probably understood that ignoring these requests could complicate relations with the American president, quickly proposed increasing his administration’s defense spending to more than 3%.
At the same time, since mid-February, Trump has expressed his intention to impose tariffs on semiconductors, of which Taiwan is a major exporter. The US president’s plan is for Taiwan to establish chip manufacturing in America. In this case, these enterprises will not be subject to tariffs, and the US will get critical manufacturing on its soil. Despite Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world’s largest chip maker, announcing on March 3 that it would invest $100 billion in the United States to finance five new manufacturing plants in Arizona, Trump has yet to give a clear answer as to whether he will impose tariffs on Taiwanese goods or not. Moreover, the process of establishing high-tech manufacturing facilities in the United States with Taiwanese investment could take years. Will Trump be able to guarantee Taiwan’s security for such a long period without provoking China? And, not less important, what guarantees will there be that the United States, having become self-sufficient in critical manufacturing, will not abandon its ally once this transfer process is complete?
Thailand
Thailand is another “nominee” for tariffs and is seriously wary of their imposition. If tariffs are imposed, the country’s economy, which relies on exports to the United States, will suffer greatly. In fact, Thailand may already be experiencing problems, as the country is linked by supply chains to North American countries, so Trump’s tariffs on goods from Canada and Mexico may affect Thailand as well. In addition, the United States suspended humanitarian aid to Bangkok amid the civil war in Myanmar, making it more difficult for Thailand to help refugees from the conflict-torn country. China and the United States have long been vying for influence in Thailand. Two years ago, the United States seemed to have seized the initiative from China by promoting its supporters to the Thai parliament. However, Trump is now doing little to retain a strategically important partner that can do a lot for the US rival (for example, build a canal through the Isthmus of Kra, thereby solving China’s Malacca Dilemma).
Japan
Despite the assumptions of the Japanese administration, during the meeting between Shigeru Ishiba and Donald Trump on February 7, the latter did not touch on the issue of increasing Japan’s defense budget. This, as well as the domestic political debates, led to Japan’s budget proposals for 2025 not mentioning the increase of this type of spending. Later, Elbridge Colby, whom we mentioned earlier, attacked the Japanese government, demanding an increase in the country’s defense spending. Shigeru Ishiba also responded sharply to this by saying that Japan would decide this issue itself and that other countries have no say in such decisions. For Ishiba, Trump’s opinion is most likely more authoritative, and, continuing this thought, one can come to the conclusion that the Japanese government is only demonstrating its independence, but in reality, it is doing exactly what Trump wants from them. He, in turn, emphasized the economy and trade in his requests to Japan, but, unlike other countries, for some reason, no demands were made on military spending. On the other hand, perhaps the increase in defense spending adopted by the Ishiba administration at the end of 2024 was enough to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to US interests. Still, Trump himself did not provide a position on Japan’s military spending that was relevant as of early March.
Inconsistency or a cold math?
Based on the examples given, it can be seen that Trump’s policy towards his Asian partners varies greatly depending on the country. While the president is extremely favorable to countries like the Philippines, he demonstrates almost no interest in building bridges with his ally Thailand, and relations with Taiwan and Japan remain uncertain. This can be attributed to the inconsistency associated with the president’s focus on domestic politics, the conflict in Ukraine, and the trade war with China, Canada, and Mexico, or to Trump’s personality. On the other hand, On the other hand, the president may be deliberately doing all of this in order to get feedback from his Asian “allies” and to understand which decisions can be pushed through in the future and which will be more difficult to impose; whose loyalty can be relied upon, and who is only using the US for their own interests, not wanting to give much in return. One way or another, Trump is an unpredictable, cunning, and hypocritical politician, and what he really has in mind regarding his Asian partners, in what way and how many times his attitude may change – all of this will only become clear with time.
Daniil Romanenko, japanologist, researcher from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
