At the end of January, “on the sidelines” of Donald Trump’s inauguration, the first negotiations for the new US administration took place between the foreign ministers of countries that are, in essence, an informal military structure within the “Quad” bloc.
The mere fact of the meeting, held in such a ceremonial setting, gave all the doubters clear answers to questions about whether Trump would support the partnership within the Quad, as well as whether Washington would maintain its commitments to its allies and those that have joined them under the new president.
As for the AUKUS pact with the United Kingdom and Australia, Trump’s position was first disclosed by US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. According to him, the newly elected president fully supports the bloc and understands its importance. In the Indo-Pacific region, the US “needs reliable allies to act not alone”; “the transfer of technology and the provision of submarines to Australia are a significant part of this process.”
By the way, Hegseth held talks with Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles, and the Australian side assured the US that Australia would fulfill all its obligations to America, including “investing billions of dollars into the American manufacturing base.” Thus, the commitments under AUKUS remain in force. However, how mutual these commitments are is a good question. More precisely, how much will this cooperation cost America’s allies?
One beats the bush while another catches the birds
It’s clear that Donald Trump will continue his policy of containing China – this time with his signature creative twists. In Beijing, the new US strategy has already been dismissed as a cynical attempt to use allies and partners to “share the costs.” In reality, Trump is likely looking to free up US resources to pursue his economic ambitions – after all, his most famous campaign slogans were “America First” and “Make America Great Again.”
This shift is largely driven by a hard truth that both Trump and his team have come to recognize: America’s industrial capacity is not limitless in its rivalry with China, nor does Washington have enough leverage to apply meaningful economic pressure on Beijing. So, in typical businessman fashion, Trump has found a pragmatic solution – offloading as much of the financial burden as possible onto America’s allies and effectively treating them as a tool for cost outsourcing.
From Washington’s perspective, its allies and partners are expected to fall in line, follow America’s lead, and accept the costs that come with the new administration’s military and trade policies – whether they like it or not. And cooperation won’t shield them from the consequences. On the contrary, Trump will have no hesitation in applying the same approach to allies, “correcting trade imbalances” by restructuring supply chains and shifting key industrial production back to US soil. In the end, America’s allies and partners will be reduced to little more than assistants – instruments for executing Washington’s broader strategy.
Quad rhetoric: the old is new
The joint statement from the Quad’s foreign ministers, while rather scant – just two paragraphs of vague, noncommittal phrases – manages to pack in every cliché and archetype of American policy in the Asia-Pacific region. If an outside observer were to ask what exactly unites these four countries and whether they have any real common ground, the statement offers a rather predictable answer. The members express their desire for a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” – a phrase that by now feels like a tired old fable, endlessly retold in this exclusive club. The authors of the statement seem incapable of acknowledging any other geographic realities – just as they would certainly struggle to answer a simple question: what exactly do they mean by “freedom” and “openness”? No less predictable is the routine invocation of “democratic values.” Western politicians, after all, love to repeat this phrase like parrots. But one has to wonder – who has actually seen these so-called values firsthand, and what do they even mean in the eyes of politicians from each of these countries? It would be fascinating to hear their explanations and compare the inevitable differences in interpretation.
The statement goes on to declare that the Quad seeks to “strengthen regional security – maritime, economic, technological – and promote reliable and resilient supply chains.” But the real takeaway from these vague declarations boils down to just two words: they’re afraid. Which naturally raises two questions: afraid of whom, exactly? And second, have they ever considered looking in the mirror – at their own bloc and the risks of military bloc escalation in the Asia-Pacific, which is arguably the biggest threat to regional security?
The statement also claims that international law is a fundamental value for the Quad. In today’s rapidly shifting world, however, events unfold so quickly that not only do international law and legal frameworks struggle to keep up – news itself barely does before it’s relegated to the archives.
And when such statements come from the US, the UK, and Japan – countries that have repeatedly violated international law throughout history – they ring at best hollow, at worst outright hypocritical. No less disingenuous is the claim that their core values are “peace, stability, and security” across all spheres, particularly at sea. In reality, these words should be understood as a veiled warning about rising tensions in the region – an ironic, almost antonymous translation of their true intentions. But the real essence of the Quad’s message – the part that reveals what this group is actually about – is buried neatly among the document’s many generic talking points: “We oppose any unilateral actions aimed at changing the status quo by force.”
And that, in a nutshell, is the whole story. Both politically and rhetorically, this boils down to a familiar, timeworn idea: what’s permitted for some (the West) is not permitted for others. Inequality. Discrimination. The old colonial mindset.
This means that forming AUKUS and heavily arming Australia? Perfectly acceptable. Those actions, apparently, don’t qualify as “unilateral changes to the status quo.” Conducting military exercises, flying bombers, and sending naval warships wherever they please (like the Australian warship that recently sailed through the Taiwan Strait – because suddenly, that’s allowed now, and it’s already happened)? Also not an issue. But if, say, another country were to respond to these actions with proportional countermeasures? Now that, according to the Quad, would be unacceptable. In other words, if Russia, China, North Korea, or any other non-signatory nation dares to defend its interests, that simply doesn’t fit within the Quad’s worldview.
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As we can see, the Trump administration has sent clear and unambiguous signals that the Quad and AUKUS remain priorities. Most likely, the US will move forward with AUKUS cooperation plans gradually, as circumstances allow, while working to restore the Quad’s more militarized character – using every ally and partner to serve its own interests. For Australia and Japan, following Washington’s lead is nothing new. But in India, many may begin to question whether this trajectory aligns with their vision of global politics and their own role within it.
As for the West’s deeply ingrained worldview – one that divides the world into superiors and inferiors and remains alive and well within the structures it has created – one thing remains clear. For Russia and the global majority, the only way to push back against this worldview is by strengthening their own military, industrial, economic, educational, scientific, and cultural potential, firmly defending their national interests, and deepening international cooperation. The West only understands the language of power and comprehensive state strength. The weak will always be broken and exploited as expendable resources. Only strong states – especially those aligning their interests through non-Western international organizations – will be taken seriously.
Ksenia Muratshina, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
