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Relations between Armenia and America: effective variables, challenges, and prospects

Samyar Rostami, February 07, 2025

In this context, the Strategic Partnership Charter is a step in expanding relations, but it is not comprehensive, all-encompassing, or game-changing, and it has various domestic and foreign opponents.

Relations between Armenia and America: effective variables, challenges, and prospects

The United States recognized the independence of Armenia on December 25, 1991, and then opened an embassy in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, in 1992. Armenia has an embassy in Washington, D.C., and a consulate general in Los Angeles. However, relations between the two countries have developed significantly in 2024 and pledged to enhance bilateral relations.

In June 2024, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State visited Armenia, and the U.S. Department of State took steps to support a lasting peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, demarcate the border, monitor the U.S.-Armenia Strategic Dialogue, and identify ways to expand relations.

Many opposition groups in Yerevan do not want to strengthen ties with NATO and the West at the expense of losing ties with Russia and Iran

Economic Trade Relations

Apart from bilateral agreements such as the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), the Bilateral Trade and Investment Treaty (BAT) Agreement, the Joint Economic Working Group, and the presence of approximately 70 American companies in Armenia, the US continues to support international financial institutions in assisting Armenia.

Although trade turnover between Armenia and the United States has quadrupled since 2020, the two sides are now considering identifying opportunities to increase trade and investment, diversify energy production, develop a civilian nuclear energy program, significantly increase the share of renewable energy, increase energy connectivity to regional and European markets, and improve Armenia’s food security.

The United States also supports the development of a transport strategy on the “Crossroads of Peace” aimed at integrating Armenia into broader regional transport networks.

Dialogues and signing of the Charter of Strategic Partnership

Despite Armenia’s aspirations for closer cooperation with Euro-Atlantic institutions and the West, a shift in Armenia’s foreign policy has become more apparent in late 2022. From Yerevan’s perspective, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) did not respond to Armenia’s requests for assistance and the changes in Armenia-Armenia relations are “irreversible.”

This is while the United States reiterated in June 2024 its support for the sovereignty, independence, democracy, and territorial integrity of Armenia in line with the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration.

The signing of the Charter of Strategic Partnership between Armenia and the United States on January 14, 2025, in Washington by the Foreign Ministers is an important step in developing relations, the path of cooperation, and deepening partnership across a wide range of priorities.

From this perspective, pursuing shared values and common interests in the diplomatic, economic, energy, high-tech, educational, scientific, cultural, legal, defense, and security fields is on the agenda of both sides.

In fact, from Armenia’s perspective, Washington’s support for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, promotion of peace and stability, a strong, independent Armenia, continued reforms, deepening relations with the Euro-Atlantic, a dignified and lasting peace (based on the Alma Ata Declaration of 1991), lifting the blockade of regional transport based on full respect for the sovereignty of countries, supporting the normalization of relations between Armenia and its neighbors is in the interests of Armenia’s geopolitical and geo-economic interests.

The recent Strategic Partnership Charter establishes a comprehensive framework for cooperation and a Strategic Partnership Commission.

The Armenian Prime Minister welcomed the agreement, he considered it a reflection of Armenia’s commitment to a “balanced foreign policy” that guarantees the country’s “independence, sovereignty and continuity”. From this perspective, deepening relations with the United States and closer cooperation with the West at the same time means strong relations with Russia, Iran, Georgia, and the European Union.

Military-Security Cooperation

In September 2023, Nikol Pashinyan considered reliance solely on Russia to ensure Armenia’s security a strategic mistake. He has therefore sought to diversify his security arrangements, particularly with the European Union and the United States.

In September 2023, Armenia and the United States held their first joint military exercise, named: the Eagle Partner 2023 exercise, in Armenia. The second Eagle Partner exercise, scheduled for the summer of 2024, grew in size and scope.

Apart from the launch of the first annual dialogue in May 2024, bilateral defense consultations, US assistance to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and police training, and the advancement of military cooperation on such topics as increasing the compatibility of the Armenian military with the West and deepening Armenia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions are now under consideration by both sides.

While US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III hosted the Armenian Defense Minister at the Pentagon in December 2024, The United States has provided Armenia with some security assistance, cybersecurity, and a national training center.

Also, participation in border patrol cooperation and strengthening security cooperation are expected to enhance Armenia’s defense capabilities.

Strengthening cultural and social cooperation

US economic assistance programs, managed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), support a variety of objectives and sectors, such as promoting sustainable economic growth and strengthening civil society.

Also, according to recent agreements, Washington is likely to take steps to promote governance, and political pluralism, strengthen civil society, support displaced persons and refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh, and strengthen independent media, freedom of expression, and human rights in Armenia. The policy of US institutions is to recognize the Armenian Genocide. Previously, Joe Biden officially recognized the Armenian massacres as genocide.

In fact, Washington is even considering facilitating the visa application process by increasing people-to-people and cultural exchanges, increasing people-to-people contacts, including through the Armenian American community, and supporting numerous initiatives and greater cooperation in higher education, etc.

Challenges and Prospects

In recent years, the US National Security Council has not published any official strategy on the South Caucasus, and except for the Armenian Protection Act of 2023, the United States still has no official strategy for the South Caucasus and Armenia. Criticism of Washington by the Armenian diaspora regarding pressure on Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan still exists. Many also believe that the United States should recognize the right of return and the right to self-determination of Armenian refugees in Artsakh.

January 2025 may serve as a geopolitical turning point for Armenia, and the recent agreement will pave the way for stronger relations with the West.

However, this agreement is not a full-fledged military alliance, similar to the fundamental defense agreements with security guarantees for Armenia. Current aid is also unlikely to provide a significant military deterrent to Armenia, and the lack of meaningful commitments to Armenia’s stability is striking.

It is therefore unclear to what extent the United States will be able to prevent further escalation, halt aggression against Armenian territory, and directly engage.

While Russia still views Armenia as a close partner and the United States as a troublemaker in the Caucasus, it does not seem to see the current partnership between Armenia and the United States as a serious threat. Also, Russia is increasingly critical of Armenia-Russia relations and does not view the partnership of Armenia with Washington positively.

Armenia’s participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is also suspended and limited. But Yerevan’s maximum expansion of ties with NATO and possible plans for membership in NATO will certainly face further opposition from Moscow and Tehran. In addition, while Moscow still has the strongest bilateral agreements with Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan’s government is facing increasing domestic criticism.

Many opposition groups in Yerevan do not want to strengthen ties with NATO and the West at the expense of losing ties with Russia and Iran. The dual loyalty strategy is fraught with risks, and the US position under Trump is not very clear.

Although Trump and his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, have expressed support for “Armenian Christians” or persecuted Christians, and Rubio has been a critic of Baku,  it is not clear to what extent US-Azerbaijani relations will be sacrificed for US-Armenia relations and the Trump administration will prioritize the South Caucasus.

Just as any departure from the Eurasian Economic Union would have much higher costs for Armenia, a unilateral and broad move towards the US and NATO would also have costs and negative consequences for Armenia’s interests.  In this context, the Strategic Partnership Charter is a step in expanding relations, but it is not comprehensive, all-encompassing, or game-changing, and it has various domestic and foreign opponents.

 

Samyar Rostami is a political observer and senior researcher in international relations

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