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The Japanese Government Managed to Force the U.S. Base Relocation on Okinawa

Daniil Romanenko, January 22, 2025

On January 17 Japan’s Supreme Court rejected Okinawa’s appeal claiming that the state had illegally taken control over the U.S. military base transfer project.

US Base Relocation in Japan: Supreme Court Decision

The Okinawan administration and population fought against the central government’s decision to relocate the US Futenma military base to Henoko Bay since 2013. Although Henoko is less populated than Futenma and locals would be less disturbed by the military if the relocation occurred, Okinawans were still against the decision. They were concerned about the possible environmental damage and several endangered species in Henoko and generally wanted the US bases to be relocated off Okinawa completely. Still, despite the protests and legal constraints, the state managed to force its decision on Okinawa. Let us review how that could have occurred.
Henoko base relocation issue demonstrates that Japan’s alliance with the US is more important than the well-being of Okinawans

Changes in the legal framework of the State-Okinawa Relations

Beata Bochorodycz in her research described in detail the patterns of central government – Okinawa interactions in 1990th. She highlighted several assimilation strategies the central government used to influence the Okinawan government. Among them were institutional arrangements, such as the creation of forums for Okinawan and central government’s politicians and bureaucrats for discussions of certain problems; financial compensation to diffuse high political pressure without addressing local demands; postponing of decisions to await better political circumstances; dimension manipulation, meaning dissemination of narratives creating a positive image of the central government’s actions.

In 2000th a series of reforms concerning local government decentralization were realized. Before them, central-local government relations worked in a so-called kikan inin jimu framework (agency delegated functions), in which local government was just an executive organ of the central government’s policy implementation. In 2000, 475 laws were amended to create a new system in which central and local governments were not in master-servant relations – since then local government could implement its own initiatives in many public spheres; the central government’s role changed from a master to a guide, and the above-mentioned assimilation methods lost their relevance. Or, at least, they should have.

Governor’s Betrayal

In December 2013, shortly after Shinzo Abe was elected Prime Minister, Hirokazu Nakaima, Okinawa’s governor, approved the central government’s proposal to relocate the US Futenma military base to Henoko. His explanation during the interviews was similar to Abe’s narratives, claiming that Japan should be ready to repel foreign threats, and Okinawa should contribute to this cause. He met Abe shortly before that decision and had some kind of arrangement with Shinzo Abe’s administration on that issue. A probable bargaining chip was the drastic increase in the Okinawa promotion budget provided by the state.

Okinawa’s public generally saw this arrangement as a betrayal, and since then protested regularly against the decision. Since 2014 in Okinawa’s parliament, the opposition to Japan’s ruling party has always won the elections. Takeshi Onaga, Okinawan governor from 2014 to 2018, declined the military base relocation plan and refused to realize it. In 2015-2019 the state held a series of discussions with the Okinawan government on the base issue but did not come to an agreement. It shows that generally, any way to realize the institutional arrangements assimilation strategy failed, as the Okinawan government and public strongly opposed the base relocation, and mediation via councils and discussion at this stage was fruitless.

Okinawa’s opposition towards Futenma base relocation led to the state forcing its decisions according to Article 245-8 of the Local Autonomy Act amendments that were made during the above-mentioned reforms of 2000. According to it, in case of a failure to ensure consistency between the policies of the national government and those of the local public entity would seriously impede the implementation of those policies, the state can take the policy under its direct control. So it did.

“Freedom of the Local Self-Governance” in Practice

In 2020 the Defence Ministry applied for change in military base design. After the decision was opposed by Okinawa, the Land Ministry filed a lawsuit to gain control over the project via Article 245-8. The Okinawan government lost the court rulings several times, and in December 2023 the Land Ministry informed Okinawa that it would gain control over the base relocation project. And, as mentioned at the beginning of the article, the Okinawan government lost the final lawsuit to prevent this from happening.

Interestingly, on the site of the Cabinet, we can see that prevalently the good efforts of the central government in returning the land to Okinawans from the US bases in emphasized, but the problematic topics are omitted. This is the case of the dimension manipulation assimilation strategy, and it demonstrates that the strategy was still relevant.

The state’s moves in 2013 are an example of another old strategy – postponing decisions till better circumstances. The Liberal Democratic Party, being in opposition in 2009-2012, waited for its return to power and for decisive and strongly focused on the Japan-US alliance Prime Minister such as Abe to come to power, held some kind of agreement with the governor Hirokazu Nakaima, and came to a decision with Okinawan administration that initiated a course of events which eventually allowed the state to influence the issue it legally could not influence directly after 2000th reforms.

Moreover, there has been a tendency to decrease Okinawa promotion budget since the Futenma Base Relocation opposition became active. The promotion budget was increased from 300.1 billion yen in 2013 to 350.1 billion yen in 2014; but since 2015 (334 billion yen) it became to decrease: to 301 billion yen in 2019 and 267.9 billion in 2023. The official reason for it was given by the Minister for Special Missions Esaki in 2017, who stated that it was due to the dire economic situation in Japan. The more probable reason is that the state punishes Okinawa and attempts to force it to follow its policies. The sudden increase of the promotion budget in 2014 after the approval of the Futenma base relocation supports this claim. Therefore, the financial compensation strategy is still relevant, and in the long run, the state can force Okinawa to comply with state plans on the US bases, as further decrease of the promotion budget may be damaging for the prefecture.

Conclusions

Despite the decentralization reforms of 2000th, the Okinawa-state relations framework in 2012-2020 retained many traits (particularly, assimilation strategies) it had in 1990th. Henoko base relocation issue demonstrates that Japan’s alliance with the US is more important than the well-being of Okinawans, and the reforms did not constrain the state enough to prevent the imposition of decisions which Okinawans strongly oppose.

 

Daniil Romanenko, Japanologist, researcher from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

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