There has yet to be a final decision on maintaining Russian military bases in Syria, although the Russian factor in the Middle East and Syria remains.
The legal status of the Russian airbase in Hmeimim is determined by an agreement signed between Russia and Syria on August 26, 2015. This agreement determined the presence of the Russian military air base as free, with the indefinite use of the Hmeimim Airport in the Latakia Governorate.
After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, the Russian air base in Syria came under threat. A part of the air defence systems was evacuated to the naval base in Tartus. It is possible that some air defence and aviation assets (planes, helicopters) have been returned to Russia.
Until 2017, the port of the Syrian city of Tartus housed a material support facility for the Russian fleet, which was the only repair and re-supply point for Russian warships in the Mediterranean Sea. This allowed our ships to swiftly resolve issues and not return to their bases in the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles). Since 2017, this facility has been classified as a naval base of the Russian Navy in Syria.
As is known, in December, some of the Russian ships were forced to leave the base and go out to sea, awaiting further instruction.
It should be recognised that Russia has faithfully and responsibly fulfilled its obligations to provide military assistance to the Syrian state in countering the forces of international terrorism and extremism.
Main approaches of foreign actors to Russian military bases in Syria
As of now, there has not been a final decision vis-à-vis Russia keeping its military presence in Syria.
It is known that the countries of the so-called Collective West are aiming for the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Syria. The head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, even underlined the withdrawal of Russian military bases to the new authorities in Damascus as the main condition for lifting economic sanctions against Syria.
Naturally, Israel’s position is synchronised with the approach of the West, as Tel Aviv is still pursuing aggressive goals in terms of the southern and southwestern provinces of Syria. The Israeli authorities, taking advantage of the fall of the Assad regime, violated the provisions of the 1974 agreement on the disengagement of forces and the security zone in the Golan Heights, entered this ‘security zone’ and occupied a number of important strategic heights in Syria.
Moreover, Israel has advanced towards Damascus and regularly carries out airstrikes on strategically important Syrian facilities. Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly noted that Israel may launch a military operation against Syria if Islamic radicals and terrorist forces come to power. Given Ahmed al-Sharaa’s background, it is unlikely that the Israelis will voluntarily leave the occupied Syrian territories.
In any case, the HTS* leader Ahmed al-Sharaa objectively noted that Syria is exhausted by the civil war and that its military power is seriously undermined. This means that the current Syrian army is unlikely to be able to independently repel the aggression of the effective and powerful Israeli Defence Forces, which receive enormous material, military, military-technical and political support from the US and Western Europe.
Iran’s position
Obviously, Iran would not mind the presence of Russian military bases in Syria. However, after HTS* came to power in Damascus, Tehran is rapidly losing its position in the Arab republic. Today, Iran hardly has the ability to influence the process of maintaining Russian bases in Syria.
At the same time, the prospect of Russian military bases remaining in Syria may remain relevant to the new Syrian authorities and comply with the norms of international law in light of the Israeli army’s illegal entry into Syria.
The Turkish factor
Taking into account HTS* and SNA*, which are pro-Turkish, coming to power in Syria, Ankara has gained significant advantages and opportunities to have a profitable impact on the nature of the decisions made by official Damascus.
This, first and foremost, concerns issues related to the confrontation with the Kurds, the green-lighting of the Qatari gas pipeline project through Syria to Türkiye and Europe, the oppression of Shi’as, Alawites and Christians, as well as the promotion of pro-Turkish figures to key positions within the Syrian government.
In this regard, Türkiye, of course, is keeping the issue of the presence of Russian military bases in Syria under special control. Commenting on HTS* coming to power in Damascus, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan noted that Türkiye managed, via negotiations and presenting various arguments, to prevent Russian military intervention on HTS’* route to Damascus.
For example, at a recent meeting with media representatives in Istanbul, Fidan noted: “We had intensive contacts on this matter. To be honest, the Russians acted like a rational player”.
From this, it follows that Russia did not decide to use its military potential due to the demoralisation of the Syrian army itself. The new Syrian authorities and Türkiye understand that Russia, having made such a decision, did not become an obstacle on HTS’* way to Damascus. Otherwise, the Russian military, together with the Iranian forces, could have disrupted the Turkish operation to overthrow Bashar al-Assad. Therefore, the Russian factor should be taken into account by the Syrian authorities.
Regarding the prospects for Russian military bases in Syria, Hakan Fidan recalled that the head of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has already touched on this topic and took into account the positive historical experience of allied relations with Russia, which cannot be interrupted overnight, and the topic of military bases will be the subject of negotiations. The question is how these negotiations will go, and on what (or whom) they will depend.
It cannot be ruled out that the possibility of high influence on al-Sharaa will allow Ankara to determine the prospects for these negotiations for Damascus. In any case, Türkiye will try to link the topic of military bases with its military, political and economic interests. Perhaps this includes Ankara’s desire to involve Russia, in one form or another, in an operation to localise the Kurdish issue in Syria or in a confrontation with Israel in the Golan Heights in southern Syria. Ankara’s ‘gratitude’ for Russian loyalty may then be expressed by offering Russia control of a part of the oil fields and oil transit in the north-western provinces of Syria.
However, Ankara may be planning absolutely anything and could have different (including illusory) intentions. The question is to what extent Türkiye’s approaches are compatible with Russia’s interests.
Apparently, Türkiye’s probing the Russian position does not leave Ankara with high hopes. While understanding Turkish concerns about the Kurdish issue, Moscow has no plans whatsoever to enter into a military conflict with the Kurds on Ankara’s side. Also, the positive prospect of the Qatari gas pipeline to Europe will create additional competition for Russian Gazprom. Therefore, Hakan Fidan cautiously approaches the topic of possible agreements on the fate of Russian military bases in Syria. At the same time, he casually reminded: “We have also seen that Russian planes and ships have largely left their bases in Syria”.
However, ‘left’ does not at all mean that they cannot return to the case of a positive solution to this issue.
* Organisations banned in the Russian Federation
Alexander SVARANTS — Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor