EN|FR|RU
Follow us on:

December Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea

Konstantin Asmolov, January 15, 2025

From 23 to 27 December, the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea convened at the party headquarters. The session aimed to summarise the results of 2024 and set the direction and development plans for party and state activities in 2025.

Results of the extended meeting of the XI Plenum of the Central Committee of the WPK of the eighth convocation in the Central Committee of the WPK: plans for 2025 and summing up the results of 2024.

Key Points from Kim Jong Un’s Address

Chairing the session, Kim Jong Un highlighted achievements in the economy: steel production reached 127% of the target, non-ferrous metals 106%, nitrogen fertilisers 103%, electricity generation 101%, coal mining 110%, cement production 101%, timber output 104%, seafood production 101%, rail freight volume 108%, fabric production 101%, and grain harvest 107%.
North Korea may remain evasive until the Trump administration’s North Korea policy becomes tangible

The modernisation of the Kŭmsŏn Tractor Factory and the construction of an energy-efficient blast furnace with oxygen injection at the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex were noted as significant successes. Substantial progress was also achieved in the construction sector.

Regarding objectives for 2025, in addition to goals for key industrial sectors, the leader of the DPRK highlighted the importance of innovative construction, improving reforestation, land management, and environmental protection, and establishing a unified leadership system to prevent natural disasters at the state level.

He also stressed “the need to tackle practical methodological issues, including the development of systems and methods suited to the country’s economic structure and conditions, enabling unified economic management and improving planning and pricing”.

  • An important task outlined was the “enhancement of the role of scientific and cultural fronts” and the strengthening of the anti-epidemic framework to address any global health crisis.

Military-Political Strategy

Although Kim Jong Un primarily addressed economic issues, he also outlined “tactical and strategic tasks in the realm of foreign policy”. The plenum set the goal of actively promoting “the development of relations with friendly countries that respect the dignity and interests” of North Korea, without specifying which nations were being referred to. Kim Jong Un noted that the country had “skilfully” responded to the “volatile structure” of international relations, establishing itself as a force contributing to “the creation of the most just multipolar world”. The Chairman of the State Affairs Commission further highlighted significant achievements in safeguarding sovereignty, securing national interests, and enhancing the country’s prestige and status on the global stage.

“The reality, in which the U.S., Japan, and ROK alliance has expanded into an aggressive nuclear military bloc, and the Republic of Korea has turned into a steadfast anti-communist outpost for the United States, clearly shows us the direction we must take, what we must do, and how we must act”. From this follows the “super-hardline counter-strategy against the U.S., which will be consistently implemented to protect the future-oriented state interests of the DPRK and ensure its security”, because “the U.S. represents the most reactionary state entity, whose unchanging policy is anti-communism”. However, the specific content of the strategy was not disclosed.

It seems that Donald Trump’s plans to “solve everything with Kim” may encounter challenges. Yet, President of the University of North Korean Studies Yang Moo-jin predicts that “North Korea may maintain its evasiveness until the Trump administration’s North Korea policy becomes clear”. According to him and other ROK experts, this year’s rhetoric is more restrained compared to previous years, as North Korea may choose to wait until the Trump administration clarifies its stance.

South Korean analysts also noted the absence of direct references to Seoul. In light of South Korea’s strengthened ties with Russia and the impeachment of its president, Pyongyang may have concluded that “further escalation with Seoul is unnecessary”.

Accelerated military modernisation was another key focus. Kim stressed the importance of refining “tactics tailored to North Korea’s capabilities”, continuing to advance the “digitalisation and modernisation of operational command systems”, and developing “scientifically grounded training methods” to effectively counter evolving enemy strategies and warfare technologies.

Kim called on party officials to lead by example and to “earn the people’s trust through their actions”. He urged them to reaffirm their commitment to the principle “Everything for the people, relying entirely on the people” and to actively “address negative factors hindering the state’s development”.

Local Industry and Infrastructure Development

Significant attention was given to the “20-10 Policy for Peripheral Development”, which was addressed in a dedicated section. Under this policy, “the Party and government commit to taking full responsibility for the annual construction of modern local industrial enterprises in 20 cities and counties, while raising the material and cultural living standards of the entire population by one step within 10 years”.

As noted by Russian military expert Vladimir Khrustalev, establishing one enterprise per year in each of the 20 selected cities and counties over a decade is not particularly burdensome. Local industry implies a focus on regional resources and demand, especially since this largely concerns light and food industries. This is crucial because, firstly, the DPRK has historically faced an industrial imbalance favouring heavy industry, and secondly, it remains a country with a relatively low per capita consumption of various goods. The output of local enterprises will be absorbed and contribute to increasing per capita consumption levels.

Moreover, Kim Jong Un has proposed supplementing local industrial development with relevant infrastructure for healthcare, science, and education. He stated, “…building a few local industrial enterprises in cities and counties is insufficient to completely eliminate the centuries-old underdevelopment in peripheral areas and place them on a sustainable development track. Therefore, I have decided to additionally construct healthcare institutions, comprehensive cultural centres, and grain storage facilities in all cities and counties across the country”.

Education: The Nation’s Top Priority

Specific measures to strengthen education remain unclear, but Kim Jong Un’s remarks suggest this is not about tightening ideological controls. The North Korean leader highlighted that “in recent years, under the tasks set out at the 6th and 8th Plenums of the Party’s 8th Central Committee, qualitative changes worthy of pride have been achieved”. Practical steps have been taken to reform the national education structure to offer advanced education, improve teaching content and methods, prepare a reserve of educators for the future, and implement socialist policies for students. However, Kim admitted, “the foundation of education as a whole is failing to keep pace with the demands of the times and revolution”.

Key directions outlined include:

  • The state will assume full responsibility for providing teaching supplies, equipment, tools, and materials, as well as creating optimal conditions for teachers and students to work and study.
  • A nationwide effort to modernise and rebuild schools, aiming to update all schools in the country within 10 years.
  • Addressing issues such as “continuously improving the intellectual level of all students by enhancing the quality of fundamental general education, improving teacher qualifications to raise the overall standard of education, reducing disparities between urban and rural education, and establishing a national system to support education for students with disabilities”.

Personnel Changes

As usual, organisational appointments garnered significant attention, but no major purges occurred.

  • Chief of the General Staff Ri Yong Gil and Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui were promoted from candidate to full members of the Politburo, reportedly in recognition of their role in strengthening ties with Russia. Defence Minister No Kwang Chol, Deputy Premier Kim Jong Kwan, Central Audit Commission Chair Ri Hi Yong, and Education and Science Overseer Choe Dong Myong were also “directly elected” to the Politburo.
  • Interior Minister Pak Du Sop and Kim Chol Won were elected as candidate members of the Politburo.

Pak Thae Song, formerly head of the Propaganda Department of the Workers’ Party Central Committee, was elected to the Presidium of the Politburo and appointed the new Premier. The previous Premier, Kim Tok Hun, has been reassigned as Secretary of the Economic Department of the Central Committee, a lateral move rather than a demotion.

Ri Hi Yong and Choe Dong Myong were elected as Central Committee Secretaries while retaining their roles as department heads for personnel and education/science, respectively. Former Secretary Kim Jae Ryong has been reassigned to head the Disciplinary Affairs Department and serve as Ri Hi Yong’s deputy.

  • No Kwang Chol and Pak Du Sop were elected to the Party’s Central Military Commission, alongside Kim Jong Sik, a renowned military engineer and one of the leading developers of missile systems.

In summary, no statements as significant as those made a year ago, when inter-Korean policy underwent a radical shift, were issued at this plenum. However, it clearly illustrates the direction the country is taking and how its state mechanisms are functioning.

 

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Modern Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences

More on this topic
The Visit of the Russian Defence Minister to the DPRK
About the session of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK
On the Summer Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea
Possible consequences and prospects of Vladimir Putin’s visit to DPRK
Significance of Putin’s Visit to North Korea