Although trust will not be easily restored, the recent limited agreement will be an important platform for reducing geopolitical competition, preventing unwanted crises and even nuclear military tension, and moving towards interaction with competition.
But in June 2020, a deadly border clash killed at least 20 Chinese and four Indian soldiers and spread to other areas. The diplomatic, economic, and social impact of the reduction in air and travel links between the two countries, as well as people-to-people contacts, has also had a wide-ranging negative impact. India has also restricted Chinese investment.
The process of de-escalation
In October 2024, the Indian government announced that it had reached a border patrol agreement with China. The meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan (their first bilateral talks since 2019) led both sides to welcome the agreement reached between the two countries on patrol arrangements along the Line of Control in Ladakh.
Last December, the first meeting between the special representatives of Beijing and New Delhi for the border mechanism, by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, in Beijing, reflects the efforts of the two neighbors to continue to reduce tensions, agree to continue negotiations, military consultations to expedite the resolution of disputes, identify solutions, the need to deepen trust and increase cross-border exchanges and trade.
Variables Affecting Relations
The recent border agreement calls for the resumption of patrols in Ladakh and the withdrawal of troops to positions before the 2020 crisis. After the October 2024 announcement, India and China have withdrawn their forces from two key areas on the Himalayan border.
The agreement has neutralized the military tension between China and India for the time being. That means, both sides will send patrols to emphasize their claims, but the coordination of patrols will help to avoid conflict, and India will have access to 65 patrol points restored.
The two countries are also pursuing a “national security interest” by reducing troops, creating new buffer zones, and pulling back forces to minimize the likelihood of conflict.
This framework could later have implications for other disputed areas, particularly Arunachal Pradesh (“Southern Tibet”) or the Aksai Chin region in Kashmir. This approach could lead to a new set of confidence-building measures, reducing tensions, and preventing renewed conflict, and could serve as a basis for normalizing China-India relations.
In recent years, India has taken steps to limit China’s interests in India. In 2020, India reduced the issuance of tourist visas for Chinese citizens. In the meantime, in addition to India’s recent and positive steps to reduce the visa issuance time for Chinese citizens to less than 30 days, removing artificial barriers to people-to-people exchanges, allowing for frequent interactions, and increasing the number of direct flights between the two countries could be beneficial.
The two countries also have many incentives and reasons to dispel suspicions. The dispatch of a new Chinese ambassador to New Delhi in May 2024, 18 months after his predecessor left the Indian capital, talks between diplomats, and a reduction in media rhetoric are seen as steps towards easing tensions.
Although India and China still see the length of the borderline differently, and mistrust between border forces remains high, completing negotiations on the “suspended areas” through diplomatic and military channels remains a significant challenge.
However, if the expansion of diplomatic meetings and talks can be translated into practical and on-the-ground actions, it will bring about significant changes in the border region between China and India. In the geopolitical sphere, there are different views on their global and regional roles. Apart from domestic components and variables in both countries, the role of regional and international variables and actors in increasing or decreasing competition and tension between the two countries is significant.
Also, any future interaction of Donald Trump with China and India will be one of the determining factors in the China-India relationship.
New Delhi rejects China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – because they pass through territory claimed by India in Kashmir, and is concerned about Beijing’s growing power in the Indian Ocean and its long-standing alliance with Islamabad. India and China also have deep differences. Beijing is unhappy with India’s policies in Kashmir, US support for India against China, India’s rapprochement with Japan, strengthening ties with Taiwan, the Tibet issue, India’s presence in the QUAD (Quadruple Security Dialogue) strategic alliance and the AUKUS (Australia-Britain-United States) pact, and so on.
In the eyes of many in New Delhi, China’s recent foreign policy has been aggressive. Therefore, New Delhi feels threatened with a siege by China.
India wants a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, which China opposes. In a speech in New York in September 2024, Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar spoke of the “parallel rise of India and China.” Thus, India’s interest-based pursuit and efforts to balance Western-aligned groups (such as the US, Japan, Australia, and India) and non-Western groups such as the BRICS will increase India’s standing in the region and the world.
However, the partnership between India and China can not only strengthen regional stability but also accelerate the transition of international relations and the world order towards a multipolar world order. Although India has expressed its willingness to strengthen strategic ties with China, enhance strategic mutual trust, and expand cooperation, however, many in Beijing see domestic public opinion as not yet ready to see China positively and to develop relations with it.
In fact, the two countries’ water needs are growing day by day. The largest rivers in India and China depend on glaciers and water resources in Tibet, so any resolution of border tensions could also have an impact on reducing water disputes.
Trade ties between the two countries remain strong, with China being India’s largest trading partner. Trade is expected to reach $118 billion in 2023-2024, despite geopolitical tensions. New Delhi and Beijing share common interests in many forums, such as BRICS and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The recent border agreement will allow India to engage more broadly with China by addressing economic challenges, increasing Chinese investment, and balancing the bilateral trade deficit.
The world’s two most populous countries have natural economic complementarities. A stable relationship also benefits China’s exports and will provide easier access to India’s vast and growing market. Also, if Trump’s future trade policy (import tariff commitment) is implemented, China and India can benefit from each other’s markets to reduce the impact of tariffs.
Outlook
The border issue has taken a heavy toll on relations, and there have been no meetings between the two countries’ top leaders for five years. 2025 marks the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India. With the recent border agreement and New Delhi’s approach to “facilitating visas for the Chinese,” there is now much hope for expanding tourism, diplomatic exchanges, and multidimensional negotiations.
Relations have not yet returned to the state before the conflict in 2020, but the current approaches of the two countries can help prevent future escalation of tensions. With the actual implementation of the non-interference agreements by the spring or summer of 2025, the military standoff is expected to ease at least in the western part of the China-India border.
In addition, the two sides appear to be exploring a mechanism for high-level economic and trade dialogue to strengthen the alignment of economic development strategies and promote balanced and sustainable growth in bilateral trade. Also, although trust will not be easily restored, the recent limited agreement will be an important platform for reducing geopolitical competition, preventing unwanted crises and even nuclear military tension, and moving towards interaction with competition.
Samyar Rostami is a political observer and senior researcher in international relations
