What Awaits Southeast Asia Following Donald Trump’s Victory in the US Presidential Election?
Expectations and fears
Southeast Asia is no exception. As soon as the votes were counted, some people began to question what would happen to import tariffs in the United States, others started calculating potential benefits, while still others celebrated the fact that someone committed to traditional values, rather than the much-maligned radical liberalism, had come to power. Meanwhile, others worried about America’s future participation (or lack thereof) in international climate agreements. Although the US presidential inauguration is still months away, this region – well-acquainted with the realities of American expansionism – has already been swept up by the full spectrum of emotions.
Transnational fraud
In the United States, such a situation could hardly go unnoticed. Enterprising overseas players have always been renowned for their cunning and resourcefulness. And now, across Southeast Asia, a completely new informational campaign is beginning to take shape, one that the US is actively promoting.
Interviews with American “experts” or local figures deeply invested in fostering relations with Washington have started appearing in the media of ASEAN countries. These individuals comment on Donald Trump’s election and speculate about its implications for the region. Generally, the content of such publications boils down to a few straightforward points:
- Trump will undoubtedly implement his plans to increase import tariffs, not only against China but also against other countries, including those in Southeast Asia.
- Engaging in re-exporting Chinese goods to the US—whether as finished products or minimally processed ones—thereby helping Beijing bypass American restrictions, is risky. The US will stringently monitor the origins of goods, and any violations could lead to severe consequences for all imports from the implicated ASEAN country.
- The countries most likely to suffer from tariff increases are those with significant trade surpluses with the US, depending on the size of these surpluses (Vietnam, Thailand, and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia being the primary targets).
- Such countries are being persuaded that a trade surplus is a “problem.” It is not presented as an indicator of the demand for their goods in the US, nor as proof of the quality and competitiveness of their products, but rather as an issue that needs resolution. The “experts” cheerfully suggest addressing this “problem” by rapidly reducing the surplus, for example, by purchasing expensive American products such as liquefied natural gas or aircraft engines. One country has even been encouraged to buy F-16 fighter jets instead of the European aircraft it had previously planned to acquire, ostensibly to retain US support. And so, the narrative unfolds—simple yet effective, and, of course, profitable.
The authors of this intriguing strategy, as well as its originating think tank, remain unknown. Whether the thread leads directly to Trump’s campaign team, his inner circle, or industrial and financial elites, is difficult to determine with certainty. What is clear, however, is that the operators of this colossal informational campaign, cast across the globe, surpass even the combined ingenuity of Ostap Bender, Scrooge McDuck, and Jordan Belfort, the protagonist of The Wolf of Wall Street. In essence, Southeast Asian countries are being asked to voluntarily surrender a significant portion of their national income to enrich American manufacturers—and to do so unconditionally, without alternatives, simply because it suits US interests.
In implementing this strategy, American tacticians (and, whether knowingly or not, their sympathisers in Southeast Asia) act with remarkable sophistication. They exploit the fears, anxieties, and expectations of their target audience, who are anxiously awaiting the actions the newly elected US President will take in implementing his economic programme. Simultaneously, the US pursues its favoured approach of issuing directives—dictating with whom nations may collaborate, what actions are permissible in their foreign economic relations, and what behaviours will result in immediate sanctions against nations that are ostensibly sovereign.
How to steal financial independence
However, the issue of sovereignty—specifically economic and financial sovereignty—is becoming increasingly challenging for many of the United States’ partners. Consider the rapid depreciation of Southeast Asian currencies against the dollar following Trump’s election. This decline appeared to be orchestrated with great haste, seemingly by stock market speculators and banks—central banks included—that, for some reason, are disinclined to support strong national currencies. The effects were felt across the board. Yet, surprisingly, “experts” (this time not American but local and self-styled) promptly emerged to advise “adapting” to the situation, insisting that “excessively defending one’s currency is a bad idea for any country.” One might wonder what kind of education these individuals received and whom they truly serve. Nevertheless, the reality remains that there are still plenty of lobbyists in Southeast Asia championing the American perspective.
The pinnacle of interference in domestic financial matters and an affront to national sovereignty appears to be Trump’s articulated idea of banning trade with any country that dares to abandon the dollar and decouple its external economic relations from it. The fact that such threats are emanating from the US suggests only one thing: the American currency is indeed losing its global dominance. The more individuals and nations around the world come to realise that anchoring all financial processes to a single, arbitrarily chosen foreign currency is a relic—irrational, illogical, detrimental to national economies, and restrictive of independent decision-making—the more futile and feudal such threats will sound. This kind of categorical financial dictate might only find historical parallels in the practices of medieval moneylenders, imposing their will on debtors trapped in a cycle of bondage.
* * *
Unfortunately, the scenario where Southeast Asian nations and other developing economies face external directives on how to behave in their international relations is neither new nor baseless. It is the consequence of tethering their economies—particularly their exports—to the American market. It is also an inevitable, albeit intermediate, outcome of the decision their leaders once made to rely on the dollar, connections with the US, and American investments. However, it remains intermediate because the situation is reversible. Every nation, every people, holds the power to forge their own path to prosperity, independence, and global competitiveness. Each is entitled to respect for their chosen trajectory of development, economic model, and sovereign policy on the international stage.
Across Asia and the broader non-Western world, increasing emphasis is being placed on national currencies. The trend of dedollarization, viewed as a progressive economic step forward, is gaining momentum. Diversifying external economic ties through bilateral and multilateral frameworks fosters a healthier model of economic activity and fairer competition in global markets.
Protectionism and the support of one’s own economy are inherently natural actions for any state striving to uphold its interests. However, in the case of the United States in 2024, protectionism has been turned into a spectacle, while omnipresent business sharks and agents of information warfare exploit the situation for their own speculative gains. Whether politicians and economists from Southeast Asian countries take the bait of the latest American ploy, rush to heed the directives of US advisors, or remain steadfast in their sovereign course depends entirely on their choices. The fate of their national development models lies squarely in their own hands.
Ksenia Muratshina, PhD in History, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
