While Iran is carefully planning its response to the provocative assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, European leaders are doing their best to save Netanyahu’s criminal regime and grant it the right to continue engaging in terrorist activities. A few days after Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran, while he was attending the inauguration of the new Iranian president, several European leaders appealed to Pezeshkian, urging him to de-escalate the situation and abandon a retaliatory strike against Israel.
The fact that some of these leaders have not been in contact with the current Iranian president for two or three years shows the seriousness of the situation. The hypocrisy and arrogance of European leaders, who did not condemn Israel, did not take any action against it, did not impose sanctions, but called on the victim (Iran) to accept this state of affairs and expect further criminal actions by Israel, is striking. And no one in the world doubts that these crimes will happen.
Details of the European plan and Iran’s response
The world was stunned by what the so-called democratic leaders of Europe proposed – expecting restraint of the victim instead of the aggressor. Macron pathetically urged Pezeshkian to “do everything possible to avoid a new military escalation that would not serve anyone’s interests, including Iran’s, and which would cause long-term damage to regional stability”. Starmer sternly warned of the “serious risk of miscalculation” and stressed that “now is the time for calm and careful reflection”. Scholz echoed these sentiments, telling the Iranian president that “the spiral of violence in the Middle East must be stopped now”. And so the question arises: how many victims should Israel kill in order for peace and tranquility, in the opinion of hypocritical Europeans, to reign in the Middle East?
In response, Iran stressed its right to defend itself against Israeli aggression, rejecting calls for restraint as “devoid of political logic” and contrary to the principles of international law. Pezeshkian criticized the silence of the West on the “unprecedented inhumane crimes” in Gaza. But while making it clear that the ongoing escalation in the region would not interfere with his administration’s domestic agenda, he also discussed the possibility of resuming the 2015 nuclear deal during telephone conversations. The fact that he even touched on the nuclear talks and the possibility of resuming negotiations between Iran and international powers underscores the difficult geopolitical environment that Tehran is navigating in deciding how to take revenge on Israel for the assassination of Haniyeh. Iran and Hezbollah have indicated that retaliation against Israel is inevitable in response to the killing of Haniyeh in Tehran and senior Hezbollah military commander Fuad Shukr in Beirut. However, the timing and nature of the response are still being discussed. Even a symbolic military response inside Israel may not be necessary if Iran believes it can achieve more with a strategy of holding back. In a speech at a memorial service for Shukr last week, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah hinted that Iran did not need to get involved in a protracted battle, suggesting that the response would be “slow, deliberate and bold, not emotional”. He even joked that Iran’s regional allies often say that “Tehran cuts the enemy’s throat with cotton wool”, which is a metaphor for slow but inevitable revenge.
What can the Iranian leadership do?
An Iranian reformist politician (his name is not mentioned) close to the new Iranian president, told Al-Ahram that Iran’s lack of response so far is not a sign of weakness. According to him, this is a strategic calculation aimed at preventing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from dragging the entire region into an open war. “President Pezeshkian expressed his opinion to senior officials of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, saying that Tehran should be patient and carefully consider its response before taking any action”, the politician said. “In his discussions with European leaders, Pezeshkian established Iran’s legitimate right to retaliate in accordance with international norms, which was extremely important for Tehran”, he added, although he noted that establishing Iran’s legitimate right to retaliate is separate from its actual response and timing. “Tehran is not interested in a simple symbolic response, but rather in ending the war in Gaza, which is the main cause of the current regional crisis”, he said.
After extensive regional and European diplomatic efforts, it appears that Tehran is leaning towards postponing any potential retaliatory actions in favour of negotiating a cease-fire in Gaza. Iranian diplomatic sources suggest that if a ceasefire agreement seems achievable in the coming days, Tehran is unlikely to take any steps that could jeopardise the truce or prevent the delivery of humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza. Iran’s mission to the UN in New York also stated: “we hope that our response will be timely and implemented in a way that does not undermine a potential ceasefire”.
According to Reuters, citing two sources, Iran is considering sending a representative to negotiate a ceasefire, which is the first such participation since the beginning of the conflict in Gaza. Although representatives may not attend the meetings directly, they are expected to participate in behind-the-scenes discussions to support the Arab side during ongoing negotiations.
Iran’s belated response to Israel has also provoked some criticism among Arabs. Many in Gaza and the region are calling on Tehran to launch a strong retaliatory strike against Israel, hoping that this will put pressure on the Israeli government to reconsider its ongoing military operations in Gaza. Arab social media is overflowing with calls for Tehran to adhere to its principle of containing Israel.
But Iran’s strategic calculations as a state differ significantly from those of Hamas as an organisation; this difference is likely related to their differing strategic goals and regional interests. Hamas, as a Palestinian militant group focused on fighting Israel, is primarily concerned about the direct impact on its operational capabilities, internal cohesion and its position among the Palestinians. The retaliatory strike will be carried out in such a way as to maintain or strengthen its support base and demonstrate resilience.
As a state actor with broader regional ambitions, Iran will consider how to respond in the context of its strategic rivalry with Israel and its desire to extend its power and influence throughout the Middle East. Tehran’s response may be more calculated, potentially seeking to exploit the situation to achieve its geopolitical goals, perhaps by coordinating a broader response through its network of regional proxies rather than focusing solely on immediate retaliation. The difference in these calculations reflects the local focus of Hamas compared to Iran’s broader strategic considerations.
Such discrepancies between Iran and Hamas are not new. The relationship between the Shi’a state and the Sunni Palestinian resistance movement is complex and has been marked by numerous twists over the years. This is a marriage of convenience dictated by common political interests. Unlike Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is closely linked to Iran both religiously and ideologically, relations between Iran, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine are motivated primarily by a shared hostility to US-Israeli hegemony in the region.
The alliance between Iran and Hamas emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Iran sought to extend its influence to the Arab world after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Although Hamas is a Sunni Islamist movement and Iran is predominantly Shi’a in terms of religion, their common hostility to the US and Israel has led to a natural alliance. Tehran began providing financial assistance, military training and weapons to Hamas, helping the group establish itself as an important player in the Palestinian territories, especially after Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006.
Tehran’s reaction to the assassination of Haniyeh will depend on many factors, while Iran’s national interests will be of paramount importance. Many Iranians are wondering about the reasons for the risk to their country’s stability in the conflict with the US and Israel, which, in their opinion, does not directly affect Iran. They highlight the fact that Iran is already facing significant consequences because of the ongoing war between Hamas and Israel, especially since Hamas did not inform Iran of its plans to attack Israel on October 7 last year. This view is reinforced by a resolute ‘Iran first’ approach that prioritises national interests. These considerations will greatly influence Tehran’s reaction, especially under the country’s new president, who has promised to heed the will of the Iranian people and avoid unplanned or risky actions abroad.
Viktor Mikhin, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
