From June 28 to July 1, 2024, the DPRK held “extended session of the 10th Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, contributing to the successful implementation of the priorities and all tasks of the Party and state policy for 2024.” The plenary meeting summarized the results of work for the first half of the year and discussed “a number of next important issues in the continued rise of the phase of comprehensive rejuvenation of socialism in line with the Korean model.”
The format of the event did not differ from similar events in the past. The expanded meeting meant that “officials of relevant departments of the WPK Central Committee, leading officials of ministries, national agencies and provincial-level leadership bodies, chief secretaries of city and county committees of the WPK and representatives of the working class were present as observers.”
The main items on the agenda related to the economy and Party discipline
In a report titled On the interim review of the implementation of the major Party and state policies for 2024, Kim Jong-unnoted that the “universal aspiration to accelerate the advance towards the comprehensive development of socialist construction is further increasing and growing.”
Compared to the equivalent period last year, there has been a distinct growth in the economy. Noting successes in the construction and agriculture sectors, Kim singled out the need to double the growth rate of the economy in the second half of the year by adopting “effective economic and business measures.” These measures, Kim said, include optimizing the management and planning systems under the leadership of the Cabinet, which he seeks to turn into the sole management body responsible for the country’s economy.
He listed a number of tasks to be accomplished in the next six months, including:
the construction of an energy-saving oxygen heat blast furnace at the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex and a facility to establish a one-carbon chemical industry,
the completion of the first-stage construction of the Tanchon Hydroelectric Power Station and accelerating the construction of new power plants and
promoting the modernization of the Ryongsong Engineering Association.
A new set of tasks related to maintenance and infrastructure in the railroad and construction industries was announced. He also focused on the 20×10 regional development plan.
The next tasks Kim Jong-un set involved planned changes to the Socialist Constitution, which will be made at the next session of the Supreme People’s Assembly, and improvement to the country’s law enforcement system.
It’s not just about defining the country’s borders, but also about the enactment of new executive and binding sector-specific laws related to different issues arising in the revolution and construction of Socialism.
During the discussion of the agenda item “On Improving Officials’ Method and Style of Work,” the seriousness and consequences of some officials’ improper work style was criticized for lacking the “revolutionary mass viewpoint.”
As media outlets in South Korea noted, Kim Jong-un did not deliver any messages critical of the ROK or the US, nor did he make any reference to North Korea’s desire to expand its arsenal of nuclear weapons and missiles. Nevertheless, South Korean experts speculated that a clause defining South Korea as the “main enemy” could be added to the Constitution.
A new female face in power
Among the personnel changes announced were the appointment of a new Minister of Finance, and the appointment of Kim Jong-sun, chairwoman of the Central Committee of the Socialist Women’s Union of Korea, as head of the Social Organizations Department of the Central Committee of the WPK (a post which plays a key role in North Korea’s propaganda strategy), in place of Ri Tu-song. This was the first time a woman had been appointed to such a position, as The Korea Timesnoted.
Cheong Seong-chang, director of the Center for Korean Peninsula Strategy at the Sejong Institute, suggests that “expanding women’s presence in the political scene and increasing the number of women in leadership roles may signal that Kim Ju-ae’s succession is likely. Some women leaders like Kim Jong-sun may appear as Ju-ae’s advisor or confident in the future… Although there is no official announcement yet, it seems like the North Korean leader has already begun planning his succession.”
But it was the lapel badges that attracted the most attention
Photos published by the KCNA of the second day of the plenum revealed that those in attendance wore lapel badges bearing the image of Kim Jong-un.
Badges with the leader’s portrait are somewhat of tradition in the DPRK, and are worn by everyone from ordinary North Koreans to the most senior state officials.
Kim Il-sung badges began to be actively produced around the time of the Fifth Congress of the WPK in November 1970, and as Kim Jong-il’s role as successor was confirmed in the 1980s, badges depicting both leaders appeared.
In February 1992, on the occasion of Kim Jong Il’s 50th birthday, badges bearing his portrait alone were issued, but due to his negative attitude towards his own personality cult while his father was still alive, only some officials wore them, and ordinary citizens started wearing them only in the 2000s.
According to South Korean media, the first badge bearing Kim Jong-un’s portrait was made in 2012, after Kim Jong Il’s death, but this is the first time these badges have has appeared publicly. “This is part of a move to obscure the legacies of previous leaders and establish Kim Jong-un’s authority as a sole leader,” said Kim In-ae, the deputy spokesperson for South Korea’s Unification Ministry, during a press briefing. He added that “the move appears to be aimed at strengthening internal cohesion and legitimizing Kim’s rule amid increasing public dissatisfaction due to economic hardships and the influx of external cultural content, such as K-pop dramas.”
However, other experts have suggested that the wearing of Kim Jong-un badges by senior party officials during important events may be a temporary measure to emphasize loyalty to Kim Jong-un.
Although the advent of the Kim Jong-un era was announced in 2016, this was followed by increased sanctions pressure, affecting living standards. In addition, the 2018 “Olympic warming” and attempts to mend relations with the ROK and the US are possibly now perceived by the DPRK’s leadership as a move in the wrong direction. However, the development of nuclear missile capabilities and the abandonment of the unification paradigm have now in some way “corrected” its course. And now Kim Jong-un can declare that his own era has begun, as the country makes moves to improve its situation.
Konstantin Asmolov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”