Yet another narrative on the situation in one of the key regions, where the current stage of the “Great World Game” is taking place in its most intense form, will start with (yet another) statement of the conventionality of the terminology used. By the way, let us note that varying degrees of conventionality are characteristic of almost all words that are present in descriptions of any aspect of human activity. In each case such terminology requires at least some explanation.
What is “South Asia” and what does “unrest” mean? Let’s assume that the former is made up mostly of India and Pakistan. That is, the two de facto nuclear powers, whose relations have been in varying degrees of tension more or less constantly, since independence until now.
This is not only a major obstacle to the implementation of the long-standing and potentially highly attractive North-South infrastructure project, but may well act as a fuse for another armed conflict. There have already been several such conflicts, and not only of a bilateral nature. Because each time the leading players of any specific time period were clearly present behind the direct participants.
However, in the 1960s, India was also directly involved in armed conflicts with China, which has long been and still is in a state of near-alliance with Pakistan. Given the fact that Beijing is now seen by Washington as the main challenge to the global American position, and New Delhi as a potential ally, the “price” of the possible involvement of both now leading world powers in another potential Indo-Pakistani conflict rises sharply.
In this text, the term “unrest” refers to a situation in the “South Asia” region that is fraught with serious negative consequences not only for the countries that make up the region. And these “negative consequences” won’t definitely be limited to the failure of the construction of the “North-South corridor”. Although even today from quite practical positions we can consider some “truncated” variant of the project, for example, in the form of the “Russia-Iran corridor”.
We should note at once that nearly all concrete manifestations of “unrest” were already a source of headache for the administration of “British India” (as this region was called then), which bequeathed them all, without any special changes, to its two main successors. These are the “Republic of India” and the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”
These particularly important “inherited” problems include first of all the various negative consequences of the attempt to rule out the very possibility of large-scale inter-confessional conflicts by means of the territorial separation of the bearers of the two main faiths, i.e. Hinduism and Islam. Let us point out the initial deficiency of this project, which was not able to replace the only possible way to solve the problem of interfaith tensions, which consists in the tolerant and respectful attitude towards each other of individuals and communities living in the same territory, but adhering to different creeds.
This project was formalized in the summer of 1947 in the form of a legislative act of the British Parliament that separated the two independent states mentioned above from the former “British India.” The Hindu-Muslim exchange that began between them culminated in the “First Indo-Pakistani War.” Estimates of the “costs” of both the exchange process and the ensuing hostilities range from one to several million deaths. Never before had sectarian friction (quite rare) in a single territory of residence led to such a large-scale tragedy.
But even at this appalling cost, the goal of territorial division between Hindus and Muslims has not been achieved. Because the territory of present-day India is home to about 180 million Muslims (which is slightly less than the population of “religiously uniform” Pakistan), who, while sometimes experiencing certain problems, do not intend to emigrate. Muslims have more than once occupied the highest government positions in India and have made a very noticeable contribution to its all-round development.
In addition, the territory of the former Principality of Kashmir, densely populated by about 10% of the Muslims of British India, was divided between India and Pakistan in proportions of about 60% to 40% and the two sides continue to claim their opponent’s “share”. Today, the two de facto nuclear powers are separated here by a 740-kilometer “Line of Control” (LoC), rather than by an internationally recognized border. Various incidents are reported almost daily from the Indian part of the former Kashmir. Including armed and quite large-scale ones.
Of these, the most dangerous, which almost led to another Indo-Pakistani war, was the terrorist attack that happened in February 2019 near the city of Pulwama. Smaller in scale, but also resulting in the death of 5 and wounding of 15 Indian soldiers, was a similar act of attack on April 21 this year by unidentified terrorists on an internal troop convoy near the LoC town of Poonch, in the same “Jammu and Kashmir Union Territory”.
In his emotional reaction to this latter event, India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, first of all, reiterated quite clearly the thesis of Pakistan’s involvement in “cross-border terrorism” in general and in this terrorist attack in particular. He also mentioned the growing deterioration of the climate in bilateral relations, against whose backdrop his Pakistani counterpart Bilawal Bhutto Zardari was scheduled to arrive in India for the next meeting of the SCO Foreign Ministers Council (planned for early May this year). It should be noted that India is hosting all of this organization’s events this year.
Meanwhile, in the context of the topic at hand, the very name of Pakistan’s current foreign minister is significant. Because Bilawal Zardari is the son of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (and now living former President Asif Ali Zardari), who was killed in the December 27, 2007 terrorist attack in Karachi. Which became a symbol of the terrorist war that has been waged for decades on Pakistani soil as well. The Pakistani leadership accuses India, more or less openly (and, as they say, on the basis of reciprocity), of supporting it. The main areas of the terrorist war in Pakistan are the previously mentioned megalopolis of Karachi, as well as the entire province of Baluchistan and its capital Quetta. But it is mainly waged in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa adjoining to Afghanistan, its capital Peshawar and the district of Swat.
Note that the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa today includes the so-called “Tribal Zone”. The term was used by the administration of British India to refer to a source of particularly serious trouble, as well as to fears in connection with the famous “Great Game” that was conducted here with the Russian Empire. One of the main measures to counter threats emanating from the area was the Durand Line, which is now the de facto border separating Pakistan from Afghanistan.
But the line divided Pashtuns, whose opinion, naturally, no one cared about when it was planned to be drawn on the map of the region. By the way, it was probably the first time that the famous phrase “don’t go there, or you’ll be completely dead” was used. But the addressee didn’t heed this wise advice, and today the Durand Line’s division of Pashtun tribes is the main motive of the de facto guerrilla war waged by the Pakistani Taliban (banned in Russia) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
This war includes terrorist acts, mainly targeting Pakistani military and police units and facilities located there. The latest such attack, which occurred on April 24 near the regional counterterrorism center of the district of Swat, immediately killed 15 people and wounded over 50 with varying degrees of severity. As a reminder, the terrorist attack in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, only three months earlier, had more lethal consequences.
The current de facto guerrilla war in both this province and Baluchistan is exacerbating an extraordinary political conflict between two political factions supporting incumbent Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif on the one side and Imran Khan, who resigned in April last year, on the other. The topic of early elections to local legislatures in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, provisionally slated for May 14, is currently at the forefront.
Reports of stampeding (with fatalities, including women and children) at flour and wheat distribution sites add to the perception that the country is on the verge of a national tragedy.
Overall, the situation in the “South Asia” region does not appear to radiate an air of optimism and joy. There is currently no time for grandiose transnational projects. In this regard, PRC experts who have been implementing the “China-Pakistan economic corridor” initiative for over five years may have a lot to say.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
