On April 19, 2023 President Yoon Seok-yeol gave an interview to Reuters in which he said, among other things, that “If there is a situation the international community cannot condone, such as any large-scale attack on civilians, massacre or serious violation of the laws of war, it might be difficult for us to insist only on humanitarian or financial support.”
Yoon noted that his government is exploring how to help protect and rebuild Ukraine, just as South Korea received international aid during the 1950-53 Korean War. “I believe there won’t be limitations to the extent of the support to defend and restore a country that’s been illegally invaded both under international and domestic law. However, considering our relationship with the parties engaged in the war and developments in the battlefield, we will take the most appropriate measures.”
Unfortunately, the news reached most Russian media in a truncated form, “South Korea is ready to supply weapons to Ukraine,” which drew the ire of a number of politicians, including former President Dmitry Medvedev: “New willingness to help our enemies has emerged. South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol said that in principle, this state is ready to supply weapons to the Kyiv regime. And not so long ago, the South Koreans fervently assured that they completely excluded the possibility of supplying lethal weapons to Kyiv. I wonder what the residents of this country will say when they see the latest Russian weapons from their closest neighbors – our partners from the DPRK.”
Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov noted that there is nothing fundamentally new in this decision, but the supply of weapons to Kyiv by Seoul will mean a certain stage of involvement in the conflict. Peskov also pointed out that the start of arms deliveries would mean participation in the conflict, albeit indirectly, and that throughout the whole development around Ukraine, South Korea had taken a rather unfriendly stance towards Russia.
The spokeswoman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova noted that “Russia is conducting defensive military actions against the collective West, which has chosen the puppet regime in Kyiv as an instrument of its hybrid proxy war against us. As such, we consider any arms deliveries to Ukraine – no matter where they come from – to be an openly hostile anti-Russian act. Such steps would have an extremely negative impact on bilateral relations with those States that take them and would be taken into account in shaping Russian positions on issues that affect the fundamental security interests of the countries concerned. In the case of the Republic of Korea, it could be about approaches to resolving the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The Russian Armed Forces are launching high-precision strikes exclusively against military targets, not civilian infrastructure. As for concerns about civilian casualties, unfortunately, this is the reality that civilians in Donbass faced back in 2014 as a result of the attack by the clique that had seized power in Kyiv. This has been one of the key causes of the current crisis. We have not seen any compassion for these many victims from the ‘collective West,’ including Seoul.” Nevertheless, there have been no official complaints or summons afterward.
The Russian Embassy in the Republic of Korea also issued a cautionary comment: “We are closely monitoring the position of the Government of the Republic of Korea on the issue of transferring lethal weapons to Ukraine.
Such a move would finally destroy Russian-Korean relations, which have been developing constructively over the past three decades for the benefit of the peoples of the two countries. It would also have very negative consequences for our bilateral cooperation in the context of the security situation on the Korean peninsula. We expect the Korean leadership to take a responsible approach to this issue.”
Opposition leader Lee Jae-myung urged the president to reconsider his remarks: “Offering military support to a conflicting region is an act that harms national interests, and we should never do so … I urge the president to reconsider this decision, which poses a serious threat to the national interests of the Republic of Korea.” In a similar vein, the leader of the parliamentary faction of the Democrats, Park Hong-keun said: “This is an important issue directly related to national security. The president cannot unilaterally make a decision without the consent of the National Assembly … the Democratic Party will never be able to make a unilateral government decision that would pose serious threats to national interests and security.”
Park stressed that the Constitution requires the government to obtain the consent of Parliament on such important issues, and expressed concern that if military assistance to Ukraine begins, South Korean businesses will be hit. Therefore, Yoon was urged to clearly state before the visit that Seoul’s position is to refuse military assistance to Ukraine.
The United States, in turn, expressed gratitude for the fact that Yoon Seok-yeol “opened the doors for the supply of weapons to Ukraine,” and the Ukrainian Embassy in South Korea expressed hope that “South Korea will join forces to support Ukraine’s fight against Russia” by providing modern Korean-made defense equipment.” “We would welcome the decision of the Korean government to increase its support for Ukraine, in addition to humanitarian and financial assistance,” the embassy said, stressing that “timely defense assistance from our partners is crucial to end the war in 2023.”
South Korean experts expressed mixed opinions about Seoul’s new position, but agreed that this would have an impact on inter-Korean relations. Thus, former chancellor of the Korean National Diplomatic Academy Kim Joon-hyun recalled Vladimir Putin’s remarks last year that South Korea’s relations with Russia would be ruined if Seoul decided to supply arms and ammunition to Ukraine: “Yoon’s remarks will give Russia more freedom in assisting North Korea, and it will only strengthen the North Korea-Russia-China bloc as a rival to the South Korea-US-Japan bloc.” In his opinion, “Yoon’s comments were an unnecessary attempt to push South Korea to the front line of the war in Ukraine by unnecessarily defining our enemy” and now Moscow will take a more active position in helping Pyongyang.
A scholar at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Go Myong-Hyun, also noted that in protest against Seoul’s new stance on the Ukraine issue, Russia may demonstrate a gesture of strengthening its relations with North Korea, but this is likely to be more limited to rhetorical actions because of international sanctions. In contrast to Kim, Go said Yoon’s comments were strategic steps that had been taken after considering the course of the war in Ukraine. “South Korea has spoken strongly in support of Ukraine … This may show that Seoul is now on the same side as its allies and friendly countries on the Ukraine issue and is removing its ambiguity on global issues.”
The Presidential Administration immediately rebutted speculation that Yoon was hinting at a change in policy regarding aid to Ukraine, and during April 19-20, its representatives explained to the media that “the South Korean government’s position in refusing military aid to Ukraine remains unchanged.”
On April 20, a representative of the Presidential Administration pointed out that “the Russian authorities are commenting on something that did not happen,” because the South Korean leader was referring only to the hypothetical possibility of arms supply in case of massacres, war crimes, etc. So far, there has been no change in the South Korean government’s position. It provides exclusively humanitarian aid to Ukraine (the volume of which may be increased) and is ready to discuss the participation of the ROK in post-war reconstruction, but further actions of the ROK depend on the actions of the Russian side.
The official added that no clause in South Korean laws prohibits the government from providing military support to a third country in trouble, but Seoul has managed to balance international efforts to support Ukraine with relations between South Korea and Russia. At the same time, he did not specify what level of “large-scale attacks on civilians” could possibly prompt South Korea to send lethal weapons to Ukraine.
South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Lim-so-seok also confirmed that South Korea’s position on Ukraine remains unchanged and that Seoul “actively participates in international efforts to protect Ukraine’s freedom and restore peace, including the provision of humanitarian assistance and support.” When asked to comment on Yoon’s remarks, Lim replied that “some countries” had been mentioned on the basis of “hypothetical circumstances” and declined further comments.
However, the author retains an anxious feeling, which consists of several elements. Let’s start with the fact that now both sides are experiencing shell hunger. The Ukrainian conflict is the first high-intensity conflict after a very long break, in which the old norms of artillery preparation have reemerged with their number of shells per gun and guns per kilometer of the front. In order for the artillery to be the “god of war”, the number of shells required is not just big but huge.
Meanwhile, ammunition stocks are running out, and no one is ready to run the risk of militarizing the economy and launching the production of shells in accordance with wartime standards. As a result, the United States has an emergency reserve to be used as a last resort, and everything else has been spent so much that the US is transferring shells from South Korea to Ukraine, although formally for the United States, the “North Korean threat” has a higher priority than a military conflict.
Moreover, if the rumors about the imminent attempt at a counteroffensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine are true, then a lot of shells will be needed for its success, and that is why arm-twisting to US allies has become more active.
Being a key US ally and major munitions manufacturer, South Korea has so far tried to avoid a conflict with Russia. And although the demands to change this policy were voiced, in particular, by the NATO Secretary General himself during his visit to Seoul, the administration of Yoon Seok-yeol is still trying to sit on two chairs. On the one hand, it is necessary to conform to the image of one of the most loyal allies of the United States, relations with which are described as a “global strategic alliance.”
In addition, the United States is actively playing on the fact that President Yoon is promoting the defense industry as one of the driving forces of the country’s exports. Against this background, South Korean defense companies conclude lucrative export deals with European countries, especially with Poland. South Korea is the eighth largest arms exporter in the world and is about to grow to fifth, and Seoul is hinted that the weapons it supplies should perform well in real combat.
On the other hand, the ROK really doesn’t want to spoil relations with Moscow and withdraw from the Russian market, in which a lot has been invested. Although in February 2022, Russia included South Korea in the list of unfriendly countries for joining Western sanctions, many South Korean companies retained their activities in Russia. According to the Korea International Trade Association, South Korea’s trade with Russia in 2022 amounted to $21.14 billion, down 22.7 percent from a year earlier. Exports declined 36.6 percent year-on-year to $6.33 billion. It’s still a lot.
Since the international community-imposed sanctions on Moscow, South Korean exports to Russia’s neighbors have grown rapidly. According to the head of the group on Russia and Eurasia at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Chung Min-hyun, “against the backdrop of a decline in direct trade with Russia, neighboring countries can be used as workarounds … For every Korean exporter, this can be a strategy to maximize profits while reducing risks.”
In this context, there are fears that in the event of a cooling of relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea, Russia may freeze or even nationalize the assets of South Korean companies in Russia, for example, the idle Samsung and LG plants near Moscow or the Hyundai Motor Group plant in St. Petersburg.
Prior to Yoon’s statements, Seoul agreed to substitution schemes: weapons go to the United States or Poland IN REPLACEMENT of those going to Ukraine. So, in March 2023, the United States and South Korea entered into an agreement to supply the American side in the form of a loan with 500,000 155mm artillery shells. This is half of the total number of shells (1 million) that the United States supplied to Ukraine last year. The request was received by Seoul in February 2023 after Washington had already purchased 100 ammunitions of this type from the Koreans in 2022 (there seemed to be a clause in the contract that the States are the end user).
However, President Yoon Seok-yeol is visiting the United States on April 26, 2023, and this is not an ordinary working visit, but a visit marking the 75th anniversary of relations between the two countries and the 70th anniversary of the Mutual Defense Treaty, which is the basis of the military alliance between Seoul and Washington. The issue of additional support for Ukraine is not on the official agenda for next week’s South Korea-US summit, but the president’s spokesman said the topic could be raised during talks.
In such a situation, anti-Yoon Seok-yeol experts believe the US will pose a direct question to the South Korean president: “Who are you friends with, me or the bear?” After which the president will have no possibility or desire to retreat, and South Korean weapons will go to the Ukrainian theater.
The Korean part of the leak of the secret documents should also be considered in the same context of pressure: it is not even important now whether it is true or a fake made to pressure Seoul. What matters is that the leaked documents revealed a conversation between Yoon Seok-yeol’s foreign policy and national security advisers, Lee Moon-hee and Kim Sung-han, in which they expressed their fears that although the ammunition sales documents said the United States was the end user, the US might violate this condition and Seoul would have to deal with Moscow.
Even more, they feared that Biden would call Yoon on the phone and put a question point-blank. The advisers were ready to change their policy and only feared that it would not look good against the backdrop of a visit to the US. That is why the option of indirect supplies through Poland was being developed.
Nevertheless, even before the documents were leaked both advisors had resigned. This can either be taken as an indirect sign that the conversations took place and the president did not appreciate such moves behind his back, or the authors of the fake managed to compromise two important people in Yoon’s entourage and replace them with more pro-American creatures. Since Kim Sung-han’s resignation, his deputy, Kim Tae-hyo, has become increasingly powerful, taking a very hard right-wing conservative stance.
In such a difficult situation, Yoon has practically nowhere to retreat and his statements should, on the contrary, be considered as the last line of defense. “Yes, we are willing to change policy, but only if the Russians do something really awful.”
It looks like a step with one’s back against the wall, but there are several problems. First, a number of Russian politicians don’t distinguish between lethal and non-lethal weapons. Delivering helmets and body armor is in their opinion also an act hostile to Russia, for which Seoul should be punished. Second, conservative South Korean circles have already started to actively describe the Russian reaction to Yoon’s statement, omitting all misunderstandings and suggesting that it is a reaction to the full text of the speech. Of course, in such a situation it looks like an additional stab in the president’s back: look how boorish the Russians are and what they threaten! Third, there are still problems related to the direct demand during the visit. Yoon will be required to demonstrate that South Korea is a responsible power defending the values of democracy.
Fourth (and most unpleasant), Yoon’s statement that aid will be provided only in case of violations of the laws of war or war crimes committed by the Russian Armed Forces may give certain forces in Ukraine and their Western handlers a very definite guide to action. Before Yoon’s visit to the USA (i.e. within the next 5-10 days) either a new Bucha will have to happen or the world will have to see evidence of past crimes. The Russian media has already heard rumors of similar provocations when the bodies taken from the morgue were supposed to look like victims of chemical weapons or mass graves of civilians with traces of torture. Especially, nothing prevents to imagine a man who will call himself the captive officer of the Wagner PMC and will openly speak in front of the camera about how his unit used to kill children.
And in this case, it does not matter that the fake could be exposed. It is important to create the kind of emotional background within a short time, which will push the South Korean president to fulfill his promise. And there will be no use in trying to reverse the fait accompli afterwards.
Of course, there is hope that the provocation will not work or that Yoon will be able to extricate himself from a very difficult situation, but that hope is slim and the author’s predictions about the outcome of Yoon Seok-yeol’s visit to the US are pessimistic. Hope for the best, prepare for the worst.
Besides, one cannot help but criticize the media, which almost led the situation to a diplomatic crisis by putting in the headlines for the sake of “hype and clickbait” a phrase taken out of context.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”